Modern-Day Judicial  politics : An Analysis Of Federal District Court Decision Making In Contemporary, Politically Divisive Issue Areas by Stepp, Kyla Kristine
Wayne State University
Wayne State University Dissertations
1-1-2016
Modern-Day Judicial "politics": An Analysis Of
Federal District Court Decision Making In
Contemporary, Politically Divisive Issue Areas
Kyla Kristine Stepp
Wayne State University,
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations
Part of the Law Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Wayne State University Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Stepp, Kyla Kristine, "Modern-Day Judicial "politics": An Analysis Of Federal District Court Decision Making In Contemporary,
Politically Divisive Issue Areas" (2016). Wayne State University Dissertations. 1486.
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/1486
MODERN-DAY JUDICIAL “POLITICS”: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 
DECISION MAKING IN CONTEMPORARY, POLITICALLY DIVISIVE ISSUE AREAS 
 by  
KYLA K. STEPP 
 
DISSERTATION 
 Submitted to the Graduate School  of Wayne State University,  Detroit, Michigan  in partial fulfillment of the requirements  for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 2016      MAJOR: POLITICAL SCIENCE  Approved By:  ________________________________________________________  Advisor     Date   ________________________________________________________    ________________________________________________________    ________________________________________________________      
  
              
© COPYRIGHT BY 
KYLA K. STEPP 
2016 
All Rights Reserved   
ii  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 I would like to thank everyone for the various forms of love, support and assistance they gave me during this (long) process. Most importantly, I want to think my amazing kids, Cooper and Bailey, who not only gave me love and support throughout the entire process, but without whom my dissertation, degree, and life would have much less meaning. Thanks to Aaron for always encouraging me and for allowing me to quit one career in favor of a less lucrative, but infinitely less soul-crushing one. Thanks also to all those in my family who gave me time to write or advice or just encouragement along the way, especially Mom, Kim, and Becky, among others.  Dr. Ronald Brown was an invaluable help and an inspiring figure as my dissertation chair and advisor – thank you for all of your help and guidance. Thanks also to Jeff Grynaviski, Ewa Golebiowska, and Wassim Tarraf, my committee members, for their ideas, insights, and improvements to this dissertation. Lastly, I want to thank my friends, officemates, fellow GTAs, and other colleagues for their support over the last few years. Many of you allowed me to bounce ideas off of you and/or to vent about frustrations I faced, allowed me to share my excitement when things went well, and gave me encouragement when I needed it most. This includes many people, but in particular I want to thank Adam Uddin, Kim Saks-McManaway, and Rob Thompson for giving me needed insight into my research, theories, methods, and sometimes into myself as well.   
iii  
TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements _________________________________________________________________________________ ii List of Tables ________________________________________________________________________________________ v List of Figures _____________________________________________________________________________________viii Chapter 1: Introduction ____________________________________________________________________________ 1  Overview of the Literature & Theory _______________________________________________________ 5 
 Research Design & Methodology ___________________________________________________________ 8  Chapter Outline ___________________________________________________________________________ 12  Chapter 2: Literature Review & Theory_________________________________________________________ 14  Judicial Decision Making __________________________________________________________________ 14  District Courts _____________________________________________________________________________ 19  Public Opinion _____________________________________________________________________________ 33  My Study ___________________________________________________________________________________ 41 Chapter 3: Research Design ______________________________________________________________________ 47  Issue Areas _________________________________________________________________________________ 47  Methodology _______________________________________________________________________________ 50  Statistical Analysis ________________________________________________________________________ 75 Chapter 4: Trends in Data and Preliminary Statistics _________________________________________ 76  Gay Rights  _________________________________________________________________________________ 76  Abortion ___________________________________________________________________________________ 84 
 Affirmative Action _________________________________________________________________________ 90  Conclusion  ________________________________________________________________________________ 96 Chapter 5: Regression Analysis __________________________________________________________________ 97 
iv  
 Gay Rights  _________________________________________________________________________________ 99  Abortion  __________________________________________________________________________________ 115  Affirmative Action  _______________________________________________________________________ 118  Conclusions  ______________________________________________________________________________ 128 Chapter 6: Conclusion  __________________________________________________________________________ 131  A “Neutral” Federal Judiciary? __________________________________________________________ 131  Further Avenues of Study  _______________________________________________________________ 135 Appendix A: State-Level Public Opinion  _______________________________________________________ 144 Appendix B: Alternate Strategic Variable Interaction Models  _______________________________ 151 References  _______________________________________________________________________________________ 158   Abstract  __________________________________________________________________________________________ 171 Autobiographical Statement  ___________________________________________________________________ 173 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v  
LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Variables................................................................................................................................................10 Table 2: U.S. District Court Decisions in Gay Rights Cases 1991-2012 ..........................................52 Table 3: U.S. District Court Decisions in Abortion Cases 1991-2012..............................................52 Table 4: U.S. District Court Decisions in Affirmative Action Cases 1991-2012 ..........................52 Table 5: Gay Rights Case Types 1991-2012 ..............................................................................................73 Table 6: Abortion Case Types 1991-2012 .................................................................................................74 Table 7: Affirmative Action Case Types 1991-2012 ..............................................................................74 Table 8: Gay Rights Decisions by Appointing President of Judge 1991-2012 .............................82 Table 9: Gay Rights Decisions by Case Type 1991-2012 .....................................................................84 Table 10: Abortion Decisions by Appointing President of Judge 1991-2012..............................88 Table 11: Abortion Decisions by Case Type 1991-2012 ......................................................................89 Table 12: Affirmative Action Decisions by Appointing President of Judge 1991-2012 ..........94 Table 13: Affirmative Action Decisions by Case Type 1991-2012 ...................................................96 Table 14: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Gay Rights Cases on all Independent Variables, including all Cases from 1991-2012, for both Judicial Ideology Models ................................................................................................................................................ 101  Table 15: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Gay Rights Cases on all  Independent Variables, including only Cases from 1991-2005, for both Judicial  Ideology Models ................................................................................................................................................ 111  Table 16: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Gay Rights Cases on all  Independent Variables, including only Cases from 2006-2012, for both Judicial  Ideology Models ................................................................................................................................................ 112  Table 17: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Abortion Cases on all  Independent Variables, including all Cases from 1991-2012, for both Judicial  Ideology Models ................................................................................................................................................ 115    
vi  
Table 18: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Affirmative Action Cases  on all Independent Variables except State-Level Variables, including all Cases  from 1991-2012, for both Judicial Ideology Models .......................................................................... 119  Table 19: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Affirmative Action Cases  on all Independent Variables, including all Cases from 1991-2012, for both  Judicial Ideology Models ............................................................................................................................... 121  Table 20: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Affirmative Action Cases  on all Independent Variables, using Berry et al.’s Citizen Ideology Measure instead  of State-Level Public Support for Affirmative Action, including all Cases from  1991-2012, for both Judicial Ideology Models ..................................................................................... 123  Table A-1: State-level Public Support for Gay Rights in all States and Washington  D.C. from 1991-2001 ...................................................................................................................................... 145 . Table A-2: State-level Public Support for Gay Rights in all States and Washington  D.C. from 2002-2012 ...................................................................................................................................... 146  Table A-3: State-level Public Support for Abortion Rights in all States and  Washington D.C. from 1991-2001 ............................................................................................................. 147  Table A-4: State-level Public Support for Abortion Rights in all States and  Washington D.C. from 2002-2012 ............................................................................................................. 148  Table A-5: State-level Public Support for Affirmative Action in all States and  Washington D.C. from 1991-2001 ............................................................................................................. 149  Table A-6: State-level Public Support for Affirmative Action in all States and  Washington D.C. from 2002-2012 ............................................................................................................. 150  Table B-1: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Gay Rights Cases on all  Independent Variables, using Judge’s Ideology*Circuit Difference Interaction  Measure instead of Circuit Ideology, including all Cases from 1991-2012, for  both Judicial Ideology Models ..................................................................................................................... 152  Table B-2: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Gay Rights Cases on all  Independent Variables, using Judge’s Ideology*Circuit Difference Interaction  Measure instead of Circuit Ideology, including only Cases from 1991-2005, for  both Judicial Ideology Models ..................................................................................................................... 153  Table B-3: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Gay Rights Cases on all  Independent Variables, using Judge’s Ideology*Circuit Difference Interaction  Measure instead of Circuit Ideology, including only Cases from 2006-2012, for  both Judicial Ideology Models ..................................................................................................................... 154  
vii  
Table B-4: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Abortion Cases on all  Independent Variables, using Judge’s Ideology*Circuit Difference Interaction  Measure instead of Circuit Ideology, including all Cases from 1991-2012, for  both Judicial Ideology Models ..................................................................................................................... 155  Table B-5: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Affirmative Action  Cases on all Independent Variables, using Judge’s Ideology*Circuit Difference  Interaction Measure instead of Circuit Ideology, including all Cases from  1991-2012, for both Judicial Ideology Models ..................................................................................... 156  Table B-6: Logistic Regression Analysis of Decisions in Affirmative Action  Cases on all Independent Variables, using Berry et al.’s Citizen Ideology  Measure instead of State-Level Public Support for Affirmative Action, and  using Judge’s Ideology*Circuit Difference Interaction Measure instead of  Circuit Ideology, including all Cases from 1991-2012, for both Judicial  Ideology Models ................................................................................................................................................ 157     
viii  
LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Distribution of Common Space Scores for all District Court Judges in Data Set......56 Figure 2: State-Level Public Support for Gay Rights over Time in MA, MN & AL,  Compared to the Average Across all 50 States (and DC) from 1991-2012 ..................................77  Figure 3: Frequency of Gay Rights Decisions made by U.S. District Court Judges from  1991-2012 .............................................................................................................................................................79  Figure 4: Percentage of Total Cases Decided in Support of Gay Rights vs. Percentage  of Total Cases Decided in Opposition to Gay Rights Each Year; Column Width  Represents the Total Number of Cases Decided (in Either Direction) Each Year .....................80  Figure 5: Numbers of Decisions in Support of Gay Rights vs. Decisions in  Opposition to Gay Rights, Broken Down by Case Type (Includes all Cases from  1991-2012) ...........................................................................................................................................................83  Figure 6: State-Level Public Support for Abortion over Time in CA, FL & TN,  Compared to the Average Across all 50 States (and DC) from 1991-2012 ..................................85  Figure 7: Frequency of Abortion Decisions made by U.S. District Court Judges from  1991-2012 .............................................................................................................................................................86  Figure 8: Percentage of Total Cases Decided in Support of Abortion Rights vs.  Percentage of Total Cases Decided in Opposition to Abortion Rights Each Year;  Column Width Represents the Total Number of Cases Decided (in Either Direction)  Each Year ................................................................................................................................................................87  Figure 9: Numbers of Decisions in Support of Abortion Rights vs. Decisions in  Opposition to Abortion Rights, Broken Down by Case Type (Includes all Cases  from 1991-2012).................................................................................................................................................89  Figure 10: State-Level Public Support for Affirmative Action over Time in DC,  IL & WY, Compared to the Average Across all 50 States (and DC) from 1991-2012 ................91  Figure 11: Frequency of Affirmative Action Decisions made by U.S. District Court  Judges from 1991-2012 ....................................................................................................................................92  Figure 12: Percentage of Total Cases Decided in Support of Affirmative Action  Policies vs. Percentage of Total Cases Decided in Opposition to Affirmative Action  Policies Each Year; Column Width Represents the Total Number of Cases Decided  (in Either Direction) Each Year .....................................................................................................................93    
ix  
Figure 13: Numbers of Decisions in Support of Affirmative Action Policies vs.  Decisions in Opposition to Affirmative Action Policies, Broken Down by Case  Type (Includes all Cases from 1991-2012) ...............................................................................................95  Figure 14: Predicted Probability of Anti-Gay Rights Decision in U.S. District  Court Cases (1991-2012), by Party of Appointing President, with 95%  Confidence Intervals ....................................................................................................................................... 106  Figure 15: Predicted Probability of Anti-Gay Rights Decision in U.S. District  Court Cases (1991-2012), by Common Space Score of Judge, with 95%  Confidence Intervals ....................................................................................................................................... 108  Figure 16: Predicted Probability of Anti-Gay Rights Decision in U.S. District  Court Cases (1991-2012), by Gender of Judge, with 95% Confidence Intervals..................... 109  Figure 17: Predicted Probability of Anti-Abortion Decision in U.S. District  Court Cases (1991-2012), by Party of Appointing President, with 95%  Confidence Intervals ....................................................................................................................................... 117  Figure 18: Predicted Probability of Anti-Abortion Decision in U.S. District  Court Cases (1991-2012), by Common Space Score of Judge, with 95%  Confidence Intervals ....................................................................................................................................... 118  Figure 19: Predicted Probability of Anti-Affirmative Action Decision in U.S.  District Court Cases (1991-2012), by Berry et al.’s “Citizen Ideology” Measure of  the State Containing the District where the Judge Presides, with 95%  Confidence Intervals ....................................................................................................................................... 125  Figure 20: Predicted Probability of Anti-Affirmative Action Decision in U.S.  District Court Cases (1991-2012), by Party of Appointing President, with 95%  Confidence Intervals ....................................................................................................................................... 126  Figure 21: Predicted Probability of Anti-Affirmative Action Decision in U.S.  District Court Cases (1991-2012), by Common Space Score of Judge, with 95%  Confidence Intervals ....................................................................................................................................... 127         
1	
 
	
 
CHAPTER	1	–	INTRODUCTION	
	
On	March	21,	 2014,	U.S.	District	 Judge	Bernard	Friedman	 struck	down	Michigan’s	
constitutional	 amendment	 banning	 gay	marriage	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution’s	
14th	 Amendment	 Equal	 Protection	 Clause1.	 Judge	 Friedman	 is	 known	 as	 a	 relatively	
conservative	 judge,	 as	 he	 was	 appointed	 to	 the	 bench	 by	 Ronald	 Reagan,	 and	 has	
consistently	 ruled	 in	 a	 conservative	direction	over	 the	 last	25	years.	He	was	 the	original	
judge	 to	 strike	 down	 the	 University	 of	 Michigan	 Law	 School’s	 Affirmative	 Action	 policy	
before	that	decision	was	ultimately	reversed	by	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court.	Thus,	some	in	the	
legal	and	political	science	communities	were	surprised	when	Judge	Friedman	released	his	
31‐page,	 strongly	 worded	 ruling	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 “liberal”	 policy	 position	 –	 gay	 marriage.	
Speculation	 among	 legal	 scholars	 began	 immediately:	 Why	 did	 this	 judge	 make	 this	
particular	 decision?	 Are	 there	 significant	 influences	 beyond	 simple	 ideology	 that	 shape	
judicial	decision	making?			
Brian	Dickerson,	a	columnist	for	the	Detroit	Free	Press,	tells	an	interesting	story	of	
Judge	Friedman’s	enduring	friendship	with	a	former	law	clerk	and	her	family2.	Judith	Levy	
(now	a	U.S.	District	Judge	herself,	as	of	March	18,	2014)	is	a	lesbian	who	was	always	open	
about	her	sexuality,	even	back	in	1995	when	she	started	clerking	for	Judge	Friedman.	She	
worked	for	him	for	several	years	and	through	two	pregnancies,	during	which	time	she	and	
the	 judge	 became	 close.	 They	 have	 stayed	 in	 touch	 over	 the	 years	 and	 maintained	 a	
professional	 relationship	 as	 well	 as	 a	 close	 friendship.	 In	 fact,	 Judith	 Levy’s	 15‐year	 old	
twin	daughters	were	 in	 the	 courtroom	during	oral	 arguments	 for	 the	 gay	marriage	 case,	
                                                            
1	DeBoer	v.	Snyder	(2014).	
2	Dickerson,	Brian.	March	23,	2014.	“What	Judge	Friedman	Learned	About	Gay	Families	from	a	Lesbian	Law	Clerk”.	The	
Detroit	 Free	 Press.	 Retrieved	 from	 http://www.freep.com/article/20140323/COL04/303230067/judge‐bernard‐
friedman‐gay‐marriage‐michigan	
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after	which	they	had	lunch	with	Judge	Friedman	in	his	chambers.	Mr.	Dickerson	posits	that	
Judge	Friedman’s	longtime	friendship	with	a	lesbian,	her	partner,	and	their	three	children	
helped	 shape	 the	 way	 he	 looks	 at	 gay	 marriage	 and	 the	 issues	 involved	 in	 the	 case,	
including	 whether	 children	 are	 “harmed”	 when	 raised	 by	 a	 same‐sex	 couple.	 It	 is	 also	
possible	 that	 Judge	 Friedman	 is	 aware	 of	 and	 considered	 the	 shift	 in	 public	 opinion	
regarding	 gay	marriage,	 especially	 in	Michigan,	 since	 the	 constitutional	 amendment	was	
passed	via	voter	referendum	in	2004.			
While	 we	may	 never	 know	 exactly	 what	 was	 in	 Judge	 Friedman’s	 head	 when	 he	
made	 his	 ruling,	 this	 case	 helps	 illustrate	 why	 we	 care	 about	 his	 (and	 other	 judges’)	
decision	 making	 processes.	 Most	 importantly,	 the	 courts	 are	 central	 policy‐making	
institutions.	 Legislatures	 and	 executive	 agencies	 are	 tasked	 with	 creating	 and	
implementing	 laws	 and	 policies,	 but	 courts	 often	 have	 (and	 exercise)	 the	 “final	 say”	 on	
most	 policy	 issues.	 Nary	 has	 an	 important	 constitutional	 issue	 arisen	 in	 the	 past	 50‐60	
years	 that	 the	 federal	 courts	 have	 not	 tackled.	 This	 has	 been	 especially	 true	 in	 recent	
decades	as	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court,	as	well	as	lower	federal	courts,	have	become	more	and	
more	active	 in	accepting	political	and	otherwise	salient	cases	to	hear.	With	each	decision	
interpreting	a	statute,	regulation,	or	constitutional	provision,	judges	shape	the	meaning	of	
the	law.	It	is	the	responsibility	of	the	judiciary	to	interpret	the	meaning	of	new	laws	and	to	
apply	 them	 to	 case‐specific	 facts	 as	part	 of	 the	 adversarial	 process.	 Further,	 courts	must	
determine	 if	 statutes,	 regulations	 or	 state	 constitutional	 provisions	 are	 at	 odds	with	 our	
nation’s	constitution.		
A	large	and	increasing	ideological	divide	between	the	two	major	political	parties	in	
the	 United	 States	 has	 accompanied	 increasingly	 partisan	 behavior	 from	 public	 officials.		
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Whether	 this	 partisan	 behavior	 extends	 to	 members	 of	 the	 judiciary	 –	 the	 so‐called	
“apolitical”	 and	 “neutral”	 branch	 of	 government	 –	 is	 an	 important	 question	 to	 consider.		
Judges	are	typically	members	of,	or	at	 least	 identify	with,	one	of	 the	political	parties,	and	
are	 certainly	human	beings	with	 fully	 formed	opinions,	 values,	 and	policy	preferences	of	
their	 own.	 Scholars	 long	 ago	 abandoned	 the	 idea	 that	 legal	 considerations	 are	 the	 only	
factors	that	influence	judicial	decision	making.	Ideology,	public	opinion,	demographics,	and	
political	considerations	have	all	been	found	to	influence	certain	types	of	 judges	in	certain	
types	 of	 cases.	 Trying	 to	 understand	 these	 extralegal	 factors	 and	 the	 role	 they	 play	 in	
decision	making	is	important	if	we	want	to	understand	why	judges	make	the	decisions	they	
make	and	what	it	means	for	this	“neutral”	branch	of	government.	
This	 large	 ideological	 divide	 has	 also	 resulted	 in	 increasingly	 polarized	 and	
mobilized	 issue‐publics.	 Controversial	 topics	 such	 as	 gay	 marriage,	 gun	 control,	 and	
contraceptive	 coverage	 have	 politically	 polarized	 the	mass	 public	 as	 well	 as	 elites.	 	 The	
debates	 over	 these	 issues	have	 in	 turn	mobilized	 supporters	 and	opponents	 to	 file	 court	
cases	challenging	these	and	other	highly	politically	charged	policies.	Many	scholars	argue	
that	as	one	branch	of	our	democratic	system,	courts	should	not	act	as	countermajoritarian	
institutions.	 As	 public	 opinion	 on	 an	 important	 or	 controversial	 issue	 changes,	 courts	
should	 not	 stand	 in	 the	way	 of	 the	 law	 changing	with	 it.	 One	 only	 needs	 to	 look	 at	 the	
Supreme	 Court’s	 decisions	 in	 Plessy	 v.	 Ferguson	 in	 1896	 and	 then	 Brown	 v.	 Board	 of	
Education	almost	60	years	later	to	understand	the	role	that	courts	play	in	our	system	and	
the	 role	 that	 societal	 values	play	 in	 constitutional	 interpretation.	The	 federal	 judiciary	 is	
currently	operating	in	more	partisan	and	thus	conflicting	political	environments,	perhaps	
as	a	result	of	the	mobilization	of	groups	that	are	opposed	to	“old	majority”	preferences.	
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Thus,	 ideology	 and	 public	 opinion	 are	 two	 potentially	 important	 influences	 on	
judicial	 decision	 making,	 especially	 in	 cases	 involving	 important	 and	 controversial	
constitutional	issues.	My	dissertation	will	examine	the	impact	of	these	and	other	factors	on	
the	decision	making	processes	of	U.S.	District	Court	 judges.	Little	has	been	written	about	
District	Court	 judges	as	opposed	to	the	 large	body	of	research	on	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	
and	 Circuit	 Courts	 of	 Appeals.	 However,	 a	 trend	 has	 emerged	 recently	 among	 political	
scientists	 in	 which	 we	 see	 scholars	 turning	 to	 the	 lower	 courts	 to	 further	 enhance	 our	
understanding	of	judicial	decision	making.	The	Michigan	gay	marriage	case	helps	illustrate	
the	importance	of	U.S.	District	Courts	in	our	legal	and	political	systems	and	how	even	the	
lowest	 level	 of	 the	 federal	 judiciary	 can	 create	 sweeping	policy	 change	 and	 substantially	
impact	the	law	and	policy	of	a	state.	Consequently,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	factors	
that	 influence	 district	 court	 judges’	 decision	making,	 including	 both	 legal	 and	 extralegal	
factors.	
At	 the	 district	 court	 level,	 the	 role	 of	 ideology	 has	 been	 studied	 relatively	
infrequently,	and	the	role	of	public	opinion	not	at	all,	despite	the	fact	that	public	opinion	is	
a	very	important	aspect	of	both	our	political	system	and	judiciary	–	the	public	participates	
in	 the	 system	 through	 elections,	 and	 even	 appointed	 judges	 are	 subject	 to	 a	 political	
process.	Public	opinion	may	also	directly	 impact	 judges’	decisions.	The	possible	effects	of	
public	opinion	on	district	courts,	and	the	value	of	studying	such	effects,	have	been	pointed	
out	by	multiple	scholars	studying	the	federal	judiciary.	Thus,	for	the	reasons	stated	above,	
understanding	 the	 behavior	 of	 our	 nation’s	 judicial	 branch	 is	 important,	 and	 examining	
various	influences	on	judges	helps	us	to	understand	judicial	behavior	beyond	simply	legal	
factors.	 Further,	 a	 comprehensive	 examination	 of	 U.S.	 District	 Courts	 will	 add	 to	 this	
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understanding	overall	and	help	to	illuminate	the	primary	influences	on	the	largest	level	of	
federal	judiciary.	
Overview	of	the	Literature	&	Theory	
Scholars	 have	 spent	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 time	 studying	why	 judges	make	 the	 decisions	
they	make.	 In	Chapter	2,	 I	will	summarize	the	vast	 literature	on	 judicial	decision	making,	
including	 the	effects	of	 legal	 factors,	 judicial	 ideology,	 strategy,	 and	public	opinion.	 I	will	
also	thoroughly	examine	the	research	to	date	on	federal	district	courts	in	order	to	describe	
and	 analyze	 the	 gaps	 in	 this	 literature.	 Perhaps	 the	 biggest	 gap	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 that	
although	studies	have	mentioned	the	 importance	of	other	extralegal	 factors,	 they	are	not	
often	tested.	Several	studies	that	I	found	postulated	that	regional	public	opinion	may	play	a	
role	in	district	court	decision	making.	As	I	discuss	below,	judicial	scholars	have	found	some	
influence	of	public	opinion	on	the	Supreme	Court,	both	direct	and	indirect,	and	there	is	a	
good	 amount	 of	 literature	 on	 the	 Court	 as	 a	 (possible)	 countermajoritarian	 institution.	 I	
believe	that	public	opinion	has	the	potential	to	play	an	even	larger	role	at	the	district	court	
level	 for	 several	 reasons	 –	 district	 court	 judges	 are	 typically	 local;	 they	 have	 lived	 and	
practiced	 in	 the	 district,	 or	 at	 least	 the	 state,	 for	 their	 entire	 careers.	 They	 frequently	
socialize	with	other	elites	 in	the	area,	 including	mayors,	commissioners,	and	other	public	
officials	and	are	often	politically	active.	They	are	presumably	aware	of	the	opinion	among	
both	the	mass	public	and	elites	in	their	states,	at	least	in	regard	to	salient	and	controversial	
issues.	 Additionally,	 they	 are	 single	 judges	 making	 decisions,	 so	 their	 behavior	 is	 not	
mitigated	 by	 potential	 panel	 effects.	 Examining	 the	 role	 of	 local	 public	 opinion	 on	 local	
courts	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 democracy	 at	 this	 level,	 as	 policymaking	 and	
implementation	at	the	level	closest	to	the	people	is	the	heart	and	soul	of	a	republican	form	
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of	 democracy.	 This	 is	 an	 especially	 critical	 topic	 lately,	 as	 increased	 policy	 diffusion	 has	
required	 state	 or	 local	 units	 of	 government	 to	 implement	 many	 federal	 policies	 and	
programs,	often	without	sufficient	federal	dollars	to	do	so.	
Another	 problem	 encountered	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 that	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 these	
studies	use	party	of	the	appointing	president	as	their	measure	of	ideology.	While	this	has	
been	 consistently	 seen	 as	 a	 valid	 enough	 measure,	 the	 more	 recent	 development	 and	
application	of	Keith	Poole’s	Common	Space	 scores	 to	 federal	 judges	has	 given	us	 a	more	
accurate,	while	still	imperfect,	measure	of	ideology.	Several	scholars,	most	notably	Epstein	
and	colleagues	(2007),	have	shown	that	Common	Space	scores	are	generally	more	reliable	
and	 accurate	 measures	 of	 judicial	 ideology	 than	 simply	 using	 party	 of	 the	 appointing	
president.		I	describe	Common	Space	scores	and	what	they	represent	more	fully	in	Chapter	
3.		
A	 third	 gap	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 studies	 surrounding	 key	 contemporary	
constitutional	 issues.	Political	officials,	and	to	some	extent,	our	society,	has	become	more	
polarized	in	recent	years,	especially	surrounding	certain	types	of	issues.	I	want	to	capture	
the	 impact	 of	 judges’	 personal	 policy	 preferences	 on	 (as	well	 as	 the	 impact	 of	 the	mass	
public’s	 policy	 preferences)	 on	 decisions	 in	 these	 highly	 ideological	 and	 polarizing	 issue	
areas.	For	this	reason,	among	other	reasons	that	I	detail	below,	I	chose	gay	rights,	abortion,	
and	affirmative	action	as	my	issue	areas.	
A	 final	 piece	 of	 the	 puzzle	 largely	 missing	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 the	 practical	
implication	of	extralegal	factors’	influence	on	judges.	Legal	scholars	and	practitioners	likely	
want	to	know	not	only	which	variables	affect	decision	making,	but	how	much	they	affect	it.	
An	 individual	 or	 group	 filing	 a	 gay	 rights	 case	 in	 district	 court	may	wish	 to	 understand	
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whether	judicial	ideology	and	other	variables	are	significant	predictors	of	judicial	behavior,	
but	they	will	be	much	more	interested	in	just	how	likely	they	are	to	succeed	when	assigned	
a	Republican‐appointed	judge	versus	a	Democrat‐appointed	judge,	or	a	female	judge	versus	
a	male	 judge.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 determine	 the	 implications	 for	 our	 legal	
system	overall	as	well	as	for	the	parties	involved	in	litigation	in	the	district	courts.		
In	 an	 effort	 to	 address	 these	 significant	 questions	 and	 gaps,	 my	 primary	
contribution	to	the	decision	making	literature	will	consist	of	an	analysis	of	both	individual	
judicial	 ideology	 and	 state‐level	 public	 opinion	 as	 possible	 determinants	 of	 judicial	
behavior	at	the	district	court	level.	To	my	knowledge,	these	two	variables	have	rarely	been	
studied	together	at	the	district	court	level,	where	each	has	the	potential	to	play	a	significant	
role	 in	 the	 lower	 courts’	 decision	 making	 process.	 I	 will	 do	 so	 using	 the	 most	 recent	
developments	 in	 measures	 of	 ideology	 and	 state‐level	 public	 opinion,	 and	 will	 examine	
cases	involving	contemporary,	salient	constitutional	issues	over	a	substantial	time	period,	
including	very	recent	decisions.		
	My	primary	research	questions	center	on	these	two	variables	but	also	examine	the	
effect	 of	 other	 potential	 explanatory	 variables.	 I	 begin	with	 a	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	
which	factors	significantly	impact	federal	district	court	judges’	decision	making.	What	kind	
of	 role	 does	 ideology	 play	 at	 the	 district	 court	 level,	 compared	 to	 the	 substantial	 role	 it	
often	plays	at	the	Supreme	Court	and	Circuit	Courts	of	Appeal	levels?		To	what	extent	does	
local	 public	 opinion	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 decision	 making	 process,	 and	 does	 it	
mitigate	the	role	of	judicial	ideology?	Consistent	with	findings	by	other	scholars	regarding	
the	impact	of	judicial	ideology	on	decision	making,	I	hypothesize	that	conservative	judicial	
ideology	 will	 be	 positively	 and	 significantly	 correlated	 with	 conservative	 outcomes	 in	
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district	 court	 cases	 involving	gay	 rights,	 abortion,	 and	affirmative	action	 issues	 (and	vice	
versa).	Beyond	this	initial	hypothesis,	my	analysis	is	largely	exploratory.	I	am	interested	in	
the	 greater	 theoretical	 question	 about	 the	 behavior	 of	 judges,	 and	 will	 use	 empirical	
evidence	to	help	answer	this	question	in	regard	to	important	contemporary	constitutional	
issues.	
Research	Design	&	Methodology	
As	described	above,	I	will	examine	the	impact	of	various	factors,	most	 importantly	
ideology	and	public	opinion,	on	the	decision	making	processes	of	U.S.	District	Court	judges.	
In	 order	 to	 differentiate	 between	 these	 potential	 factors,	 I	 will	 examine	 cases	 regarding	
three	constitutional	and	highly	salient	issues	–gay	rights,	abortion,	and	affirmative	action.	
All	 of	 these	 topics	 can	 be	 framed	 as	 civil	 rights/equal	 protection	 issues	 (additionally,	
abortion	and	gay	rights	are	also	civil	liberties	issues).	For	each	of	them,	there	is	consistent	
survey	 data	 over	 the	 last	 couple	 of	 decades,	 plenty	 of	 district	 court	 cases,	 and	 a	 clear	
ideological	divide	between	 conservatives	 and	 liberals.	Additionally,	 I	 think	 they	 compare	
well	 to	 one	 another,	 as	 they	 are	 all	 issues	 that	 have	 been	 significant	 for	 the	 last	 few	
decades,	 each	 deals	 with	 a	 different	 "protected"	 or	 disadvantaged	 group	 (women,	 LGBT	
individuals,	and	African	Americans),	all	have	been	a	huge	source	of	"elite"	debate,	and	they	
have	 varying	 public	 opinion	 trends	 (opinion	 on	 abortion	 has	 remained	 relatively	 stable,	
support	 for	 affirmative	 action	 has	 trended	 downward,	 and	 support	 for	 gay	 rights	 has	
trended	upward).	
	 	For	each	issue,	I	will	analyze	every	District	Court	decision	nationwide	in	these	issue	
areas	(gay	rights,	abortion,	and	affirmative	action)	over	a	22‐year	time	period	(1991‐2012).	
The	decision	in	each	case	will	be	the	dependent	variable	(pro‐gay	rights	vs.	anti‐gay	rights,	
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etc.).	Using	multivariate	logistic	regression,	I	can	determine	which	factors	are	significantly	
associated	with	case	outcomes.	The	primary	independent	variables	will	be	the	ideology	of	
individual	judges	(measured	both	by	Common	Space	scores	and	by	party	of	the	appointing	
president)	and	state‐level	public	opinion	on	the	three	issue	areas.		
Since	each	federal	district	sits	within	a	state's	boundaries	(and	often	cover	an	entire	
state),	 I	 will	 use	 the	 public	 opinion	 within	 the	 state	 where	 the	 judge	 sits	 as	 my	 public	
opinion	 variable.	 This	 will	 make	 my	 dissertation	 unique	 as	 studies	 on	 public	 opinion	
usually	look	at	national	data,	instead	of	more	difficult	to	obtain	state‐level	data.	To	obtain	
enough	 public	 polling	 data	 at	 the	 state	 level	 for	 (theoretically)	 every	 state	 for	 multiple	
years	 will	 require	 one	 of	 two	 approaches	 that	 have	 been	 developed	 in	 the	 literature:	
disaggregation	by	state	of	national	surveys,	or	multilevel	regression	and	post	stratification	
(MRP),	 a	 recently	 developed	 sophisticated	 modeling	 method.	 Both	 approaches	 are	
considered	 valid	 and	 each	 has	 its	 own	 benefits	 and	 drawbacks.	 Disaggregation	 is	
straightforward	but	requires	a	 large	number	of	national	 survey	responses	 (for	which	 the	
same	 or	 similar	 questions	 must	 have	 been	 asked).	 MRP	 is	 relatively	 sophisticated	 but	
requires	many	fewer	survey	responses,	and	it	has	been	found	to	be	more	accurate	overall	
than	disaggregation	(Lax	and	Phillips	2009).	As	described	more	fully	in	Chapter	3,	I	chose	
to	utilize	the	MRP	method	to	obtain	the	most	accurate	measurements	of	state‐level	opinion	
possible,	and	will	generate	this	opinion	over	time	in	order	to	examine	the	dynamic	nature	
of	such	opinion	in	the	states	and	its	relationship	with	case	outcomes.	
Other	 than	 my	 primary	 independent	 variables,	 I	 will	 include	 several	 additional	
independent	and	control	variables.	These	will	 include	individual‐level	variables	about	the	
judges	 themselves	 (gender,	 race,	 religion),	 regional	 location	 of	 the	 court	 (south	 vs.	 non‐
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south),	 state	 culture	 (based	 on	 Elazar’s	 typology),	 legal	 factors,	 case‐level	 variables,	 and	
strategy	(ideology	of	the	reviewing	circuit	court;	difference	between	circuit	court	ideology	
and	judge’s	ideology).	In	addition	to	their	use	as	control	variables,	I	am	also	interested	in	
the	independent	and	combined	effect	of	these	variables	on	decision	making	in	these	issue	
areas.	I	have	listed	my	dependent	and	independent	variables	in	the	table	below.	
	
Table	1	
Variables	
	
Independent	Variables	 How	Measured
Judge’s	Ideology	 1.	Common	Space	Score
	 2.	Party	of	Appointing	President
State	Public	Opinion	 1.	Level	of	support	for	issue	(gay	rights,	abortion,	
affirmative	action)	
	 2.	EWM’s	measure	of	State	Liberalism	(alternate	measure)
	 3.	Berry’s	measure	of	Citizen Ideology	(alternate	measure)
Judge’s	Gender	 Male	or	Female
Judge’s	Race	 White	or	Non‐white
Judge’s	Religion	 Catholic,	Mainline	Protestant,	Other	Christian,	Jewish,	or	No	
Affiliation/Refuses	to	Answer	
Region	 South	or	Non‐South
State	Culture	 Elazar’s	Typology
State	Culture*State	Opinion	 Interaction	Variable
Circuit	Ideology	 1.	Party	of	Appointing	President	of	Majority	
	 2.	Median	Common	Space	Score	of	the	Circuit	
Circuit	Difference	 1.	Judge’s	Party	of	Appt.	Pres.	matches	that	of	Circuit	or	Not
	 2.	Judge’s	CS	Score	– Median	CS	Score	of	Circuit	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Diff.	 Interaction	Variable (alternate	measure)
Case	Type	 Major	issue	presented
Remanded	Case	 Yes	or	No
Decision	on	Facts	or	Law	 Facts	or	Law	or	Mixed
	 	
Dependent	Variable	 	
Case	Outcome	 Binary	– either	in	support	of	or	opposition	to	issue	
	
My	research	design	 faces	several	 limitations.	First,	since	I	am	looking	at	 just	 three	
issue	areas,	the	findings	will	not	be	as	generalizable	to	district	court	decision	making	as	the	
studies	 that	 examine	 every	 district	 court	 decision	 in	 every	 issue	 area.	 However,	 by	
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choosing	politically	charged	and	salient	constitutional	issues	involving	civil	liberties	or	civil	
rights,	 I	 believe	 that	 the	 results	 will	 not	 be	 “watered	 down”	 by	 cases	 involving	 every	
possible	 litigable	 issue	 covering	multiple	 political	 periods.	 The	 results	will	 also	 be	more	
generalizable	than	the	majority	of	district	court	studies	that	examine	only	one	issue	area.		
The	second	major	 limitation	of	my	design	 is	 the	difficulty	 in	assessing	causation.	 I	
may	 find	a	 correlation	between	one	or	more	variables	and	case	outcomes,	however,	 it	 is	
impossible	 to	 rule	out	all	 other	alternative	explanatory	variables,	 especially	 legal	 factors.	
However,	 this	 is	a	widely	recognized	problem	with	any	study	of	 judicial	decision	making,	
and	the	accepted	answer	in	the	literature	is	to	 look	for	and	analyze	associations	between	
variables;	a	conclusion	that	one	or	more	variables	actually	caused	an	outcome	in	a	case	is	
unnecessary.		
A	third	major	limitation	is	the	use	of	state‐level	public	opinion	data	for	districts	that	
compose	 only	 a	 portion	 of	 a	 state.	 Approximately	 half	 of	 the	 states	 have	more	 than	 one	
district	court.	The	public	opinion	of	a	state	(as	measured	by	polls)	may	not	be	the	same	as	
the	public	opinion	of	a	district	that	covers	only	half	of	a	state.	However,	there	is	no	way	to	
disaggregate	 the	 data	 along	 district	 court	 lines.	 Further,	 while	 district	 court	 judges	
normally	come	from	the	same	state	where	they	sit	as	judges,	they	may	not	be	from	within	
that	 district’s	 boundaries.	 They	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 statewide	 opinion	 on	
these	 types	 of	 issues,	 as	 statewide	 polling	 numbers	 are	 typically	 the	 ones	 released.	
Therefore,	any	consideration	of	public	opinion	by	a	judge	when	making	a	decision	may	very	
well	 take	 into	 account	 state	 public	 opinion	 regardless	 of	 whether	 his	 or	 her	 district	
comprises	only	a	portion	of	that	state.	
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Chapter	Outline	
	 The	remainder	of	the	chapters	will	unfold	as	follows:	Chapter	2	provides	an	in‐depth	
literature	review	of	each	topic	of	interest	and	each	body	of	literature	I	pull	from,	including	
judicial	decision	making	generally,	decision	making	in	district	courts	and	the	role	of	public	
opinion	in	the	judiciary.	Chapter	2	also	sets	forth	my	theory,	hypotheses,	and	how	I	expect	
to	contribute	to	 the	 judicial	decision	making	 literature.	Chapter	3	details	my	methods	 for	
answering	 my	 research	 questions	 and	 testing	 my	 hypotheses.	 It	 sets	 forth	 my	 research	
design,	including	my	choice	of	issue	areas,	collection	of	data,	variables	included	in	the	data	
set,	statistical	methods,	and	descriptions	of	the	compiled	data.	
	 My	 empirical	 findings	 and	 analysis	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5.	 Chapter	 4	
provides	 rich	 descriptive	 analysis	 of	 the	 data	 itself	 to	 help	 readers	 get	 a	 handle	 on	 the	
variables,	what	 they	mean,	 and	how	 trends	 over	 time	may	 impact	 the	 results.	 Chapter	 4	
also	 includes	 some	 preliminary	 basic	 statistical	 analyses	 of	 the	 data	 before	 turning	 to	
multivariate	regression	analysis	in	Chapter	5.	Chapter	5	describes	the	findings	for	each	of	
the	 issue	 areas	 and	 explains	 in	 detail	 the	 different	 models	 and	 analyses	 I	 ran	 and	 the	
conclusions	to	be	drawn	from	each	model.	I	also	compare	and	contrast	the	results	from	the	
three	 different	 issue	 areas	 and	 their	 implications	 in	 these	 types	 of	 cases.	 Perhaps	 most	
importantly,	Chapter	5	demonstrates	the	substantive	impact	of	significant	factors	on	case	
outcomes.	 This	 information	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 the	 most	 useful	 for	 legal	 scholars	 and	
practitioners,	and	helps	my	study	to	span	the	legal	and	social	science	disciplines.	
	 Chapter	6	concludes	with	a	discussion	of	the	important	findings,	the	implications	for	
our	 legal	 and	 political	 systems,	 especially	 whether	 the	 judicial	 truly	 behaves	 as	 an	
“apolitical”	institution,	and	how	this	analysis	can	guide	scholars	as	they	look	to	the	future	of	
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decision	 making	 in	 salient	 and	 politically	 charged	 cases.	 I	 also	 point	 out	 the	 additional	
questions	 raised	by	 this	 study	 and	how	 future	 research	building	 on	 these	 findings	 could	
potentially	further	our	knowledge	of	district	court	decision	making	even	more.		
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CHAPTER	2	–	LITERATURE	REVIEW	&	THEORY	
	
	 Before	embarking	on	my	own	study	of	 judicial	decision	making	 in	 the	U.S.	District	
Court,	 it	 is	 important	to	establish	what	 the	 literature	to	date	says	about	 these	courts	and	
the	 potential	 influence	 of	 judicial	 ideology	 and/or	 public	 opinion	 on	 judicial	 decision	
making.	I	can	then	identify	the	gaps	in	this	literature	and	describe	the	theoretical	bases	for	
my	research	questions,	including	how	my	results	and	analysis	will	complement	the	existing	
literature	 on	 judicial	 decision	making.	 I	 address	 all	 of	 these	 questions	 in	 this	 chapter.	 I	
begin	by	briefly	describing	 the	 three	models	of	 judicial	 decision	making	and	 the	 seminal	
studies	on	each.	Secondly,	I	discuss	the	increasingly	important	policymaking	role	of	district	
courts	 in	 our	 legal	 and	 political	 systems	 and	 explain	why	 scholars	 have	 recently	 turned	
their	attention	to	these	district	courts	as	the	next	wave	of	research	in	judicial	politics.	Next	
I	 analyze	 the	 studies	 that	 have	 been	 conducted	 on	 district	 courts	 and	 their	 conclusions	
regarding	 the	 impact	 of	 ideology	 and	 strategic	 factors	 on	 judicial	 behavior	 at	 this	 level.	
Throughout,	I	point	out	what	the	existing	literature	is	missing	and	why	filling	those	gaps	is	
critical	 to	a	 comprehensive	understanding	of	 judicial	decision	making.	Next	 I	 explore	 the	
literature	on	public	opinion	and	 its	 crucial	 role	 in	 shaping	public	policy	 generally	 and	 in	
shaping	 court	 decisions	 specifically,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 bases	 for	 my	 assertion	 that	 public	
opinion	likely	has	a	greater	impact	on	district	courts	than	on	the	Supreme	Court.	Lastly,	I	
set	forth	my	theory	and	explain	why	and	how	I	will	contribute	to	the	literature	in	this	area	
and	further	scholars’	knowledge	of	why	judges	behave	the	way	they	do.	
Judicial	Decision	Making	
“[I]t	 is	 probably	 true	 to	 say	 that	 judges	 correspond	 with,	 more	 than	 they	
differ	from,	people”	(March	1956,	534).		
	
15	
 
	
 
Over	the	last	century,	scholars	have	spent	a	great	deal	of	time	and	energy	studying	
the	 courts,	 and	 judges	 in	particular,	 because	of	 their	 important	position	 in	 our	 legal	 and	
political	systems.	Any	attempt	to	understand	the	behavior	of	judges	is	particularly	thorny	
compared	 to	 other	 political	 environments,	 as	 judges	 have	 complex	 pressures	 and	
influences	on	them	from	several	different	directions.	James	Gibson	succinctly	summarized	
this	complexity	in	his	famous	remark	“judges’	decisions	are	a	function	of	what	they	prefer	
to	do,	tempered	by	what	they	think	they	ought	to	do,	but	constrained	by	what	they	perceive	
it	 feasible	 to	 do”	 (1983,	 9).	 In	 this	 section	 I	 very	 briefly	 describe	 the	models	 of	 judicial	
decision	making	and	touch	on	the	large	body	of	scholarship	that	exists	on	this	general	topic	
before	turning	to	the	literature	on	district	courts	specifically.	
The	 original	 explanatory	 theory	 of	 judicial	 decision	 making	 is	 the	 legal	 model.	 It	
holds	that	case	outcomes	are	primarily	determined	by	legal	doctrine,	including	precedent,	
plain	meaning,	and	the	framers’	intent.	The	legal	model	still	has	many	strong	proponents,	
including	 the	prominent	 legal	 theorist	and	scholar	Ronald	Dworkin.	He	asserts	 that	stare	
decisis	plays	a	vital	role	in	judicial	decision	making	and	argues	that	judges	ignore	their	own	
personal	beliefs	in	order	to	follow	existing	law	and	adhere	to	legal	history	(Dworkin	1988).		
In	 addition,	 when	 discussing	 the	 issue	 of	 decision	 making,	 Supreme	 Court	 justices	 and	
lower	court	judges	almost	always	speak	out	in	favor	of	the	legal	model	and	the	important	
role	of	precedent.	 In	fact,	adherence	to	precedent	is	the	primary	justification	provided	by	
justices	for	the	decisions	they	reach	(Segal	and	Spaeth	1996).	
The	 legal	model	 has	 been	 attacked	over	 the	 last	 50	 years,	most	 commonly	 by	 the	
political	science	community,	as	outdated	and	naïve.	Greg	Caldeira,	for	example,	can	think	of	
“no	political	scientists	who	would	take	plain	meaning,	intent	of	the	framers,	and	precedent	
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as	good	explanations	of	what	 the	 justices	do	 in	making	decisions”	(1994,	485).	He	claims	
that	 the	 legal	 model	 is	 a	 “silly	 formalism”	 that	 “no	 one	 who	 has	 taken	 introduction	 to	
American	 government	 or	 read	 Marbury	 v.	 Madison	 or	 witnessed	 the	 fights	 over	
nominations	to	the	Court	during	the	Reagan	and	Bush	years	is	going	to	ascribe	to”	(1994,	
485).	However,	 prior	 to	 the	mid‐1990s,	 the	 attacks	 on	 the	 legal	model	 had	 been	 lacking	
systematic	empirical	evidence	 showing	 that	 legal	 factors	do	not	play	a	 significant	part	 in	
Supreme	Court	decision	making.		
A	 new	wave	 of	 scholarship	 began	 in	 1993	with	 Jeffrey	 Segal	 and	Harold	 Spaeth’s	
groundbreaking	book,	The	Supreme	Court	and	the	Attitudinal	Model,	which	clearly	laid	out	
the	attitudinal	model	 and	provided	 strong	empirical	 evidence	of	 its	value	as	 the	primary	
explanation	for	judicial	behavior.	They	presented	systematic	evidence	on	various	processes	
within	the	Court,	including	staffing,	gatekeeping,	decisions	on	the	merits,	and	distribution	
of	 opinion	 assignments.	 By	 focusing	 on	 so	 many	 institutional	 features	 of	 the	 Court,	 the	
authors	were	able	to	show	how	ideology	plays	a	substantial	role	from	the	very	beginning	of	
the	process	through	the	decision	itself.	They	presented	strong	evidence	of	the	importance	
of	 ideology	 to	 decision	 making	 in	 each	 of	 these	 areas,	 thereby	 setting	 forth	 a	 more	
comprehensive	analysis	of,	and	support	for,	the	attitudinal	model	than	had	been	attempted	
before.	They	provided	a	blunt	view	of	 judicial	decision	making	 that	did	not	allow	 for	 the	
possibility	of	legal	or	other	outside	factors	to	play	any	role.		
A	flurry	of	new	studies	immediately	followed,	reigniting	a	long‐dormant	debate	over	
the	influence	of	legal	factors	versus	policy	preferences	on	judges.	Some	of	the	criticism	of	
the	 attitudinal	 model	 stems	 from	 perceived	 limitations	 on	 it.	 For	 example,	 Unah	 and	
Hancock	(2006)	found	that	the	attitudinal	model	is	highly	sensitive	to	case	salience	and	is	a	
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strong	explanatory	vehicle	 for	high	salience	cases	only.	Other	 scholars	have	disputed	 the	
claim	 that	 the	 legal	model	 is	 completely	dead,	and	purport	 that	 it	has	an	 impact,	 albeit	a	
complicated	 and	 difficult	 one	 to	 prove	 (e.g.,	 Brisbin	 1996; Songer	 and	 Lindquist	 1996).	
Many	 legal	 practitioners	 believe	 that	 the	 attitudinal	model	 (called	 “legal	 realism”	within	
legal	academy)	is	incomplete	when	it	does	not	take	into	account	legal	factors	(e.g.,	George	
and	Epstein	1992;	Dworkin	1988).		
The	third	model	of	Supreme	Court	decision	making,	the	strategic	model	(also	called	
the	 rational	 choice	 model),	 is	 actually	 an	 expansion	 and	 modification	 of	 the	 attitudinal	
model.	It	holds	that	justices	do	indeed	vote	in	a	way	to	maximize	their	preferences,	but	that	
does	 not	 always	 mean	 a	 simple	 vote	 with	 the	 preferred	 side.	 Instead,	 justices	 act	
strategically	 to	 ensure	 that	 their	 policy	 goals	 are	met.	 They	 understand	 that	 the	 fate	 of	
policies	depends	on	 the	preferences	of	 other	 actors,	 such	as	Congress,	 the	president	and	
their	 fellow	 justices.	 This	 theory	 of	 strategic	 decision	 making	 was	 first	 laid	 out	 by	
constitutional	scholar	Walter	Murphy	in	1964,	although	he	offered	no	empirical	evidence	of	
it.	The	attitudinal	model	came	into	dominance	shortly	thereafter,	and	the	strategic	decision	
making	thesis	was	virtually	ignored	until	the	1990s.	
The	 first	 comprehensive	 empirical	 analysis	 and	 substantive	 formation	 of	 the	
rational	choice	model	was	conducted	by	Epstein	and	Knight	(1998)	in	The	Choices	Justices	
Make.	 They	 argued	 that	 the	 attitudinal	 model	 was	 not	 incorrect,	 just	 incomplete.	 The	
framework	they	developed	rests	on	three	main	ideas:	“justices’	actions	are	directed	toward	
the	 attainment	 of	 goals;	 justices	 are	 strategic;	 and	 institutions	 structure	 justices’	
interactions”	 (Epstein	and	Knight	1998,	10‐11).	Those	actions	 include	voting	and	 joining	
opinions	 in	accordance	with	 their	policy	positions,	but	also	 the	entire	decisional	process,	
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from	 accepting	 cases,	 conference	 discussion,	 initial	 votes,	 opinion	 assignment,	 and	 draft	
opinions	 up	 to	 the	 final	 decision	 to	 sign	 an	 opinion.	 The	 authors	 found	 each	 of	 these	
processes	 fraught	 with	 evidence	 of	 strategic	 actions	 and	 interactions	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	
justices.	 Further,	 the	 justices	 often	 feel	 constrained	 by	 outside	 forces,	 such	 as	 Congress,	
who	can	overturn	their	rulings,	and	the	president,	who	can	change	the	makeup	of	the	Court	
with	 new	 appointments	 and	who	 can	 speak	 out	 against	 the	 Court,	 possibly	 affecting	 its	
legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	the	public.	The	authors	concluded	that	for	the	most	part,	justices	
act	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 promotes	 their	 policy	 preferences	 beyond	 simply	 voting	 in	
accordance	 with	 their	 values	 (Epstein	 and	 Knight	 1998).	 Subsequent	 to	 Epstein	 and	
Knight’s	 work,	 a	 wealth	 of	 studies	 have	 further	 investigated	 and	 refined	 the	 strategic	
model,	which	has	solidified	its	place	as	one	of	the	core	considerations	at	the	center	of	the	
debate	 over	 judicial	 decision	 making	 (e.g.,	 Epstein,	 Hoekstra,	 Segal,	 and	 Spaeth	 1998;	
Bergara,	Richman,	and	Spiller	2003;	Hammond,	Bonneau,	and	Sheehan	2006)	
While	 all	 three	 models	 continue	 to	 be	 studied	 by	 judicial	 politics	 scholars,	 the	
emphasis	in	the	last	few	decades	has	been	on	the	latter	two	models	(together	referred	to	as	
the	“political	model”)	and	the	role	of	judicial	ideology	in	decision	making.	Research	on	the	
attitudinal	 model	 has	 taken	 a	 multitude	 of	 different	 forms	 and	 has	 resulted	 in	 varying	
conclusions	 regarding	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 judges	 ignore	 everything	 other	 than	 their	
personal	 policy	 preferences	 when	 making	 decisions.	 Even	 staunch	 proponents	 of	 the	
strategic	 model	 start	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 judges’	 behavior	 is	 ultimately	 aimed	 at	
advancing	 their	 own	policy	 goals	 (e.g.,	 Hammond,	 Bonneau,	 and	 Sheehan	 2006;	 Bergara,	
Richman,	 and	 Spiller	 2003;	 Epstein	 and	 Knight	 1998).	 Indeed,	 very	 few	 scholars	 have	
argued	that	 ideology	plays	anything	 less	 than	a	major	role	 in	decision	making,	at	 least	at	
19	
 
	
 
the	 Supreme	 Court	 level.	 As	 prominent	 judicial	 scholar	 Lawrence	 Baum	 points	 out,	 “the	
attitudinal	model	in	its	various	versions	has	been	the	most	influential	conception	of	judicial	
behavior	in	political	science”	(Baum	1997,	25).	
District	Courts	
Their	Role	in	our	Legal	and	Political	Systems	
The	 complexity	 of	 human	 behavior	 makes	 it	 difficult	 for	 scholars	 to	 try	 and	
understand	why	judges	do	what	they	do,	and	even	decades	of	excellent	research	have	not	
given	us	any	 conclusive	answers,	 although	 they	have	brought	us	closer	 to	understanding	
such	 behavior.	 Even	 powerfully	 consistent	 patterns	 of	 behavior	 are	 subject	 to	 multiple	
possible	 explanations.	 However,	 the	 more	 information	 we	 have,	 and	 the	 greater	 the	
number,	 creativity,	 and	 diversity	 of	 studies	 we	 are	 privy	 to,	 the	 more	 comprehensive	
explanation	of	judicial	behavior	we	will	obtain.	Baum	has	argued	that	our	understanding	of	
judicial	behavior	has	been	limited	by	scholars’	overwhelming	focus	on	the	Supreme	Court.	
He	advocates	for	more	extensive	research	on	the	lower	courts	in	order	to	“provide	a	more	
comprehensive	picture	of	the	forces	that	shape	judicial	behavior”,	and	that	“[c]ourts	whose	
institutional	characteristics	create	unusual	situations	for	judges	may	be	instructive”	(1997,	
148).	
District	 courts	are	often	overlooked	at	 the	expense	of	 the	 “higher”	 courts	because	
they	 cover	 much	 less	 geographic	 ground	 and	 their	 decisions	 therefore	 carry	 less	
precedential	value.	However,	as	the	emerging	scholarship	on	district	courts	has	noted,	they	
also	play	important	policymaking	roles.	District	courts	are	trial	courts	and	thus	are	on	the	
“front	lines”	in	“adjudicating	legal	clashes”	over	important	constitutional	issues	(Blakeman	
and	Greco	2004,	 439).	There	are	94	 federal	 district	 courts	 throughout	 the	United	 States,	
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including	at	least	one	in	every	state,	with	677	district	court	judges	(as	of	December	2014).	
District	courts	decide	almost	seven	times	as	many	cases	as	the	circuit	courts	of	appeal	and	
3,000	times	as	many	cases	as	the	Supreme	Court	every	year	(Epstein,	Landes,	and	Posner	
2013).	 Although	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 and	 courts	 of	 appeals	 have	 important	 roles	 in	
interpretation	 of	 the	 law	 and	 precedent	 setting,	 district	 courts	 impact	 the	 lives	 of	 the	
citizens	 of	 their	 states	 much	 more	 so	 than	 the	 upper	 courts.	 District	 courts	 are	 local,	
accessible	federal	courts	for	individuals	and	interest	groups	concerned	with	a	policy	or	its	
implementation	 to	challenge	 it.	 If,	 as	Harold	Lasswell	 claimed,	politics	 is	 “who	gets	what,	
when,	and	how”,	then	trial	court	judges,	who	make	these	determinations	on	a	daily	basis,	
are	as	large	a	part	of	the	political	system	as	other	governmental	institutions.	
Further,	 the	 decisions	 of	 district	 court	 judges	 provide	 direction	 to	 other	 political	
institutions	 in	 the	 state	 including	 state	 legislatures	 and	 executives	 regarding	 the	
constitutionality	of	 laws	and	policies.	Due	 to	 the	 recent	 trend	 toward	devolution	and	 the	
increased	 political	 reality	 of	 policy	 diffusion,	 many	 issues	 that	 raise	 important	
constitutional	questions	are	encountered	at	the	state	and	local	levels,	where	most	policies	
are	actually	implemented.	District	courts	also	set	the	boundaries	for	subsequent	appellate	
review	with	the	types	of	decisions	made	and	the	 language	used.	They	constitute	the	“last	
word”	on	many	types	of	matters	as	the	high	standard	of	review	applied	by	appellate	courts	
in	 many	 cases	 often	 results	 in	 deference	 to	 district	 court	 opinions.	 In	 essence,	 district	
courts	are	“formulating	policy	to	guide	other	judges	and	…	potential	litigants”	both	in	their	
states	and	beyond	(Rowland	and	Carp	1996,	4).	
Consequently,	district	courts	also	 serve	a	policymaking	 function,	 through	both	 the	
accumulation	 of	 individual	 decisions	 based	 on	 similar	 facts,	 and	 sometimes	 via	 single	
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important	decisions	upholding	or	striking	down	a	state	law	or	regulation.	Similarly,	district	
courts	have	the	important	role	of	policy	 implementation.	District	court	 judges	have	made	
decisions,	 and	 thus	 policy,	 on	 such	 important	 issues	 as	 “integration	 of	 our	 schools;	 the	
availability	of	abortions;	standards	for	defining	obscenity;	the	quality	of	air	we	breathe	and	
the	 water	 we	 drink;	 requirements	 for	 affirmative	 action	 programs;	 and	 standards	 for	
maintenance	of	our	prisons,	public	hospitals,	and	mental	institutions”	(Rowland	and	Carp	
1996,	 2).	 District	 courts	 significantly	 shape	 legal	 doctrine	 within	 a	 state.	 They	 hear	 the	
issues	first;	issues	which	appellate	courts	do	not	hear	until	years	later,	and	often	not	at	all.	
Even	 lower‐level	 courts	 thus	have	 the	power	 to	 strongly	 influence	 legal	 policy	 for	 entire	
states,	which	is	not	an	insignificant	responsibility.			
Several	early	studies	on	district	courts	nicely	 illustrate	 the	policymaking	power	of	
district	 courts	 as	well	 as	 the	potential	 for	 extralegal	 factors	 to	 supersede	 legal	 factors	 in	
decision	making.	Research	conducted	on	cases	decided	during	the	very	tumultuous	period	
of	 school	 desegregation	 highlighted	 particular	 extralegal	 factors,	 including	 the	 political	
party	of	judges,	region	(south	vs.	non‐south),	state	culture,	and	background	characteristics	
of	judges,	as	significant	predictors	of	judicial	decision	making	in	racial	relations	cases	(e.g.,	
Vines	1964;	Peltason	1971;	Giles	and	Walker	1975).	The	variation	in	case	outcomes	across	
districts	 during	 this	 time	 was	 extensive,	 and	 could	 only	 legitimately	 be	 explained	 by	
extralegal	factors.	In	one	striking	example,	Vines	(1964)	found	that	of	the	37	district	court	
judges	who	were	 active	 in	 litigation	 involving	 race	 relations	 in	 the	 south,	 seven	 of	 them	
never	 decided	 a	 case	 in	 favor	 of	 black	 litigants,	 and	 four	 of	 them	 decided	 for	 the	 black	
litigants	over	90%	of	 the	 time.	Such	early	studies	 laid	 the	groundwork	 for	contemporary	
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research	on	district	courts	and	the	role	of	extralegal	factors	in	the	important	policy	making	
decisions	district	judges	make.	
It	is	clear	that	federal	district	courts	perform	a	variety	of	important	roles	in	our	legal	
system	and	are	very	much	a	part	of	the	political	process	as	well.		Judges	at	this	level	do	not	
just	resolve	disputes	between	parties,	but	also	allocate	wealth	and	other	resources,	enforce	
societal	 norms	 or	 strengthen	 changes	 in	 them,	 monitor	 governmental	 institutions	 and	
make	 sure	 they	 do	 not	 exceed	 constitutional	 or	 statutory	 boundaries,	 speed	 up	 social	
change	 or	 stomp	 it	 out,	 and	 act	 as	 a	 forum	 for	 citizens	 to	 enact	 change	 in	 the	 legal	 or	
political	 systems.	 For	 all	 of	 these	 reasons,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 the	 factors	 that	
influence	district	court	judges’	decision	making,	including	both	legal	and	extra‐legal	factors.		
Ideological	Decision	Making	
Unlike	the	large	body	of	research	on	the	Supreme	Court,	and	to	a	lesser	extent,	the	
federal	 courts	 of	 appeals,	 federal	 district	 courts	 have	 been	 largely	 ignored	 by	 scholars	
studying	 the	 impact	 of	 ideology	 on	 judicial	 decision	 making.	 However,	 several	 scholars	
have	 extended	 this	 analysis	 down	 to	 the	 district	 court	 level,	 especially	 recently	 as	more	
grass‐roots	 mobilization	 has	 taken	 place	 at	 the	 local	 and	 state	 levels	 addressing	 such	
diffuse	 issues	 as	 reproductive	 rights,	 gay	marriage,	 and	 voting	 rights.	 Prior	 studies	 that	
examine	 the	 impact	 of	 ideology	 on	 federal	 district	 court	 judges	 have	 typically	 fallen	 into	
two	categories:	comprehensive	studies	of	thousands	of	district	court	decisions	over	a	long	
period	of	time	covering	many	different	issues,	and	more	specific	studies	that	examine	the	
role	of	ideology	in	a	particular	issue	area.	I	will	discuss	and	report	the	conclusions	of	both	
categories	 of	 studies	 in	 this	 section,	 as	well	 as	 a	 brief	mention	 of	 how	 studies	 of	 circuit	
courts	of	appeals	impact	this	line	of	research.	
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The	 influence	 of	 ideology	 appears	 to	 slightly	 decrease	 as	 one	 moves	 down	 the	
federal	 court	 hierarchy	 from	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 to	 the	 circuit	 courts	 of	 appeals	 (e.g.,	
Epstein,	 Landes,	 and	 Posner	 2013;	 Cross	 2007).	 There	 are	 several	 reasons	 for	 this.	 The	
primary	 argument	 of	 attitudinal	model	 proponents	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 is	
that	a	lack	of	(1)	electoral	accountability	and	(2)	ambition	of	higher	office	free	up	justices	
to	 pursue	 their	 own	policy	 agendas,	 unlike	 the	majority	 of	 state	 court	 judges	 (Segal	 and	
Spaeth	 2003).	 Lifetime	 tenure	 is	 a	 characteristic	 shared	 among	 the	 different	 levels	 of	
federal	courts;	however,	circuit	courts	of	appeals	judges,	(as	well	as	district	court	judges),	
do	not	share	a	lack	of	ambition	for	higher	office	with	Supreme	Court	justices,	resulting	in	
the	potential	 for	 differing	 behavior	 at	 these	 lower	 levels.	 Indeed,	 the	 evidence	on	 circuit	
court	 judicial	 behavior	 is	 less	 comprehensive	 and	 less	 consistent	 than	 studies	 of	 the	
Supreme	 Court,	 and	 reveals	 a	 historically	 weaker	 role	 for	 ideology	 at	 this	 level	 (Cross	
2007).	Nevertheless,	 ideology	 has	 been	 consistently	 found	 to	 have	 the	 largest	 impact	 on	
circuit	court	judges	compared	to	legal	or	strategic	factors	(e.g.,	Sisk	and	Heise	2012;	Cross	
2007;	Klein	2002).	
Thus,	it	stands	to	reason	that	the	effect	of	judicial	ideology	will	continue	to	lessen	as	
we	 continue	 down	 the	 hierarchy	 from	 circuit	 court	 judges	 to	 district	 court	 judges.	 The	
career	goals	of	district	court	judges	vary	dramatically	from	those	of	Supreme	Court	justices,	
who	have	already	achieved	the	ultimate	destination	 for	any	 lawyer/judge.	District	 judges	
are	also	substantially	different	from	circuit	courts	of	appeals	judges,	as	district	judges	have	
a	much	better	chance	at	promotion	than	circuit	court	judges,	whose	options	are	limited	to	
openings	 in	the	9	U.S.	Supreme	Court	seats	(Baum	1997).	Thus	the	concerns	and	goals	of	
24	
 
	
 
district	 judges	 differ	 from	 those	 of	 upper	 court	 judges,	which	may	 ultimately	 result	 in	 a	
diminished	role	for	ideology	at	the	district	court	level.			
The	limited	research	that	has	been	conducted	on	district	courts	has	found	a	role	for	
both	 legal	and	 extralegal	variables	 in	 judicial	decision	making.	District	 judges	 themselves	
point	 to	 legal	 principles	 as	 the	 overwhelming	 factor	 in	 decision	making	 (Sisk	 and	 Heise	
2012;	 Rowland	 and	 Carp	 1996).	 However,	 as	 judicial	 scholars	 often	 point	 out,	 when	
“traditional	 legal	 cues	 are	 ambiguous	 or	 absent”	 (Carp	 and	 Stidham	 1998,	 141),	 judges	
often	look	to	extralegal	factors	to	make	their	decisions,	including	individual	ideology,	local	
sentiment,	 public	 opinion,	 and	 political	 pressures	 (Blakeman	 and	 Greco	 2004).	 Studies	
examining	the	impact	of	each	of	these	(and	other)	extralegal	factors	on	district	court	judges	
have	been	 sporadic	over	 the	past	 few	decades	 and	vary	 substantially	 in	 research	design,	
methods,	and	findings.	However,	for	the	most	part,	scholars	studying	the	district	court	over	
the	last	half‐century	have	accepted	as	axiomatic	the	assumption	that	ideological	values	do	
impact	 judicial	decision	making	at	 this	 level	 (e.g.,	Epstein,	Landes,	and	Posner	2013;	Sisk	
and	 Heise	 2012;	 Zorn	 and	 Bowie	 2010;	 Rowland	 and	 Carp	 1996).	 The	 debate	 in	 the	
literature	over	the	last	few	decades	has	been	reduced	to	the	extent	of	this	impact.				
On	 one	 side	 of	 this	 debate	 are	 the	multitude	 of	 studies	 that	 have	 shown	 a	 strong	
association	between	ideological	preference	and	decision	making.	In	the	largest	study	of	the	
federal	district	courts	to	date,	Rowland	and	Carp	(1996)	examined	nearly	46,000	published	
district	 court	 opinions	 over	 a	 44‐year	 period	 and	 coded	 the	 outcomes	 in	 the	 cases	 as	
“liberal”	or	 “conservative”.	 	Using	party	of	 the	appointing	president	as	 their	 independent	
variable,	 they	 found	 that	district	 judges	appointed	by	Democrats	were	significantly	more	
likely	to	decide	in	a	“liberal”	manner	as	those	appointed	by	Republicans,	with	the	degree	of	
25	
 
	
 
likelihood	largely	dependent	on	the	type	of	 issue.	These	decisional	differences	were	most	
pronounced	 in	 civil	 rights	 and	 civil	 liberties	 cases	 (Rowland	 and	 Carp	 1996).	 Other	
comprehensive	studies	have	found	similar	results.	Examining	district	court	decisions	from	
1933	 to	 1977,	 one	 study	 found	 that	 "to	 an	 impressive	 degree	 the	 voting	 patterns	 of	 the	
district	judges	reflect	the	political	values	of	their	appointing	president"	(Stidham,	Carp,	and	
Rowland	1984).	Johnson	and	Songer	(2002)	found	party	of	the	appointing	president	to	be	
significantly	 related	 to	 the	 policy	 decisions	 of	 federal	 district	 judges	 in	 civil	 rights,	 civil	
liberties,	criminal	and	economic	and	labor	cases	over	a	period	of	35	years	(1961‐1995).	
On	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	 debate	 are	 those	 scholars	 that	 point	 to	 the	 conventional	
wisdom	suggesting	that	district	courts,	as	the	lowest	rung	on	the	federal	court	ladder,	will	
feel	 constrained	 by	 their	 position	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 and	 the	 appellate	 courts	 above	 them,	
waiting	 to	 review	 their	 decisions	 and	 potentially	 overturn	 them.	 Further,	 district	 courts	
have	not	 typically	been	 considered	 important	policymakers	 to	 the	 same	extent	 as	 circuit	
courts	 of	 appeal	 and	 the	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court;	 district	 court	 judges	 recognize	 this	 and	
behave	 accordingly.	 In	 support	 of	 this	 assertion,	 judicial	 scholars	 conducting	 broad,	
comprehensive	 studies	 of	 district	 courts	 have	 found	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 demonstrate	
that	 ideology	does	not	significantly	influence	district	court	 judges	because	of	 institutional	
and	legal	constraints,	including	much	bigger	caseloads,	threat	of	review	and	reversal	from	
above,	 ambitions	 for	 higher	 judicial	 office,	 and	 other	 various	 constraints	 (e.g.,	 Epstein,	
Landes,	and	Posner	2013;	Zorn	and	Bowie	2010).		
Conversely,	 compared	 to	 these	 large,	 comprehensive	 studies,	 scholars	 examining	
decision	making	 in	narrow	 issue	areas	have	more	 consistently	 shown	 the	 significance	of	
ideology	 on	 judicial	 behavior,	 despite	 institutional	 constraints.	 Sisk	 and	 Heise	 (2012)	
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examined	Establishment	Clause	rulings	by	judges	in	the	district	courts	as	well	as	the	circuit	
courts	 of	 appeal	 from	 1996	 through	 2005.	 They	 found	 that	 ideology	 was	 strongly	
correlated	 with	 decisions	 in	 Establishment	 Clause	 cases	 at	 both	 the	 district	 court	 and	
appeals	court	 levels;	 in	 fact,	an	Establishment	Clause	claimant’s	chances	for	success	were	
2.25	times	higher	before	a	judge	appointed	by	a	Democratic	president	than	one	appointed	
by	a	Republican	president	(Sisk	and	Heise	2012,	1216).	Other	scholars	examining	district	
court	decision	making	in	narrow	issue	areas	have	found	similar	results,	including	in	cases	
involving	gay	rights	(Pinello	2003),	sexual	discrimination	and	sexual	harassment	lawsuits	
(Peresie	 2005;	 Songer	 1994),	 abortion	 (Alumbaugh	 and	 Rowland	 1990),	 criminal	
defendant	actions	(Rowland,	Carp,	and	Songer	1985),	and	civil	rights	claims	(Stidham	and	
Carp	1987).		
Not	all	studies	of	narrow	issue	areas	have	 found	a	significant	effect	of	 ideology	on	
judges.	For	example,	Ashenfelter,	Eisenberg,	and	Schwab	 (1995)	 found	 that	 ideology	had	
little	 influence	 on	 judicial	 actions	 in	 civil	 rights	 and	 prisoners’	 cases	 in	 federal	 district	
courts	 in	 three	 districts	 (the	 Central	 District	 of	 California,	 the	 Eastern	 District	 of	
Pennsylvania,	and	the	Northern	District	of	Georgia)	in	1981.	Similarly,	Blakeman	and	Greco	
(2004)	 examined	 the	 impact	 of	 legal	 and	 extralegal	 variables	 on	 district	 court	 decision	
making	 in	 public	 forum	 and	 religious	 speech	 cases	 and	 found	 only	 a	 weak	 correlation	
between	 judicial	 ideology	 and	 case	 outcome,	 although	 they	 did	 find	 a	 strong	 correlation	
between	 a	 judge’s	 religion	 and	 case	 outcome,	 as	well	 as	 court	 region	 and	 case	 outcome,	
indicating	the	importance	of	certain	other	types	of	extralegal	factors.		
Thus,	prior	studies	have	provided	support	for	both	sides	of	the	debate	regarding	the	
extent	of	ideology’s	impact	on	judicial	behavior.	Despite	this	conflicting	evidence,	the	bulk	
27	
 
	
 
of	studies	examining	judicial	decision	making	in	specific	issue	areas	conclude	that	ideology	
does	play	a	significant	role	compared	to	legal	factors.	This	effect	appears	to	be	heightened	
in	 two	 specific	 subsets	 of	 cases:	 (1)	 those	 involving	 issues	 that	 are	 both	 ideological	 in	
nature	and	politically	charged,	and	(2)	those	in	which	the	law	is	ambiguous	and	not	well‐
settled.	 Ideology	 plays	 a	 larger	 role	 in	 “major	 cases”,	 those	 involving	 highly	 salient	 and	
controversial	 issues	 in	which	major	organized	 interests	are	 involved	 (e.g.,	 Yarnold	1997;	
Rowland	and	Carp	1996).	As	one	study	puts	it,	in	these	cases,	“our	nation’s	judges	appear	to	
have	separated	into	the	same	camps	as	the	national	political	parties”	(Sisk	and	Heise	2012,	
1205).	Further,	ideology	appears	to	play	a	larger	role	when	judges	have	greater	discretion	
to	 invoke	 their	 political	 preferences	 due	 to	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 the	 law	 (Stidham	 and	 Carp	
1987;	 Rowland	 and	 Carp	 1996).	 Scholars	 focusing	 on	 district	 court	 outcomes	 in	 cases	
falling	 into	 one	 or	 both	 of	 these	 subsets	 have	 consistently	 found	 a	 significant	 effect	 of	
ideology	 on	 judges	 (e.g.,	 Sisk	 and	 Heise	 2012;	 Pinello	 2003;	 Rowland	 and	 Carp	 1996;	
Alumbaugh	and	Rowland	1990).		
Strategic	Behavior	
	 The	other	primary	focus	of	judicial	studies	over	the	past	few	decades	has	been	the	
strategic	behavior	of	judges.	The	bulk	of	research	on	the	strategic	model	focuses	on	short‐
term	strategic	behavior	by	justices	on	the	Supreme	Court.	These	studies	show	that	justices	
deviate	 from	 sincerely	 voting	 their	 policy	 preferences	 in	 limited	 circumstances	 by	
modifying	 their	 written	 opinions,	 joining	 opinions	 they	 may	 partially	 disagree	 with,	 or	
engaging	in	other	specific	actions	in	order	to	win	support	from	their	colleagues	in	those	or	
other	cases	(e.g.,	Epstein	and	Knight	1998;	Baum	1997;	Spiller	and	Gely	1992).	However,	
28	
 
	
 
this	 research	 also	 evidences	 how	 difficult	 it	 is	 to	 differentiate	 between	 sincere	 voting,	
strategic	voting,	or	other	motivations	(Baum	1997).	
There	exists	a	much	smaller	body	of	research	regarding	the	role	of	strategy	in	lower	
courts;	however,	considerable	research	has	been	conducted	on	one	vital	aspect	of	strategy	
–	 judges’	behavior	 in	 light	of	decisions	by	higher	courts	and	the	 likelihood	of	 reversal	by	
higher	 courts.	 The	 theoretical	 basis	 for	 these	 studies	 is	 that	 judges	 want	 to	 match	 case	
outcomes	with	their	policy	preferences	as	closely	as	possible;	however,	they	cannot	simply	
decide	 cases	 in	 line	with	 these	 preferences	 due	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 reversal	 from	 reviewing	
courts.	 Thus,	 judges	 must	 strike	 a	 balance	 between	 their	 preferences	 and	 those	 of	 the	
higher	courts,	sometimes	by	making	rulings	that	diverge	from	their	ideal	position,	in	order	
to	avoid	reversals	that	could	move	policy	even	further	from	their	preferences	(Baum	1997).		
These	 studies	 have	 produced	 inconclusive	 and	 conflicting	 results.	 Some	 scholars	
have	argued	 that	 lower	 courts’	 desire	 to	 avoid	 reversal	has	 led	 them	 to	 at	 least	partially	
adopt	 the	policy	positions	of	 their	 reviewing	 court,	 such	 that	 both	 ideology	 and	 strategy	
play	 large	roles	 in	 lower	court	decisions	(Songer,	Segal,	and	Cameron	1994).	Others	have	
concluded	that	circuit	court	judges	strategically	choose	legal	and/or	factual	bases	that	are	
more	 resistant	 to	 review	when	making	 certain	 ideologically	 driven	 decisions	 (Smith	 and	
Tiller	 2002;	 Hume	 2009;	 Smith	 2014).	 Conversely,	 several	 other	 scholars	 have	 asserted	
that	lower	court	judges	do	not	typically	modify	their	behavior	based	on	a	fear	of	reversal,	
as	they	recognize	that	very	few	cases	are	substantively	reviewed	and	reversed,	especially	
by	the	Supreme	Court	(Bowie	and	Songer	2009;	Cross	2007;	Klein	2002).		
The	 focus	 of	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 this	 research	 has	 been	 at	 the	 circuit	 courts	 of	
appeal	level	and	their	responses	to	the	Supreme	Court.	Very	few	studies	exist	that	analyze	
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whether	 district	 courts	 act	 strategically	 in	 the	 same	manner.	 However,	 because	 of	 their	
position	 in	 the	 judicial	 hierarchy,	 specifically	 the	 fact	 that	 all	 district	 court	 opinions	 are	
subject	to	mandatory	review	by	the	circuit	courts	of	appeal,	there	is	good	reason	to	believe	
that	 district	 court	 judges	may	 act	 strategically	 to	 avoid	 reversal.	 If	 district	 judges	made	
their	decisions	based	solely	on	legal	decisions,	then	it	should	not	matter	to	them	whether	
they	are	overturned	or	not	–	they	simply	interpreted	the	law	and/or	precedent	incorrectly	
in	 light	 of	 the	 facts	 of	 a	 particular	 case,	 and	 an	 appellate	 court	 corrected	 their	 error.	
However,	if	their	decisions	are	made	on	the	basis	of	ideology,	it	may	be	disconcerting	to	see	
their	policy	preferences	overridden	by	an	appellate	court.	Beyond	this,	district	judges	have	
other	good	reasons	to	avoid	reversal	by	higher	courts,	including	feelings	of	defeat	and	the	
appearance	of	 incompetence.	Additionally,	district	 judges	with	ambitions	of	higher	office,	
typically	 appointment	 to	 a	 circuit	 court	 of	 appeals,	 believe	 they	 may	 find	 their	 chances	
diminished	if	they	are	repeatedly	reversed	and	derided	by	the	higher	courts3.	Thus,	judges	
may	 act	 strategically	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 approval	 from	higher	 courts	 and	 an	 appearance	of	
success	(Baum	1997).		
The	scant	evidence	that	does	exist	on	district	courts	and	strategic	decision	making	is	
not	conclusive	either	way.	Several	scholars	have	recently	argued	that	district	judges	may	be	
more	concerned	with	reversal	of	their	decisions	than	previously	accounted	for	(e.g.,	Choi,	
Gulati,	 and	 Posner	 2011;	 Randazzo	 2008).	 These	 scholars	 argue	 that	 if	 unconstrained,	
district	judges	would	decide	cases	so	as	to	advance	their	ideological	preferences.	However,	
under	the	constraint	of	mandatory	appellate	review	by	the	circuit	courts	of	appeal,	district	
                                                            
3	Scholars	have	found	no	evidence	that	a	district	judge’s	rate	of	reversal	actually	impacts	his	or	her	chances	of	elevation	to	
the	circuit	courts	of	appeal	(Choi,	Gulati,	and	Posner	2011).	However,	that	does	not	mean	district	judges	do	not	think	high	
rates	of	reversal	will	hurt	their	potential	career	advancement.	
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judges	 cannot	 simply	 follow	 their	 preferences.	 Instead,	 they	 have	 a	 greater	 incentive	 to	
match	 their	 decisions	 to	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 reviewing	 judges	 by	 predicting	 how	 an	
appellate	 panel	 will	 respond	 to	 a	 case	 and	 deciding	 in	 accordance	 with	 that	 prediction	
(Choi,	Gulati,	 and	Posner	2011).	This	 “strategic	anticipatory	effect”	 is	 strongest	when	 the	
circuit	 in	 which	 they	 sit	 is	 ideologically	 homogeneous	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction	 of	 the	
district	judge’s	ideology,	and	is	dampened	when	the	circuit	is	split	or	the	majority	of	circuit		
judges	share	the	district	judge’s	ideological	leanings	(Randazzo	2008;	Epstein,	Landes,	and	
Posner	2013).		
Based	on	these	findings,	it	is	possible	that	district	courts	do	indeed	feel	constrained	
by	a	fear	of	reversal	and	may	act	accordingly.	However,	the	majority	of	district	court	cases	
are	not	appealed,	and	only	a	very	small	percentage	(3%	or	less)	of	district	court	judgments	
are	typically	reversed	on	appeal	 in	a	given	year.	The	 low	 likelihood	of	appeal	may	soften	
the	strategic	anticipatory	effect	felt	by	district	court	judges,	and	they	may	be	more	inclined	
to	rule	 in	 favor	of	their	personal	preferences	and	hope	for	 the	best,	especially	 in	cases	of	
political	and	 ideological	 importance	 to	 them.	Smith	 (2006)	 looked	at	one	circuit,	 the	D.C.	
Circuit	Court	of	Appeals,	and	found	that	district	court	 judges	did	decide	 in	 line	with	their	
ideological	preferences	until	 reversed	by	 the	appeals	 court,	 at	which	point	 they	adjusted	
their	behavior	to	follow	the	preferences	of	the	appeals	court.	Other	studies	have	found	only	
insignificant	 evidence	 of	 strategic	 anticipation	 by	 district	 court	 judges	 (e.g.,	 Boyd	 and	
Spriggs	2009).		
Further,	 district	 court	 judges	 can	 also	 partially	 insulate	 themselves	 from	 higher	
court	 reversal	 by	 carefully	 choosing	 the	 foundations	 for	 their	 decisions.	Appellate	 courts	
typically	must	find	a	legal	error	in	order	to	reverse	a	trial	court	decision;	any	lower	court	
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decision	 based	 on	 a	 judge’s	 factual	 interpretation	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 very	 high	 threshold	 of	
deference	and	can	only	be	overturned	based	on	a	finding		of	egregious	error.	Thus,	a	clever	
trial	judge	can	word	his	or	her	decision	in	such	a	way	to	make	reversal	very	difficult	(Cross	
2007).	Indeed,	some	scholars	have	argued	that	district	court	judges	actively	advance	their	
ideological	 preferences	while	 protecting	 themselves	 from	 reversal	 by	manipulating	 their	
findings	 of	 fact	 in	 this	manner,	 at	 least	 for	 cases	 or	 issues	 that	 they	 feel	 strongly	 about	
(Tiller	and	Spiller	1999).	
Overall,	 the	 scholarship	on	 strategic	 behavior	by	district	 court	 judges	 is	 relatively	
new	 and	 contradictory.	 I	 include	 it	 here	 because	 of	 its	 importance	 in	 the	 recent	 judicial	
decision	 making	 literature.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 I	 set	 forth	 the	 theoretical	 bases	 for	 my	
hypotheses	by	describing	how	the	existing	literature	informs	my	research,	as	well	as	what	
type	of	roles	I	believe	ideology	and	strategy	will	play	in	my	chosen	issue	areas.		
Summary	of	Theoretical	Bases	
There	 is	 good	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 both	 legal	 and	 policy	 considerations	 play	 an	
important	 role	 for	 judges.	 Virtually	 all	 judges	 are	 lawyers	who	have	 received	 law‐school	
training	emphasizing	the	importance	of	law	and	precedent	and	taking	personal	feelings	out	
of	decision	making.	When	practicing	 law,	most	 lawyers	must	occasionally	 (or	often)	 take	
positions	they	do	not	necessarily	believe	in,	or	represent	a	side	of	an	issue	they	would	not	
represent	 if	acting	solely	on	behalf	of	 their	personal	preferences.	Above	all,	 lawyers	seek	
legal	accuracy	from	judges	when	ruling	in	matters	of	fact	and	of	law.	However,	lawyers	are	
often	 politically	 active;	 indeed,	 one	 reason	 people	 become	 lawyers	 is	 because	 of	 their	
interest	in	the	political	system	and	policy.	They	are	educated,	knowledgeable	about	politics,	
and	 have	 their	 own	 political	 values	 and	 preferences	 that	 they	 care	 about.	Many	 become	
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advocates	 for	 these	 values	 and	 preferences	 in	 one	way	 or	 another.	 Thus,	 when	 lawyers	
become	judges,	they	have	opposing	forces	influencing	them	in	their	decision	making	–	their	
legal	training	and	desire	for	legal	accuracy	above	all	and	their	strongly‐held	policy	values	
and	advocacy	goals.	
Between	 the	 legal	 training	 judges	 receive	 emphasizing	 legal	 considerations	 in	
decision	making,	the	pressure	from	both	parties	and	outside	forces	for	legal	accuracy	and	
clarity,	and	the	fear	of	reversal	by	higher	courts,	it	may	seem	obvious	that	federal	district	
judges	would	 ignore	 their	 own	 preferences	 and	 come	 to	 decisions	 based	 solely	 on	 legal	
context.	However,	there	is	one	crucial	reason	why	it	is	not	this	easy	–	ambiguity	in	the	law.	
Only	 occasionally	 does	 the	 law	 (or	 precedent)	 give	 judges	 a	 clear‐cut	 answer	 to	 a	 legal	
problem.	This	ambiguity	allows	judges	to	use	other	skills	learned	in	law	school	and	through	
experience	practicing	 law	–	 the	ability	 to	shape	a	 legal	argument	to	support	 the	outcome	
they	 want,	 and	 to	 persuade	 others	 to	 see	 it	 their	 way.	 There	 is	 widespread	 agreement	
among	 judicial	 politics	 scholars	 that	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 law	 limits	 the	 influence	 of	 legal	
considerations	on	judicial	decisions	(Baum	1997,	64).	One	can	simply	look	at	the	Supreme	
Court’s	high	rate	of	dissent	 (70%	of	 cases	decided	since	1940),	 and	 the	 frequency	of	5‐4	
decisions	(one	in	every	six	cases	since	1940)	to	see	how	our	most	experienced	and	learned	
judges	can	reach	differing	conclusions	given	the	same	facts	and	law	(Goff	2005).	Thus	we	
should	not	discount	the	potential	for	legal	ambiguity	to	allow	lower	court	judges	to	insert	
their	 own	 policy	 preferences	 into	 their	 decision	 making	 process	 as	 well.	 I	 believe	 that	
individual	policy	preferences	will	indeed	play	a	strong	role	in	judicial	behavior,	even	when	
accounting	for	legal	factors,	in	the	three	ambiguous	and	highly	ideological	issue	areas	I	will	
examine.		
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As	 also	 described	 above,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 lower	 court	 judges	 may	 act	
strategically	 in	order	to	ultimately	advance	their	policy	goals	and/or	career	advancement	
goals	 based	 on	 their	 subordinate	 position	 to	 other,	 higher	 courts.	 However,	 the	 studies	
examining	 this	 issue	 thus	 far	 have	been	 incomplete	 and	have	 typically	 examined	district	
court	 behavior	 in	 all	 cases,	 not	 just	 those	 involving	 politically	 charged	 issues.	 Further,	 I	
propose	 that	 district	 court	 judges	 may	 actually	 be	 less	 constrained	 in	 some	 ways	 than	
appellate	 judges	 to	 decide	 cases	 based	 on	 personal	 preferences.	 Appellate	 decisions	 are	
made	by	3‐judge	panels	(or	rarely,	all	circuit	judges	in	en	banc	hearings).	Multiple	decision	
makers	may	check	 judicial	discretion	by	 individual	 judges,	and	panel	effects	can	result	 in	
different	decisions	and	opinion	language	than	any	one	judge	would	prefer	him	or	herself.	
District	court	judges,	able	to	make	decisions	in	isolation	without	a	need	to	shape	collective	
action	or	to	take	 into	account	the	preferences	of	colleagues,	and	with	the	knowledge	that	
reversal	 by	 a	 higher	 court	 is	 the	 exception,	 not	 the	 rule,	may	have	more	 freedom	 to	 use	
their	discretion	to	decide	cases	in	whatever	way	they	see	fit.	I	will	test	the	use	of	strategy	
by	 district	 court	 judges	 in	 three	 highly	 ideological	 issue	 areas	 to	 see	 whether	 it	 has	 an	
independent	effect	or,	more	likely,	whether	it	dampens	the	effect	of	judicial	ideology	when	
the	majority	of	the	reviewing	circuit	holds	an	opposing	ideology.								
Public	Opinion	
Generally	
		 One	of	the	central	tenets	of	our	democratic	system	is	responsiveness	of	government	
to	 majority	 will	 –	 officials	 should	 advance	 the	 policy	 preferences	 of	 the	 people	 they	
represent.	 As	 V.O.	 Key	 declared,	 “unless	 mass	 views	 have	 some	 place	 in	 the	 shaping	 of	
policy,	all	the	talk	about	democracy	is	nonsense”	(1961,	7).	Public	opinion	is	thus	a	crucial	
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component	 to	any	measure	of	 success	of	democratic	governance,	and	 therefore	has	been	
carefully	studied	and	measured	by	political	scholars	for	decades.	
Studies	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 mass	 public	 opinion	 on	 policymaking	 has	 historically	
focused	 on	 the	 national	 level.	 Polls	 measuring	 public	 opinion	 on	 salient	 issues	 like	 gay	
marriage,	 immigration	 reform,	 health	 care,	 legalization	 of	 marijuana,	 and	 increasing	 the	
minimum	wage,	 just	 to	 name	 a	 few,	 are	 released	 virtually	 every	 week	 by	 various	 news	
outlets	 and	 polling	 agencies.	 A	 large	 body	 of	 literature	 shows	 that	 executive	 officials,	
legislators,	and	innumerable	others	take	account	of	these	polls	and	the	public’s	attitudes	on	
these	 issues	when	deciding	 their	 agendas,	 speaking	points,	 and	 support	 or	 opposition	 to	
proposed	 laws	 or	 regulations	 (e.g.,	 Soroka	 and	 Wlezien	 2010;	 Erikson,	 MacKuen,	 and	
Stimson	2002;	Page	and	Shapiro	1983).	
Comparatively	 little	 research	 has	 examined	 public	 opinion	 at	 the	 state	 level.	
However,	states	are	particularly	well‐suited	for	research	on	public	opinion	and	its	impact	
on	 state	 policy	 decision‐makers.	 The	 50	 states,	 each	 with	 their	 own	 set	 of	 publics	 and	
policies,	 provide	 excellent	 opportunities	 for	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 the	 influence	 of	
public	 opinion	 on	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 processes	 and	 people.	 The	 largest	 impetus	 to	 such	
analyses	 has	 been	 the	 lack	 of	 reliable	 and	 sufficient	 survey‐based	 measures	 of	 public	
opinion	at	the	state	level.	
Despite	these	problems,	several	scholars	began	turning	their	attention	to	state‐level	
public	opinion	in	the	mid‐1990s	and	consequently	developed	new	ways	of	measuring	state	
public	opinion.	Eriksen,	Wright	and	McIver	(1993)	aggregated	122	national	opinion	polls	
over	a	13‐year	period	(1976‐88),	 resulting	 in	over	167,000	 individual	 respondents.	They	
then	 disaggregated	 the	 data	 by	 state,	 giving	 them	 enough	 respondents	within	 each	 state	
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(ranging	from	292	in	Wyoming	to	14,000	in	California)	to	analyze	the	impact	of	state	public	
opinion	on	state	policy	in	48	states.	Other	scholars	have	utilized	this	method,	often	referred	
to	as	“disaggregation”,	in	order	to	analyze	state‐level	public	opinion	in	a	variety	of	contexts.	
Other	methods	have	also	been	utilized	in	recent	years,	most	notably	the	use	of	state	“policy	
mood”	as	a	proxy	for	state	public	opinion	(Berry,	Ringquist,	Fording,	and	Hanson	1998),	as	
well	 as	 a	 newly	 developed	 simulation	 method	 that	 has	 so	 far	 shown	 great	 promise	 in	
obtaining	 accurate	measurements	 of	 state	 public	 opinion	 (Lax	 and	 Phillips	 2009).	 I	 will	
describe	each	of	these	methods	in	much	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter.	
National	 and	 state	 government	 responsiveness	 to	 the	 policy	 preferences	 of	 the	
polity	 they	 serve	 is	 of	 vital	 concern	 to	 political	 scientists,	 government	 officials,	
policymakers,	and	anyone	else	interested	in	the	healthy	functioning	of	our	representative	
democracy.	 While	 the	 majority	 of	 public	 opinion	 research	 examines	 the	 actions	 of	 the	
legislative	 and	 executive	 branches,	 an	 important	 subset	 of	 the	 literature	 focuses	 on	 the	
judiciary,	a	subject	to	which	I	now	turn.	
In	the	Federal	Judiciary	
The	federal	courts	present	a	unique	place	in	the	debate	over	democracy’s	mandate	
that	 governments	 be	 responsive	 to	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 public.	 Federal	 judges	 are	
unelected	and	serve	for	life,	thus	they	are	completely	unaccountable	to	the	American	polity.	
Despite	 this,	 federal	 judges	are	 important	political	actors	with	policymaking	power.	They	
enjoy	 the	 power	 of	 judicial	 review,	 which	 gives	 them	 the	 ability	 to	 strike	 down	 laws,	
policies,	and	other	actions	of	the	legislative	and	executive	branches	as	unconstitutional.	By	
utilizing	this	power,	and	others	possessed	by	the	courts	more	broadly,	 federal	 judges	are	
able	to	replace	the	judgment	of	elected	officials	with	their	own.	This	feature	of	the	federal	
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judiciary	has	 created	 tension	and	debate	 regarding	 the	proper	 role	of	 such	 courts	 in	our	
democratic	system.	Thus,	as	I	will	describe	in	this	section,	scholars	have	spent	a	great	deal	
of	 attention	 on	 determining	 whether	 federal	 courts	 follow	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 polity	 or	
instead	act	as	countermajoritarian	institutions.	If	the	courts	are	indeed	responsive	to	public	
opinion	 on	 policy,	 this	 might	 alleviate	 concern	 that	 these	 judges	 are	 unelected	
policymakers	(Calvin,	Collins,	and	Eshbaugh‐Soha	2011).	
The	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 traditionally	 been	 viewed	 as	 a	 countermajoritarian	
institution,	 meaning	 it	 thwarts	 the	 majority	 will	 of	 the	 people	 and	 their	 elected	
representatives	 when	 it	 overturns	 a	 legislative	 act.	 	 In	 fact,	 “almost	 all	 constitutional	
scholars	and	democratic	theorists	agree	that	the	Supreme	Court	is,	either	in	process	or	in	
substance,	 a	 countermajoritarian	 institution”	 (Marshall	 1989,	 4).	 	 Although	 the	 Court	 is	
countermajoritarian	in	form,	it	does	not	necessarily	ignore	the	opinions	of	the	majority	of	
the	people.		Dahl	(1957)	was	one	of	the	first	scholars	to	suggest	that	the	Court’s	reputation	
as	 a	 countermajoritarian	 institution	 has	 been	 greatly	 exaggerated;	 subsequently	 several	
other	scholars	have	supported	Dahl’s	hypothesis	by	showing	that	the	policy	outputs	of	the	
Court	are	likely	to	conform	to	the	policy	preferences	of	the	majority,	at	over	the	long	run	
(Barnum	1985;	Marshall	1989).		
	 Despite	 lifetime	 appointments	 and	 insulation	 from	 politics	 in	 general,	 there	 are	
several	 reasons	 for	 justices	 to	be	 attentive	 to	public	 opinion.	 	 Justices	must	 consider	 the	
possibility	that	Congress	or	the	president	will	overturn	their	decisions,	or	that	they	will	be	
improperly	 implemented	 or	 enforced.	 	 Institution‐minded	 justices	 want	 to	 maintain	 the	
legitimacy	of	the	Court	and	therefore	want	to	avoid	the	public	embarrassment	of	defeat	and	
the	accompanying	weakening	of	the	Court	(Casillas,	Enns,	and	Wohlfarth,	2011).		They	may	
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adjust	 their	 decisions	 slightly	 toward	 a	 compromise	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 active	 political	
opposition	by	paying	attention	to	public	opinion	(McGuire	and	Stimson	2004).		In	this	way,	
the	 rational	 choice	 model	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 thesis	 that	 public	 opinion	 does	 directly	
impact	 decision	making,	 as	 the	 justices	 are	 necessarily	 acting	 strategically.	 Although	 the	
evidence	on	any	direct	impact	of	public	opinion	on	the	Supreme	Court	is	inconsistent,	the	
majority	 of	 studies	 do	 show	 a	 significant	 effect	 (e.g.,	 Mishler	 and	 Sheehan	 1993,	 1996;	
Flemming	and	Wood	1997;	McGuire	and	Stimson	2004;	but	see	Norpoth	and	Segal	1994;	
Segal	and	Spaeth	2002)							
The	literature	on	the	influence	of	public	opinion	on	the	federal	judiciary	has	focused	
almost	exclusively	on	the	Supreme	Court.	Scholars	have	recently	expanded	their	research	
to	 include	 the	 circuit	 courts	 of	 appeal	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 increase	 our	 understanding	 of	 this	
influence	on	the	whole	of	the	federal	judiciary.	Investigating	the	influence	of	public	opinion	
on	the	lower	federal	courts	can	provide	a	more	generalizable	and	nuanced	understanding	
of	this	relationship	(Calvin	et	al.	2011).	Circuit	courts	of	appeal	and	district	court	judges	are	
also	 important	 policymakers,	 but	 share	 the	 unique	 feature	 of	 being	 both	 national	 and	
regional	 actors.	 They	 are	 clearly	 federal	 officials,	 as	 they	 are	 appointed	by	 the	president	
and	 confirmed	 by	 the	 Senate,	 their	 salaries	 are	 appropriated	 by	 Congress,	 and	 they	 are	
charged	with	the	duty	of	upholding	and	interpreting	federal	law,	including	the	Constitution.	
At	the	same	time,	circuit	court	and	district	court	judges	are	regional	actors	–	their	decisions	
are	binding	only	on	certain	courts	and	limited	geographic	areas,	federal	law	requires	them	
to	 be	 residents	 of	 their	 circuits/districts,	 and	 most	 are	 prominent	 members	 of	 their	
communities	who	engage	 in	political	and	civil	activities	with	peers	and	other	community	
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members	(Calvin	et	al.	2011).	Thus,	unlike	the	Supreme	Court,	lower	court	judges	may	be	
influenced	by	both	national	and	state	public	opinion.	
In	 an	 effort	 to	 expand	 the	 research	 on	public	 opinion	beyond	 the	 Supreme	Court,	
Calvin,	Collins,	and	Eshbaugh‐Soha	(2011)	conducted	the	first	comprehensive	study	of	the	
influence	of	the	public’s	policy	preferences	on	circuit	court	judges.	As	a	proxy	measure	for	
state	public	opinion,	the	authors	utilized	Berry	et	al.’s	(1998,	2007)	state‐level	indicators	of	
public	mood.	They	found	strong	support	for	the	proposition	that	courts	of	appeals	judges	
are	indirectly	impacted	by	public	opinion	through	the	federal	judicial	selection	process,	but	
little	 evidence	 of	 any	 direct	 influence	 of	 national	 or	 regional	 public	 opinion	 on	 circuit	
judges.	As	the	authors	point	out,	they	examined	a	sample	of	all	cases	heard	by	circuit	court	
panels	over	a	period	of	40	years,	such	that	many	of	the	cases	did	not	involve	particularly	
salient	or	political	 issues.	They	speculate	that	public	opinion	may	have	a	 larger	 impact	 in	
highly	salient	cases	or	issues	and	suggest	further	research	in	this	area.		
District	Courts	
	 From	 the	earliest	 studies	of	 federal	district	 courts,	 scholars	have	been	pointing	 to	
the	potential	 role	of	public	opinion	and	 community	 approval	 in	 judicial	decision	making.	
Unlike	 Supreme	 Court	 justices	 and	 circuit	 court	 judges,	 district	 judges	 live	 and	 socialize	
where	 they	 work,	 in	 their	 home	 communities,	 surrounded	 by	 friends	 and	 political	
connections.	Indeed,	federal	district	judges	typically	have	deep	roots	in	the	states	in	which	
they	serve.	Most	are	raised,	educated,	and	have	served	in	public	office	either	as	a	judge	or	
other	 official	 in	 their	 home	 states.	 As	Beverly	 Cook	 explained,	 “[j]udges	 absorb	 the	 local	
beliefs,	 attitudes,	 and	 values	 during	 their	 formative	 years	 and	 as	 part	 of	 their	
apprenticeship	 for	 the	 bench	 serve	 in	 political	 parties	 and	 accept	 elected	 or	 appointed	
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governmental	positions	in	the	other	two	branches.	To	the	extent	permitted	by	ethical	codes	
and	 their	 own	 role	 definitions,	 judges	 after	 appointment	maintain	 their	 old	 associations	
with	friends	in	the	political	elite	and	participate	in	everyday	life	with	their	families”	(1977,	
569).	
	 The	appointment	process	further	demonstrates	how	district	courts	are	local	actors	
in	addition	 to	national	actors.	While	nominees	 for	vacant	 seats	are	 technically	chosen	by	
the	president,	they	are	in	practice	chosen	by	elites	in	the	state	who	are	familiar	with	state	
judges,	politicians,	and	other	 important	 lawyers.	These	elites	often	consist	of	one	or	both	
senators,	if	they	are	from	the	president’s	party,	but	can	also	be	other	high‐ranking	elected	
or	 unelected	 state	 or	 local	 officials,	 state	 party	 leadership,	 or	 even	 powerful	 donors	 or	
interest	groups	 in	 the	 state.	Historically,	 the	 responsibility	 for	narrowing	down	potential	
candidates	 and	 choosing	 final	 nominees	 has	 fallen	much	more	 squarely	 on	 state	 or	 local	
elites	from	the	president’s	party	than	on	the	president	himself.	As	described	by	one	judicial	
scholar	 six	 decades	 ago,	 "the	 Constitution	 does	 not	 give	 an	 accurate	 description	 of	 the	
selection	 process.	 ...	 It	 would	 be	 more	 accurate	 to	 say	 that	 federal	 district	 judges	 are	
selected	by	the	individual	Senator	or	local	party	organization	in	the	area	in	which	they	are	
to	serve,	subject	 to	presidential	veto"	(Peltason	1955,	31).	This	 is	an	even	more	accurate	
depiction	today,	especially	as	the	political	environment	has	become	increasingly	polarized	
and	hyperpartisan	in	recent	years.	
	 The	influence	of	public	opinion	on	policy	at	the	state	level	has	been	well	established	
in	 the	 literature	 since	 the	 1990s.	 In	 their	 groundbreaking	 study,	 Erikson,	 Wright,	 and	
McIver	 (1993)	 found	 that	 state	 public	 opinion,	 as	 measured	 by	 self‐reported	 partisan	
identification	 and	 ideological	 identification,	 was	 strongly	 correlated	 to	 state	 policy	
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outcomes,	even	after	controlling	 for	demographic	and	socioeconomic	variables.	Thus,	 the	
more	 “liberal”	a	 state’s	 residents,	 the	more	 liberal	 the	policies	of	 that	 state	 tended	 to	be.	
Their	 study	 was	 the	 first	 to	 evidence	 a	 strong	 relationship	 between	 public	 opinion	 and	
government	 action	 in	 the	 states,	 demonstrating	 the	 significant	 influence	 the	public	 often	
has	over	state	policy.	Erikson	et	al.’s	conclusions	have	been	upheld	by	numerous	scholars	
utilizing	various	direct	or	indirect	measures	of	public	opinion	(e.g.,	Brace	et	al.	2004;	Berry	
et	 al.	 1998,	 2007).	 The	 question	 I	 raise	 here	 is	 whether	 state	 public	 opinion	 influences	
judicial	policymaking	in	the	same	way.	
District	judges	obtain	information	regarding	public	opinion	the	same	way	that	we	all	
do	–	through	the	media	as	well	as	interactions	with	family,	friends,	and	neighbors	(Epstein	
and	 Knight	 1998).	 Judges	 may	 alter	 their	 decision	 making	 unconsciously	 as	 their	 own	
preferences	 change	 in	 conjunction	with	 changing	 preferences	 of	 the	 public,	 or	 they	may	
consciously	follow	shift	in	public	opinion	by	likewise	adapting	their	policy	decisions	(Calvin	
et	 al.	 2011).	 Some	 judges	 have	 explicitly	 expressed	 this	 position	 –	 First	 Circuit	 Court	 of	
Appeals	Judge	LeBaron	Colt	asserted	that	“[t]he	purpose	and	end	of	law	are	the	welfare	of	
society	 and	 the	 happiness	 of	 the	 people.	 The	 law	 should	 always	 be	 viewed	 from	 the	
standpoint	of	society,	and	not	from	the	standpoint	of	the	law	itself…	The	law	must	march	
with	society;	the	constitution	must	march	with	the	nation”	(1903,	675).	
Despite	 the	 noted	 importance	 of	 public	 opinion	 on	 district	 judges,	 scholars	 have	
undertaken	very	little	empirical	testing	of	this	proposition,	in	large	part	due	to	the	difficulty	
in	 obtaining	 local	 public	 opinion.	 Occasionally,	 scholars	 have	 used	 proxy	 measures	 to	
determine	whether	 judges	may	 be	 vulnerable	 to	 public	 opinion.	 For	 example,	 Giles	 and	
Walker	 (1975)	 used	 the	 number	 of	 associational	 memberships	 a	 judge	 held	 within	 the	
41	
 
	
 
community	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 the	 closeness	 of	 his	 relationship	with	 the	 community,	 and	
Alumbaugh	and	Rowland	(1990)	found	state	political	climate	to	be	a	significant	predictor	
of	 federal	 district	 court	 decisions	 in	 abortion	 cases.	 One	 early	 study	 did	 use	 state‐level	
public	 opinion	 as	 a	 predictor	 variable	 and	 found	 a	 strong	 link	 between	 the	 behavior	 of	
district	judges	and	shifts	in	public	opinion	about	the	Vietnam	War	(Cook	1977).	However,	
the	simulation‐based	method	Cook	used	to	generate	state‐level	public	opinion	was	heavily	
criticized	 for	 not	 incorporating	 geography	 as	 an	 explanatory	 factor,	 and	 overall	 for	
including	only	a	 limited	set	of	voter	 types	due	 to	 the	 inadequacies	of	statistical	 tools	and	
computing	power,	and	fell	out	of	favor	by	the	1980s	(Erikson,	Wright,	and	McIver	1993)4.		
The	 almost	 complete	 lack	 of	 research	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 public	 opinion	 on	 federal	
district	 judges	 is	 lamentable	 because	 it	 deprives	 us	 of	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 the	
relationship	between	public	opinion	and	unelected	federal	judges,	which	speaks	directly	to	
their	 role	 in	 our	 democratic	 system.	 However,	 with	 ever‐improving	 technology	 and	
methodology	for	obtaining	state‐level	public	opinion	data,	this	gaping	hole	in	the	literature	
and	our	understanding	can	begin	to	be	filled	in.	
My	Study	
	 The	purpose	of	my	study	 is	 to	help	 fill	 in	some	of	 the	gaps	and	deficiencies	 in	 the	
literature	on	district	courts,	judicial	decision	making,	and	public	opinion	that	I	have	pointed	
out	above.	Specifically,	I	hope	to	contribute	to	the	aforementioned	literature	in	four	ways.	
First,	 I	 seek	 to	 help	 bridge	 the	 divide	 between	 legal	 scholars,	 the	 legal	 community,	 and	
social	 scientists.	 As	 previously	 stated,	 legal	 scholars,	 as	 well	 as	 historians	 and	 political	
                                                            
4	 Fortunately,	 a	 new	and	much	 improved	 simulation	 technique	 for	 obtaining	 state‐level	 public	 opinion	has	 reemerged	
recently	and	has	been	increasingly	utilized	by	political	science	scholars	(Lax	and	Phillips	2009).	I	describe	this	method	in	
much	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter.				
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scientists,	have	been	very	interested	in	the	determinants	of	judicial	behavior	over	the	past	
half‐century;	 however	 these	 academic	 disciplines	 have	 approached	 this	 issue	 very	
differently.	 Social	 scientists	 have	 typically	 used	 statistical	 methods	 and	 quantitative	
analysis	 to	 examine	 judicial	 behavior	 and	 legal	 institutions.	 Legal	 scholars	 have	 focused	
much	 less	on	quantitative	 techniques	and	have	 instead	conducted	qualitative	analyses	of	
judges	 and	 courts,	 including	 legal	 analysis	 of	 judicial	 decisions,	 opinions,	 case	 law,	 and	
other	types	of	law.	Several	legal	scholars	have	lamented	the	lack	of	quantitative	analysis	in	
legal	 research,	even	devoting	entire	articles	 to	questions	 like	 “Why	Don’t	Law	Professors	
Do	More	Empirical	Research?”	 (Schuck	1989).	Further,	Hall	 and	Wright	 (2008)	note	 that	
systematic	content	analysis	of	judicial	opinions	is	an	important	way	in	which	legal	scholars	
can	create	a	 “uniquely	 legal	empirical	methodology”	 that	combines	 the	rigor	of	empirical	
social	science	with	the	classic	interpretative	and	analytical	skills	developed	by	those	in	the	
legal	profession	(2008,	64).		
In	 recent	 years,	 legal	 scholars	 have	 increasingly	 turned	 to	 quantitative	 research	
designs	 to	 explain	 judicial	 decision	making,	 and	 some	 of	 the	most	 important	 studies	 on	
judges	and	the	courts	have	been	published	in	 law	reviews	as	opposed	to	political	science	
journals.	Despite	this	trend	toward	empiricism,	many	legal	scholars	continue	to	ignore	the	
quantitative	 findings	on	 the	courts	 in	 the	social	science	 literature,	 finding	 it	 too	 technical	
and	difficult	 to	understand	 in	 laymen’s	 terms,	 thus	making	 it	 impractical	 to	 study	and	 to	
apply	to	the	real	world	of	judges	and	courts	(Cross	2007;	Epstein	and	Martin	2014).	In	this	
dissertation,	 I	 will	 attempt	 to	 bridge	 this	 divide	 by	 performing	 empirical	 analysis	 and	
reporting	my	 findings	 in	easily	accessible	and	 interpretable	ways.	This	will	provide	 legal	
scholars,	 practitioners,	 and	 advocates	 the	 ability	 to	 understand	 the	 results	 and	 the	 real‐
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world	 implications,	 and	 to	 utilize	 the	 knowledge	 gained	 about	 judicial	 decision	 making	
going	forward.	As	an	attorney	who	has	been	trained	in	the	art	of	legal	content	analysis	and	
has	years	of	experience	doing	so,	I	am	in	a	position	to	make	a	unique	contribution	to	the	
scholarship	on	judicial	decision	making	across	multiple	disciplines.	
Secondly,	I	begin	to	fill	in	the	gaps	in	our	knowledge	of	judicial	decision	making	due	
to	the	dearth	of	empirical	 investigations	surrounding	salient	contemporary	constitutional	
issues.	 Political	 officials,	 and	 to	 some	 extent,	 our	 society,	 has	 become	more	 polarized	 in	
recent	 years,	 especially	 surrounding	 certain	 types	of	 issues.	The	 so‐called	 “culture	wars”	
have	 further	 emphasized	 this	 polarization	 regarding	 morality	 policy,	 including	 abortion	
and	 gay	 rights,	 and	 have	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 partisan	 conflict	 at	 both	 the	
national	and	state	levels.		
Daniel	 Pinello’s	 (2003)	 comprehensive	 study	 of	 judicial	 treatment	 of	 gay	 rights	
claims	 illustrates	 the	 potentially	 powerful	 influence	 of	 ideology	 in	 salient,	 politically	
charged	 issues.	 He	 examined	 two	 decades	worth	 of	 gay	 rights	 cases	 in	 both	 federal	 and	
state	appellate	courts.	He	found	that	ideology	(based	on	party	of	appointing	president)	had	
a	considerable	impact	on	decision	making	at	the	federal	level,	predicting	case	outcome	far	
better	than	any	other	judicial	attribute.	He	also	found	religion,	gender,	and	race	of	the	judge	
to	 significant	 predictors	 of	 case	 outcomes.	 Although	 his	 study	 was	 limited	 to	 appellate	
courts,	the	force	of	his	findings	suggests	that	judges	at	all	levels	of	the	federal	judiciary	may	
be	 more	 inclined	 to	 follow	 their	 personal	 ideological	 preferences	 when	 deciding	 cases	
involving	 ideologically	 charged	 issues	 like	 gay	 rights.	 I	 want	 to	 capture	 the	 impact	 of	
district	 judges’	 personal	 policy	 preferences	 (as	 well	 as	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 public’s	 policy	
preferences)	on	decisions	in	these	politically	sensitive	issue	areas.		
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These	 ideologically	charged	cases	are	also	those	where	the	public	 is	most	 likely	to	
hold	 strong	 opinions,	 polling	 data	 are	most	 likely	 to	 be	 readily	 available	 and	 commonly	
reported,	and	judges	are	most	likely	to	be	aware	of	the	opinions	of	their	state’s	residents.	
Therefore,	cases	involving	such	salient	and	ideological	issues	are	the	best	ones	to	analyze	
for	 evidence	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 ideology,	 public	 opinion,	 or	 both,	 as	 well	 as	 whether	 the	
impact	 of	 each	 is	 mitigated	 by	 legal,	 strategic,	 or	 demographic	 factors.	 For	 this	 reason,	
among	 other	 reasons	 that	 I	 detail	 in	 the	 following	 chapter,	 I	 chose	 gay	 rights,	 abortion	
rights,	and	affirmative	action	as	my	issue	areas.	
Thirdly,	I	examine	cases	decided	in	the	modern	era.	All	but	a	few	studies	of	district	
courts	examine	decision	making	in	cases	that	are	several	decades	old.	The	current	state	of	
scholarly	work	on	the	role	of	ideology	and	other	factors	in	district	court	decision	making	is	
based	on	the	literature	encompassing	these	studies	of	older	cases.	These	studies	are	very	
informative	and	certainly	remain	valid,	but	are	no	longer	sufficient	to	explain	the	current	
state	of	the	judiciary.	The	lower‐tier	courts	have	recently	(in	the	last	20‐30	years)	begun	to	
play	an	increasingly	significant	role	in	policymaking,	as	opposed	to	their	more	traditional	
role	of	simple	error	correction.	At	the	same	time,	the	courts	have	become	more	and	more	
ideologically	driven.	In	just	one	example,	Cross	(2007)	found	that	the	association	between	
judicial	ideology	and	judicial	votes	in	the	circuit	courts	was	not	statistically	significant	until	
the	1980s,	with	the	significance	of	the	association	increasing	ever	since.	The	role	of	district	
courts	 as	 important	 policymakers	 is	 an	 even	 more	 recent	 occurrence,	 and	 historically	
scholars	have	often	dismissed	district	courts	as	courts	of	limited	reach	and	scope,	and	thus	
not	 as	 worthy	 of	 study.	 This	 perception	 has	 changed	 in	 the	 last	 15‐20	 years,	 as	 district	
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courts	have	 increasingly	made	key	decisions	impacting	state	policy	while	becoming	more	
ideological	in	nature.	
Lastly,	 and	 perhaps	 most	 importantly,	 I	 seek	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 literature	 by	
analyzing	 the	mechanisms	 by	which	 public	 opinion	may	 influence	district	 court	 decision	
making.	 A	 significant	 number	 of	 published	 works	 have	 postulated	 that	 regional	 public	
opinion	may	play	a	role	in	district	court	decision	making.	As	discussed	above,	scholars	have	
found	 some	 influence	 of	 public	 opinion	 on	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	 and	 I	 believe	 that	 public	
opinion	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 play	 an	 even	 larger	 role	 at	 the	 district	 court	 level	 for	 the	
reasons	I	spelled	out	in	the	prior	section.	Examining	the	role	of	local	public	opinion	on	local	
courts	is	important	to	understand	democracy	at	a	local	level,	which	is	the	heart	and	soul	of	
a	republican	 form	of	democracy.	This	 is	an	especially	 important	 topic	 lately,	as	 increased	
policy	diffusion	has	required	state	or	local	units	of	government	to	implement	many	federal	
policies	and	programs,	often	without	sufficient	federal	dollars	to	do	so.			
In	sum,	my	purpose	here	is	to	further	our	understanding	of	judicial	behavior,	not	to	
provide	 a	 means	 for	 accurately	 predicting	 case	 outcomes.	 Baum	 argues	 that	 “full	
explanation	 goes	 beyond	 successful	 prediction	 to	 identify	 the	 fundamental	 sources	 of	
behavior”	(1997,	5).	In	that	vein,	I	seek	to	gain	insight	into	federal	district	judges	and	the	
potential	explanations	for	why	they	do	what	they	do,	and	in	so	doing,	add	to	the	extensive	
but	incomplete	body	of	literature	on	judicial	decision	making.		
While	my	research	is	aimed	at	answering	these	broad	inquiries	more	so	than	testing	
narrow	hypotheses,	I	have	formed	a	few	specific	hypotheses	based	on	my	synthesis	of	the	
scholarly	work	in	this	area.	Consistent	with	findings	by	other	scholars	regarding	the	impact	
of	 judicial	 ideology	 on	decision	making,	 I	 hypothesize	 that	 conservative	 judicial	 ideology	
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will	 be	positively	 correlated	with	 conservative	outcomes	 in	district	 court	 cases	 involving	
gay	rights,	abortion	rights,	and	affirmative	action	issues	(and	vice	versa).	Additionally,	I	do	
not	expect	strategic	variables	to	be	significantly	associated	with	decision	making	 in	these	
highly	ideological	issue	areas,	or	at	least	not	to	the	same	extent	as	ideology.	The	dearth	of	
research	on	public	 opinion	 and	district	 courts	 gives	me	only	 a	 limited	basis	 on	which	 to	
form	hypotheses.	I	anticipate	some	effect	of	public	opinion	on	district	judges,	although	the	
effect	is	likely	to	vary	by	issue	area	and	over	time.	Further,	public	opinion	could	have	both	
direct	and	indirect	effects	on	judges;	even	if	public	opinion	is	not	a	significant	predictor	of	
case	outcomes,	 it	may	mitigate	the	effect	of	 judicial	 ideology	or	other	variables.	 I	will	use	
empirical	evidence	to	test	these	hypotheses	and	to	answer	my	broader	inquiries	regarding	
judicial	 behavior	 in	 cases	 involving	 contemporary	 constitutional	 issues.	 In	 the	 following	
chapter,	 I	 explain	 how	 I	 plan	 to	 achieve	 this	 goal	 by	 describing	my	 research	 design	 and	
methodology	in	detail.	
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CHAPTER	3	–	RESEARCH	DESIGN	
	
	 I	 have	 explained	why	 I	 seek	 to	 study	 the	 determinants	 of	 judicial	 behavior	 at	 the	
district	court	level	and	have	formulated	my	hypotheses;	the	next	step	is	to	test	my	theories.	
There	 are	 typically	 many	 different	 ways	 to	 test	 a	 theory,	 and	 choosing	 the	 best	
methodology	to	do	so	is	not	always	straightforward.	This	chapter	will	explain	my	research	
design,	 beginning	 with	 why	 I	 chose	 the	 three	 issue	 areas	 of	 gay	 rights,	 abortion,	 and	
affirmative	action	and	how	 they	are	 appropriate	 for	 examining	 the	 roles	of	 ideology	and	
public	opinion	in	the	district	courts.	I	will	describe	how	my	analysis	bridges	the	traditional	
gap	 between	 political	 scientists	 and	 legal	 scholars	 in	 their	 study	 of	 judicial	 behavior,	
thereby	 contributing	 to	 both	 fields.	 Lastly,	 I	 will	 describe	 my	 methodology	 in	 detail,	
including	 how	 I	 created	 my	 data	 set,	 why	 I	 included	 each	 of	 my	 variables,	 and	 how	 I	
operationalized	 each	 variable,	 devoting	 specific	 attention	 to	 my	 methods	 for	 obtaining	
state‐level	public	opinion	data.		
Issue	Areas	
	 A	large	body	of	literature	has	indicated	that	research	on	the	linkages	between	mass	
public	 opinion	 and	 policy	 often	 turn	 on	 the	 salience	 of	 the	 issues	 at	 hand;	 thus	 I	 have	
chosen	three	highly	salient	dispute	areas	to	examine	this	 link	–	gay	rights5,	abortion,	and	
affirmative	action.	Scholars	agree	that	Americans	do	not	pay	close	attention	to	politics	and	
are	 generally	 unknowledgeable	 about	 policy,	 unless	 the	 issues	 are	 highly	 salient	 and	
therefore	not	easily	overlooked	(e.g.,	Delli	Carpini	and	Keeter	1996;	Carmines	and	Stimson	
1989).	 Generally	 speaking,	 the	 public	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 pay	 attention	 to	 and	 care	 about	
issues	that	are	topics	of	discussion	in	the	media	and	among	political	elites.	Scholars	have	
                                                            
5	For	ease	of	use	and	for	consistency	with	prior	studies,	I	use	the	term	“gay	rights”	throughout	this	dissertation	to	refer	to	
all	issues	concerning	rights	for	members	of	the	LGBTQ	community.	
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shown	 that	 the	 greater	 the	 salience	 of	 an	 issue,	 the	 stronger	 the	 link	 between	 public	
opinion	and	policy	outcomes	(e.g.,	Haider‐Markel	and	Meier	1996;	Carmines	and	Stimson	
1989).	 Taking	 this	 general	 concept	 a	 step	 further	 to	 apply	 it	 to	 judicial	 behavior,	 cases	
involving	 highly	 salient	 issues	 should	 show	 closer	 links	 between	 public	 opinion	 and	
outcomes.	
As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 the	 body	 of	 literature	 on	 judicial	 decision	
making	suggests	that	judicial	ideology	impacts	decision	making	for	some	dispute	categories	
much	more	so	than	others.	The	types	of	disputes	in	which	ideology	plays	a	significant	role	
have	 typically	 had	 three	 criteria	 in	 common:	 (1)	 they	 are	 characterized	 by	 a	 moderate	
degree	of	either	 factual	or	 legal	ambiguity,	 (2)	 they	evoke	 ideological	values	held	by	and	
advanced	by	 the	 two	major	political	parties,	 and	 (3)	 they	do	not	evoke	competing	extra‐
judicial	 preferences,	 including	 the	 local	 political	 environment	 and	 public	 opinion	
(Alumbaugh	and	Rowland	1990;	Rowland	and	Carp	1996).	Research	on	the	district	courts	
to	date	has	typically	focused	on	either	all	 types	of	cases	heard	by	the	courts,	or	on	broad	
categories	 such	 as	 civil	 rights	 cases.	 These	 broad	 categories	 include	 both	 strongly	
ideological	 disputes	 and	 other	 disputes.	 By	 focusing	 specifically	 on	 ideologically	 and	
politically	 charged	 dispute	 categories,	 I	 help	 satisfy	 the	 second	 criteria	 listed	 above.	
Another	criterion,	ambiguity	in	the	law,	is	also	satisfied	by	the	three	issues	areas	I	examine.	
Each	 issue	 is	 characterized	 by	 ambiguous	 legal	 criteria	 in	 the	 precedents	 set	 by	 the	
Supreme	 Court	 and	 other	 appellate	 courts,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 explicit	 role	 of	 district	 court	
judges	in	interpreting	and	applying	these	criteria	to	individual	cases.	The	third	criterion	is	
the	 subject	of	 this	 research,	 as	 I	 seek	 to	analyze	 the	varying	 roles	of	 ideology	and	public	
opinion,	along	with	other	extra‐legal	factors,	in	decision	making	in	these	three	issue	areas.	
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Further,	 morality	 policy	 is	 an	 especially	 appropriate	 area	 to	 test	 possible	 links	
between	 public	 opinion	 and	 judicial	 policymaking,	 as	 morality	 policy	 issues	 tend	 to	 be	
highly	salient	and	technically	simple.	Although	the	specifics	of	tax	code	provisions,	welfare	
policy,	and	other	economic	 issues	 tend	 to	be	 too	 technically	complex	 for	most	citizens	 to	
understand,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 expect	 that	 most	 people	 can	 form	 coherent	 opinions	 on	
morality	issues	(often	called	“easy”	issues)	without	specific	technical	knowledge	(Carmines	
and	Stimson	1980).	Rarely	is	an	individual	unable	to	express	an	opinion	when	asked	about	
such	 issues.	 “Morality	 policy	 raises	 questions	 that	 instigate	 debate	 over	 first	 principles,	
resulting	in	uncompromising	clashes	of	values”	(Mooney	and	Lee	1995,	600).	Additionally,	
these	moral	debates	typically	fall	easily	along	party	and	ideological	lines.	Indeed,	research	
has	 consistently	 shown	 a	 strong	 link	 between	 public	 opinion	 on	 morality	 policy	 and	
decision	 by	 elected	 officials	 (Haider‐Markel	 1999;	 Carmines	 and	 Stimson	 1989).	 The	
question	 presented	 here	 is	 whether	 that	 link	 extends	 to	 decisions	 made	 by	 unelected	
federal	 judges	 acting	 as	 policymakers	 in	 their	 states.	 Gay	 rights	 and	 abortion	 are	 both	
prime	 examples	 of	 morality	 policies	 and	 thus	 should	 definitively	 evidence	 this	 link	 if	 it	
exists.	Affirmative	action	does	not	 fit	 the	 standard	definition	of	morality	policy	based	on	
religious	 values/morality;	 however	 it	 does	 involve	 ethics	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 “right”	 and	
“wrong”	and	is	thus	also	a	moral	issue,	as	well	as	one	that	is	highly	salient	and	politically	
charged	in	its	own	right.	
In	addition	to	being	salient	and	highly	ideological	along	party	lines,	these	three	issue	
areas	also	can	be	used	to	compare	the	impact	of	differing	public	opinion	trends	on	judicial	
policymaking.	We	have	seen	variation	 in	national	public	opinion	across	 these	 issue	areas	
between	 1991	 and	 2012:	 opinion	 on	 abortion	 and	 affirmative	 action	 has	 remained	
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relatively	 stable,	 while	 support	 for	 gay	 rights	 has	 trended	 sharply	 upward.	 As	 I	
demonstrate	 in	 the	next	 chapter,	public	opinion	 in	 the	states	has	 followed	similar	 trends	
during	this	time	period.	This	allows	me	to	examine	temporal	trends	for	each	issue	area	and	
to	compare	the	role	of	public	opinion	in	policymaking	for	each	issue	to	one	another.		
Methodology	
Data	Set		
My	 data	 set	 includes	 every	 reported	 District	 Court	 decision	 across	 the	 nation	 in	
these	 three	 issue	areas	 (gay	 rights,	 abortion,	 and	affirmative	action)	over	a	22‐year	 time	
period	 (1991‐2012).	This	 time	period	 is	 important	 for	 several	 reasons:	 it	 represents	 the	
contemporary	era	of	district	 court	decision	making	 (including	 the	most	 recent	 cases	 and	
information	 available)	 –	 an	 era	 characterized	 by	 increasing	 party	 polarization	 and	
partisanship	 as	well	 as	 the	 recent	 judicial	 trend	 favoring	 devolution,	 especially	 in	 social	
issues	like	those	examined	here.	The	analysis	and	conclusions	provided	by	this	data	set	will	
give	 a	more	 accurate	 picture	 of	 the	 current	 federal	 judiciary	 and	 influences	 on	 decision	
making	 in	 contemporary	 constitutional	 issues,	 and	will	 better	provide	practitioners	with	
information	that	can	be	applied	to	their	own	cases	going	forward.		
To	 obtain	 my	 list	 of	 cases	 for	 each	 topic,	 I	 performed	 a	 search	 in	 LexisNexis6,	
resulting	in	a	total	of	1,390	gay	rights	cases,	663	abortion	cases,	and	591	affirmative	action	
cases	during	this	time	period.	I	also	cross‐referenced	the	lists	of	cases	from	LexisNexis	with	
case	lists	(based	on	the	same	search	terms)	from	Westlaw	in	order	to	make	sure	that	I	had	
the	entire	universe	of	cases	during	this	time	period.	The	next	step	was	to	read	each	case	to	
                                                            
6	I	used	the	advanced	search	option	on	LexisNexis	Academic	Universe	for	all	district	court	cases	between	January	1,	1991	
and	December	31,	2012	containing	the	core	terms	“(gay	OR	lesbian	OR	homosex!	OR	same	sex	OR	sexual	orientation)”	for	
gay	rights	cases,	the	core	term	“abortion”	for	abortion	cases	and	the	core	terms	“(affirmative	action	OR	preferencing)”	for	
affirmative	action	cases.		
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determine	whether	it	was	appropriate	to	include	in	my	analysis.	Only	those	cases	involving	
substantive	decisions	on	the	merits	were	included	in	the	data	set;	more	specifically,	I	only	
included	rulings	that	either	accepted	or	rejected	a	party’s	claim	in	a	way	that	engaged	the	
merits	of	the	claim	(Sisk	and	Heise	2012).	The	majority	of	rulings	were	made	on	motions	
for	summary	judgment,	but	the	data	set	includes	an	array	of	substantive	rulings	on	various	
types	of	motions	as	well	as	final	judgments.	
The	Lexis‐Nexis	database	 from	which	 I	obtained	 the	cases	 in	 the	data	set	 includes	
unpublished	 district	 court	 opinions	 starting	 from	 June	 2005.	 Unpublished	 opinions	 are	
selectively	 included	 in	 this	 database	 prior	 to	 June	 2005.	 Although	 this	 results	 in	 the	
omission	of	many	district	court	opinions	prior	to	June	2005,	the	best	evidence	suggests	that	
"the	vast	majority	of	published	opinions	are	explications	of	discretionary	policy	decisions	
that	directly	or	 indirectly	allocate	value	beyond	 the	 litigants	of	 record"	 (Rowland	&	Carp	
1996,	19),	and	that	unpublished	opinions	typically	determine	technical	or	standard	matters	
and	do	not	engage	in	policymaking.		
		 I	coded	each	case	based	on	the	directionality	of	the	decision	(pro‐gay	rights	vs.	anti‐
gay	 rights;	 pro‐abortion	 vs.	 anti‐abortion;	 pro‐affirmative	 action	 vs.	 anti‐affirmative	
action).	For	each	of	my	 three	 issues,	 a	 “pro”	decision	 indicates	a	 liberal	outcome,	 and	an	
“anti”	 decision	 indicates	 a	 conservative	 outcome.	 Liberal	 decisions	 are	 coded	 as	 0	 and	
conservative	decisions	are	coded	as	1.	For	example,	in	Davis	v.	Prison	Health	Services,	2010	
U.S.	 Dist.	 LEXIS	 127890	 (W.D.	 Mich.	 2010),	 a	 prisoner	 sued	 the	 prison	 alleging	
discrimination	 based	 on	 his	 identity	 as	 an	 openly	 gay	man.	He	was	 terminated	 from	his	
offsite	public	works	 job	after	being	 subject	 to	 ridicule	and	discriminatory	 comments	and	
behavior	 by	prison	 guards.	 The	prison	 responded	 that	Davis	was	 terminated	because	he	
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was	diabetic	and	it	was	concerned	for	his	health.	Davis	was	able	to	show	that	other	diabetic	
prisoners	were	 permitted	 to	 continue	 doing	 the	 same	 job	 he	 was	 terminated	 from.	 The	
district	 court	 judge	 ruled	 against	 Davis	 and	 granted	 the	Defendant	 summary	 judgment7;	
therefore	I	coded	the	decision	as	a	1.	Following	standard	practice,	I	omitted	decisions	that	
were	mixed,	indeterminate,	decided	by	magistrate	judges,	or,	as	mentioned	above,	were	not	
substantively	decided	on	 the	merits.	My	 final	data	 set	 contains	297	gay	 rights	 cases,	187	
abortion	cases,	and	95	affirmative	action	cases.	Tables	2,	3	and	4	show	the	breakdown	of	
decisions	in	each	issue	area.		
 
Table	2	
U.S.	District	Court	Decisions	in	Gay	Rights	Cases	1991‐2012	
 
Decision	 Frequency	 Percent
Support	 174	 58.59
Oppose	 123	 41.41
Total	 297	 100.00
 
 
Table	3	
U.S.	District	Court	Decisions	in	Abortion	Cases	1991‐2012	
 
Decision	 Frequency	 Percent
Support	 137	 73.26
Oppose	 50	 26.74
Total	 187	 100.00
 
 
Table	4	
U.S.	District	Court	Decisions	in	Affirmative	Action	Cases	1991‐2012	
	
Decision	 Frequency	 Percent
Support	 	51	 53.68
Oppose	 	44	 46.32
Total	 	95	 100.00
 
	
                                                            
7	Incidentally,	this	decision	was	reversed	on	appeal	to	the	6th	Circuit.   
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Dependent	Variable	
	
As	described	above,	my	dependent	variable	is	the	judge’s	decision	in	a	case,	coded	
(0)	for	pro‐gay	rights,	pro‐abortion,	and	pro‐affirmative	action	decisions,	and	(1)	for	anti‐
gay	rights,	anti‐abortion,	and	anti‐affirmative	action	decisions.	As	will	be	discussed	further	
in	subsequent	chapters,	I	use	logistic	regression,	which	is	appropriate	in	models	containing	
a	dichotomous	dependent	variable,	and	 is	commonly	used	 in	analyses	of	 judicial	decision	
making.		
Primary	Independent	Variables	
	 My	primary	independent	variables	of	interest	are	judicial	ideology,	state‐level	public	
opinion,	and	strategic	factors.	This	section	describes	how	I	operationalize	each	variable.	
1. Judicial	Ideology	
Until	 relatively	 recently,	 the	most	 accepted	measure	 of	 judicial	 ideology	 has	 been	
the	political	party	of	the	president	that	appointed	a	judge.	Most	of	the	studies	mentioned	in	
the	 preceding	 chapter	 regarding	 federal	 appeals	 courts	 and	 federal	 district	 courts	 have	
used	this	measure	of	ideology.	Despite	being	a	simplistic	and	indirect	measure	of	ideology,	
scholars	 have	 found	 the	 party	 of	 the	 appointing	 president	 to	 be	 a	 remarkably	 accurate	
proxy	 for	 judicial	 ideology	 (Sisk	 and	 Heise	 2012).	 Presidents	 have	 been	 extraordinarily	
consistent	in	their	choice	of	like‐minded	judicial	candidates.	Additionally,	many	appointees	
were	party	activists	before	joining	the	bench	(Cross	2007).	However,	this	method	has	also	
been	criticized	for	its	simplicity,	in	that	it	does	not	account	for	the	fact	that	presidents	from	
the	same	party	are	not	necessarily	equal	in	their	ideologies.		
In	the	last	decade,	scholars	have	developed	and	tested	a	newer	measure	of	judicial	
ideology	 that	 I	 will	 refer	 to	 as	 “Common	 Space”	 scores.	 Poole	 and	 Rosenthal	 (1997)	
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originally	developed	Common	Space	NOMINATE	scores	for	members	of	Congress	based	on	
their	voting	records,	placing	them	on	a	continuum	from	very	liberal	to	very	conservative.	
Giles,	Hettinger	and	Peppers	(2001)	adapted	the	Common	Space	scores	for	federal	judges	
by	assigning	each	judge	the	NOMINATE	Common	Space	score	of	the	home‐state	Senator	if	
the	 home‐state	 Senator	 and	 the	 appointing	 President	 are	 from	 the	 same	 party	 (or	 the	
average	of	both	home‐state	Senators	 if	both	are	from	the	same	party	as	the	President).	 If	
neither	 home‐state	 Senator	 are	 from	 the	 President’s	 party,	 the	 judge	 is	 assigned	 the	
appointing	President’s	NOMINATE	Common	Space	score.		This	approach	utilizes	senatorial	
courtesy	 and	 accounts	 for	 regional	 differences	 in	 appointments.	 For	 example,	 an	 Obama	
appointee	 in	 Vermont	 may	 not	 be	 ideologically	 identical	 to	 an	 Obama	 appointee	 in	
Mississippi.	 It	 also	 accounts	 for	 differences	 in	 ideology	 among	 appointing	 Presidents	
belonging	to	the	same	party	(a	Reagan	appointee	vs.	a	George	W.	Bush	appointee).		
While	both	measures	are	considered	accurate,	valid	proxies	 for	 ideology,	Common	
Space	scores	have	come	to	be	seen	as	“the	state‐of‐the‐art	measure	for	the	preferences	of	
US	Court	of	Appeals	 judges	and…	federal	district	court	 judges”	(Epstein	et	al.	2007,	306).	
The	most	recent	studies	of	federal	district	court	decision‐making	have	used	both	measures	
in	 order	 to	 fully	 capture	 judicial	 ideology.	 These	 studies	 typically	 find	 a	 high	 correlation	
between	the	two	measures,	and	most	scholars	have	found	little	difference	in	results	when	
using	one	measure	versus	the	other	(Sisk	and	Heise	2012;	Peresie	2005).	However,	several	
scholars	 argue	 that	 Common	 Space	 scores	 significantly	 outperform	 the	 party	 of	 the	
appointing	 president	 as	 a	measure	 of	 ideology	 for	 several	 reasons.	 First,	 since	 Common	
Space	 scores	 lie	 along	 a	 continuum,	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 binary	measure,	 they	 capture	more	
variation	between	judges	as	well	as	a	more	accurate	picture	of	judicial	ideology.	Judges	can	
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also	 be	 compared	 to	 one	 another	 and	 placed	 on	 the	 spectrum	 relative	 to	 each	 other	 to	
compare	 levels	 of	 “liberalness”	 or	 “conservativeness”.	 	 Further,	 although	 the	 Common	
Space	spectrum	ranges	from	‐1	to	1,	aligning	its	scores	with	those	of	party	of	the	appointing	
president,	real‐world	actors,	including	presidents	and	senators,	and	therefore	judges,	very	
rarely	fall	at	the	extreme	ends	of	the	spectrum.	The	vast	majority	of	these	political	actors	
fall	between	‐.6	and	.6	(Sisk	and	Heise	2012).	The	trend	in	contemporary	studies	of	judicial	
ideology	at	all	 levels	has	been	to	use	Common	Space	scores	(Epstein	and	King	2002;	Sisk	
and	Heise	2012;	Epstein	et	al.	2007).		
This	measure	 is	 even	more	appropriate	 for	district	 court	 judges,	where	 senatorial	
courtesy	plays	perhaps	the	largest	role	in	the	nomination	process,	and	home	state	culture	
is	maintained	when	a	judge	“stays	home”	to	be	a	judge	in	his	or	her	own	community.	I	will	
use	both	measures	in	my	analysis	in	order	to	more	fully	test	my	hypothesis	that	ideology	is	
correlated	with	case	outcome	and	to	better	determine	the	magnitude	of	any	effect	I	find	as	
well	 as	 to	 discern	 any	 differences	 between	 the	 two	 measures.	 Judges	 appointed	 by	
Republican	presidents	are	coded	(1)	and	those	appointed	by	Democrats	are	coded	(0).		The	
Common	Space	scores	range	 from	‐1	 (most	 liberal)	 to	1	 (most	conservative).	 	 I	 retrieved	
Common	Space	scores	for	most	of	the	judges	from	calculations	completed	and	provided	by	
Christina	 Boyd	 (2010);	 for	 the	 judges	 not	 contained	 in	 this	 data	 set,	 I	 calculated	 the	
Common	Space	scores	according	to	the	description	outlined	above.		
Figure	 1	 graphs	 the	 distribution	 of	 District	 Court	 Common	 Space	 Scores	 for	 all	
judges	 in	my	data	set.	Scores	are	disbursed	rather	evenly	with	a	slight	right	skew,	which	
indicates	 a	 relatively	 high	 number	 of	 staunchly	 conservative	 judges	 and	 few	 staunchly	
liberal	judges.	As	evidenced	by	the	summary	statistics	below	Figure	1,	the	mean	Common	
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Space	 Score	 is	 slightly	 conservative,	 but	 very	 close	 to	 zero,	 at	 .034.	 The	 lowest	 score,	
indicating	the	most	 liberal	 judge,	 is	 ‐.65,	and	the	highest	score,	 for	 the	most	conservative	
judge,	is	.61.	
 
Figure	1	
Distribution	of	Common	Space	Scores	for	all	District	Court	Judges	in	Data	Set	
  
 
	 N	 Mean Median Std.	Dev. Min	 Max
Common	Space	Scores	 579	 .034 .028 .374 ‐.65	 .61
	
2. State‐Level	Public	Opinion	
Public	opinion	has	 long	been	a	 topic	of	 interest	 to	political	 scientists.	However,	as	
discussed	above,	 the	exploration	of	state‐level	public	opinion	and	its	relationship	to	state	
policy	 or	 other	 variables	 has	 suffered	 from	 a	 severe	 lack	 of	 state‐level	 public	 polling.	
Although	several	organizations,	typically	universities	or	media	outlets,	within	most	states	
do	conduct	state	polls,	such	polls	are	sporadic,	 inconsistent,	and	often	specific	to	an	issue	
0
20
40
60
80
Fre
qu
en
cy
-.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4 .6
Common Space Scores
57	
 
	
 
area,	 hot‐button	 topic,	 political	 figure,	 or	 election.	 Additionally,	 finding	 comparable	 polls	
across	states	 is	very	difficult,	and	variations	 in	 topic	areas,	question	wording,	and	survey	
techniques	 make	 scientific	 comparisons	 of	 this	 data	 untenable.	 The	 vast	 majority	 of	
scientific	polls	are	conducted	on	a	national	level,	and	these	polls	very	rarely	include	enough	
respondents	from	each	state	to	allow	for	comparisons	across	states.	
Scholars	have	developed	several	viable	solutions	to	 this	nagging	problem	over	 the	
last	 few	 decades.	 Erikson,	Wright,	 and	McIver	 (1993)	 (“EWM”)	 pioneered	 a	 method	 for	
aggregating	 many	 national	 surveys	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 large	 enough	 sample	 sizes	 for	
individual	states,	creating	measures	of	residents’	overall	 ideology	and	party	identification	
for	 each	 state.	 Their	 measure	 has	 been	 repeatedly	 found	 to	 be	 a	 valid	 and	 useful	
measurement	of	state	ideology	over	time,	and	is	meant	to	capture	public	sentiment	toward	
politics	and	policy	within	a	state.	Berry	et	al.	(1998)	developed	an	alternative	measure	of	
state	 ideology	 based	 on	 state	 congressional	 election	 results	 and	 roll‐call	 data.	 Most	
recently,	Park,	Gelman,	and	Bafumi	(2006)	created	a	new	method	to	obtain	state‐level	data	
from	national	polls	based	on	multilevel	regression	and	poststratification	(“MRP”).	Pacheco	
(2011)	has	used	MRP	to	create	dynamic	measures	of	state	ideology	and	state	partisanship	
based	on	EWM’s	methodology.	Any	or	all	of	these	measures	have	been	used	by	scholars	to	
approximate	the	overall	ideology	of	a	state’s	residents	and	gauge	the	effect	on	state	policy,	
the	effectiveness	of	state	political	institutions,	and	other	areas	of	interest.		
However,	since	this	study	examines	judicial	decision	making	in	specific	issue	areas	
of	high	political	interest	and	salience	to	the	public,	measures	of	general	state	ideology	may	
be	inappropriate	(Norrander	2001).	For	example,	a	self‐identified	liberal	voter	may	have	a	
different	 opinion	 on	 abortion	 than	 on	 welfare	 spending,	 gun	 control,	 or	 other	 issues.	
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Certainly	support	for	gay	rights	has	grown	rapidly	in	recent	years,	however	the	number	of	
self‐identified	liberals	has	remained	approximately	the	same.	At	the	national	level,	Wlezian	
(2004)	 found	 that	 specific	 policy	 attitudes	more	 strongly	 influenced	 policy	 outcomes	 in	
salient	and	highly	visible	issue	areas,	including	welfare	and	national	defense,	while	global	
indicators	were	more	likely	to	affect	those	policy	areas	that	were	 less	 important	or	more	
poorly	understood	by	the	public.	These	same	effects	are	also	likely	at	the	state	level.	Thus,	a	
measure	of	public	opinion	within	a	state	on	these	three	specific	issues	will	more	fully	and	
accurately	capture	 the	attitudes	of	state	residents	 toward	the	 issues	of	 interest	and	most	
appropriate	for	this	study.			
Two	 methodologies	 exist	 to	 obtain	 such	 state‐level	 opinion	 on	 specific	 topics	 –	
disaggregation	and	MRP.	 I	 seek	 to	create	a	dynamic	measure	of	 state	opinion	 in	order	 to	
evaluate	the	relationship	between	state	public	opinion	at	the	time	of	a	judicial	decision	and	
the	decision	itself.	Thus,	I	need	a	yearly	measurement	of	state	public	opinion.	This	makes	
the	 disaggregation	method	 virtually	 impossible	 here.	 EWM	had	 to	 aggregate	 13	 years	 of	
national	surveys	in	order	to	obtain	large	enough	sample	sizes	from	each	state	to	create	one	
measure	 of	 state	 ideology	 and	 one	 measuring	 partisanship.	 For	 this	 study	 to	 obtain	
estimates	of	state	public	opinion	on	a	yearly	basis,	I	would	need	to	find	dozens	of	national	
surveys	every	year	of	my	study,	all	containing	similar	enough	questions	about	each	topic	
area	to	enable	combining	the	respondents	together.	Even	if	I	could	find	enough	surveys	to	
accomplish	 this,	 the	resulting	state‐level	opinion	may	suffer	 from	non‐representativeness	
(Pacheco	2011).		
The	 myriad	 limitations	 of	 the	 disaggregation	 method,	 especially	 for	 dynamic	
measures	of	opinion,	have	fueled	a	scholarly	trend	toward	the	MRP	method	in	just	the	last	
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few	years.	The	MRP	method	is	a	way	to	simulate	state	public	opinion	using	national	survey	
data	 in	conjunction	with	geographic	and	demographic	data.	The	 first	step	uses	multilevel	
regression	analysis	of	one	or	more	national	 surveys	 to	estimate	 the	opinions	of	different	
categories	 of	 individuals	 (often	 called	 “person	 types”)	 on	 a	 particular	 topic.	 The	 person	
types	are	based	on	several	individual	factors,	including	gender,	race,	age,	and	education,	as	
well	as	state	of	residence	and	region.	Each	individual	respondent’s	opinion	is	treated	as	a	
function	of	his	 or	her	demographic	 and	geographic	 characteristics.	The	 second	 step	uses	
U.S.	Census	data	to	identify	how	many	of	each	person	type	live	in	each	state;	for	example,	
how	 many	 (1)	 white,	 (2)	 18‐25	 year	 old,	 (3)	 college‐educated,	 (4)	 women	 live	 in	 (5)	
Missouri.	Poststratification	then	estimates	overall	state	opinion	based	on	the	percentage	of	
each	 person	 type	 within	 a	 state	 (for	 further	 explanation	 see	 Park,	 Gelman,	 and	 Bafumi	
2006;	Pacheco	2011;	and	Lax	and	Phillips	2009).						
Scholars	are	still	experimenting	with	MRP	and	its	many	potential	uses.	Although	still	
relatively	new,	this	innovative	method	has	been	rigorously	tested	by	a	number	of	scholars	
and	has	 universally	 been	 found	 to	 provide	more	 accurate	 and	 reliable	 estimates	 of	 state	
public	 opinion	 than	 disaggregation,	 especially	 when	 using	 smaller	 national	 sample	 sizes	
(e.g.	 Pacheco	 2014;	 Lewis,	Wood,	 and	 Jacobsmeier	 2014;	 Enns	 and	 Koch	 2013;	 Lax	 and	
Phillips	 2009).	 In	 fact,	 MRP	 provides	 further	 benefits	 in	 addition	 to	 increased	 accuracy,	
including	 increased	 representativeness	 and	 increased	 reliability	 of	 estimates	 for	 less	
populous	 states.	 National	 surveys	 typically	 use	 sampling	 designs	 that	 are	 aimed	 to	 be	
representative	 of	 the	 nation,	 but	 not	 individual	 states.	 Additionally,	 the	 number	 of	
respondents	from	small	states	in	national	surveys	can	result	in	very	small	sample	sizes	for	
those	states.	The	MRP	method	helps	overcome	both	of	these	problems.	It	adjusts	estimates	
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of	 state‐level	 opinion	 and	 partially	 pools	 data	 across	 states	 using	 multilevel	 modeling,	
resulting	 in	poststratified	estimates	 that	 are	more	 representative	of	 states	and	are	much	
more	 reliable	 for	 less	 populous	 states	 (Pacheco	 2011;	 Lax	 and	 Phillips	 2009).	 Further,	
scholars	 have	 concluded	 that	 the	 MRP	 method	 provides	 valid,	 accurate,	 and	 reliable	
estimates	 even	 when	 using	 only	 a	 single	 large	 national	 survey	 (Lax	 and	 Phillips	 2009;	
Lewis,	Wood,	and	Jacobsmeier	2014).	
For	 purposes	 of	 my	 study,	 I	 need	 to	 obtain	 state‐level	 public	 opinion	 that	 (1)	
includes	each	of	the	22	years	my	data	set	covers	and	(2)	is	specific	to	each	of	my	three	issue	
areas.	 The	 best	 data	 source	 to	 accomplish	 both	 of	 these	 requirements	 is	 General	 Social	
Survey	(GSS)	data.	The	National	Opinion	Research	Center	(NORC)	has	conducted	the	GSS	on	
an	 annual	 or	 biennial	 basis	 since	 1972.	 One	 of	 the	 biggest	 benefits	 of	 the	 GSS	 is	 that	 it	
repeats	certain	core	questions	every	time	it	is	administered,	including	questions	on	each	of	
my	 three	 issue	 areas.	 Although	 the	 GSS	was	 administered	 biennially	 for	 the	 time	 period	
covered	in	my	analysis,	data	for	the	in‐between	years	can	easily	be	imputed.	Further,	while	
the	sampling	strategy	used	in	administering	the	GSS	is	not	aimed	at	providing	samples	that	
are	representative	of	individual	states,	scholarly	analysis	of	state	samples	has	shown	they	
typically	 end	 up	 being	 representative	 nonetheless	 (Brace,	 Sims‐Butler,	 Arceneaux,	 and	
Johnson	2002).	
Two	very	recent	scholarly	works	demonstrate	the	utility	of	GSS	data	to	obtain	yearly	
state	 opinion	 on	 specific	 topics.	 Lewis,	Wood,	 and	 Jacobsmeier	 (2014)	 applied	 the	MRP	
approach	to	GSS	data	from	1980	to	2010	to	obtain	state‐level	opinion	on	gay	rights,	using	
answers	 to	 the	 question	 whether	 respondents	 believe	 that	 homosexual	 sex	 is	 always,	
almost	always,	sometimes,	or	never	wrong.	They	repeat	the	MRP	method	for	each	year	of	
61	
 
	
 
GSS	data	in	order	to	obtain	biennial	measurements	of	opinion	and	to	examine	the	change	in	
state	opinion	over	time.	They	use	the	resulting	specific	state	opinion	variable	 to	evaluate	
the	impact	of	such	opinion	on	the	decisions	of	state	judges	and	find	that	it	does	influence	
judges	in	states	with	certain	types	of	institutions	and	electoral	retention	methods.	Pacheco	
(2014)	uses	 the	MRP	method	 to	 analyze	 the	 stability	of	 state	public	opinion	on	abortion	
from	 1977	 to	 2004	 as	 measured	 by	 GSS	 and	 National	 Election	 Survey	 (NES)	 data.	 Both	
studies	confirm	the	validity	and	accuracy	of	the	MRP	method	when	used	to	estimate	state	
opinion	from	a	single	national	survey,	as	well	as	the	usefulness	of	GSS	data	when	estimates	
of	opinion	on	specific	topics	are	necessary.		
Following	the	lead	of	these	scholars,	 I	use	GSS	data	from	1991	to	2012	in	order	to	
obtain	estimates	of	state‐level	opinion	on	gay	rights,	abortion,	and	affirmative	action8.	The	
specific	 question	 I	 used	 to	 measure	 attitudes	 toward	 gay	 rights	 was	 the	 respondents’	
opinion	 on	 sexual	 relations	 between	 two	 adults	 of	 the	 same	 sex	 –	 always	wrong,	 almost	
always	wrong,	 sometimes	wrong,	 and	not	wrong	 at	 all.	 The	question	 I	 used	 for	 abortion	
was	respondents’	opinion	on	whether	or	not	it	should	be	possible	for	a	pregnant	woman	to	
obtain	a	 legal	 abortion	 if	 the	woman	wants	 it	 for	any	 reason	–	 yes	or	no.	The	question	 I	
used	to	measure	attitudes	toward	affirmative	action	was	whether	the	respondent	was	for	
or	 against	 preferential	 hiring	 and	 promotion	 of	 blacks	 –	 strongly	 support	 preferences,	
support	 preferences,	 oppose	 preferences,	 or	 strongly	 oppose	 preferences9.	 In	 order	 to	
                                                            
8	 Publically	 available	 GSS	 data	 only	 include	 respondents’	 region,	 not	 state	 of	 residence,	 as	 NORC	 considers	 state	 of	
residence	 to	be	 “sensitive	data”.	However,	NORC	does	make	such	data	available	 for	purchase	under	certain	conditions,	
one	being	the	destruction	of	all	data	sets	that	include	any	sensitive	data,	such	as	state	of	residence	of	respondents,	once	
statistical	 analysis	 is	 complete.	 Thus,	 that	 part	 of	my	 data	 set	 is	 not	 available	 for	 replication	 purposes.	 However,	 the	
resulting	 state	public	 opinion	variable	obtained	utilizing	 the	MRP	method	on	 the	GSS	data	 in	 conjunction	with	Census	
data,	as	well	as	the	rest	of	my	data	set	containing	all	other	variables,	is	available	and	can	be	provided	upon	request.	
9	Although	perhaps	not	the	most	ideal	questions	to	measure	opinion	on	these	issues,	especially	the	gay	rights	question,	
they	appear	to	be	the	best	option	available	for	questions	that	are	repeated	each	year	and	are	broad	enough	to	measure	
support	for	gay	rights,	abortion,	and	affirmative	action	generally,	as	opposed	to	specific	applications	of	each.	
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provide	an	even	larger	sample	size	and	more	accurate	estimates	when	possible,	I	added	in	
NES	 data	 for	 the	 years	 in	which	 similar	 questions	were	 asked	 (1992,	 1996,	 2000,	 2004,	
2008,	 and	2012).	 Several	 scholars	 have	 combined	GSS	 and	NES	data	 in	 this	way	 as	 they	
found	 minimal	 differences	 in	 the	 wording	 of	 relevant	 questions	 as	 well	 as	 the	
administration	of	the	survey	instruments	(Brace	et	al.	2004,	Pacheco	2014).	The	questions	
of	interest	in	the	present	analysis	were	very	similar	in	the	GSS	and	NES	surveys.		
	 Although	 I	 believe	 that	 specific	 public	 opinion	 on	 these	 issue	 areas	 is	 the	 best	
measure	of	state	public	opinion	for	my	study,	I	also	include	two	alternate	general	measures	
of	 state	 ideology.	 The	 first	 is	 the	measure	 of	 state	 ideology	 created	 and	 popularized	 by	
EWM	(1993).	Prior	to	the	more	recent	development	of	the	MRP	method,	this	measure	was	
the	most	commonly	used	proxy	for	state	public	opinion	for	scholars	studying	state	policy	
and	opinion.	Subsequent	work	by	Pacheco	(2011)	built	on	EWM’s	measures	and	developed	
yearly	 estimates	 of	 state	 ideology	 using	 the	 MRP	 method.	 Thus,	 I	 include	 Pacheco’s	
estimates	for	as	many	years	as	possible	in	my	data	set10.	The	second	alternative	measure	of	
state	 opinion	 I	 include	 is	 Berry	 et	 al.’s	 (1998,	 2007)	 yearly	 estimates	 of	 state	 “policy	
mood”11.	This	 is	a	measure	of	operational	 ideology,	 i.e.	how	state	residents	 feel	about	the	
job	 their	 state	 representatives	 are	 doing,	 and	 it	 can	 vary	 significantly	 from	year	 to	 year.	
Conversely,	 EWM’s	 measure	 best	 captures	 symbolic	 ideology,	 or	 how	 individual	 state	
residents	 self‐identify	 with	 a	 particular	 political	 party	 or	 ideological	 grouping	 (Pacheco	
2011;	 Norrander	 2007).	 Other	 scholars	 have	 argued	 that	 Berry’s	 measure	 is	 more	
representative	of	elite	preferences	than	those	of	the	public	and	are	thus	inappropriate	as	a	
                                                            
10	Pacheco’s	measures	are	kindly	made	available	on	her	website;	however,	those	data	are	currently	only	available	through	
2006.	
11	These	data	are	also	generously	provided	by	the	authors	and	are	available	for	the	entire	time	period	in	my	data	set.	
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proxy	 for	 state‐level	mass	public	opinion	 (Brace	et	 al.	 2004).	Nonetheless,	 I	 include	both	
measures	in	alternate	models	in	order	to	assess	the	relationship	of	each	differing	measure	
of	general	state	ideology	to	district	judge	decision	making.	
3. Strategic	Factors	
In	 order	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 strategic	 model	 of	 judicial	 decision	 making	 as	
described	in	the	previous	chapter,	I	need	to	include	as	independent	variables	those	factors	
that	may	point	to	strategic	behavior	by	district	judges.	As	Baum	(1997)	explains	in	his	book	
The	Puzzle	of	 Judicial	Behavior,	 the	 label	 “strategic	behavior”	can	apply	 to	many	different	
types	of	 behavior,	which	 are	often	 lumped	 together	 confusingly	under	 rational	 choice	or	
strategic	models.	For	example,	 the	 form	of	 judicial	strategy	can	consist	of	either	strategic	
voting	 or	 a	wide	 variety	 of	 other	 strategic	 non‐voting	 behavior	 (choosing	 cases,	 opinion	
assignment,	 formation	 of	 coalitions,	 etc.).	 The	 time	 horizon	 of	 judicial	 behavior	 can	 be	
considered	 either	 short‐term	 (one‐shot	 games)	 or	 long‐term	 (future	 cases).	 Additionally,	
the	 target	 of	 judicial	 strategy	 can	 be	 either	 the	 judge’s	 own	 court	 or	 other	 institutions,	
especially	higher	 courts	 that	have	 the	power	of	 review	over	decisions	of	 a	district	 judge.	
Studies	of	strategic	behavior	typically	research	one	or	several	related	aspects	of	strategic	
behavior	in	order	to	prove	that	judges	act	strategically.	Some	of	these	aspects	apply	only	to	
Supreme	Court	justices,	and	others	apply	to	appellate	judges	sitting	in	panels.	Only	a	few	of	
these	aspects	apply	to	district	court	judges.	District	court	judges	do	not	sit	in	panels	and	do	
not	choose	their	own	cases;	 thus,	strategic	non‐voting	behavior	 is	not	an	area	of	 interest.	
Likewise,	 district	 court	 judges,	 sitting	 alone,	 likely	 would	 not	 vote	 against	 their	 policy	
preferences	in	one	case	for	the	purpose	of	advancing	their	preferences	overall,	as	coalition	
forming	 and	 quid	 pro	 quo	 voting	 are	 only	 possible	 on	 appellate	 panels.	 Consequently,	 a	
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judge’s	own	court	would	not	be	a	target	of	judicial	strategy,	as	each	district	judge	in	essence	
is	the	court.	That	leaves	other	institutions	as	the	only	probable	target	of	judicial	strategy	at	
the	district	court	level.	
Acting	strategically	 in	order	to	garner	 favor	and	not	derision	 from	upper	courts	 is	
not	straightforward.	Many	cases	are	not	appealed,	and	the	vast	majority	of	cases	that	are	
appealed	are	upheld	by	the	circuit	courts	of	appeal.	Thus,	a	district	 judge	concerned	with	
the	possibility	of	reversal	must	try	and	predict	the	likelihood	that	a	case	will	be	appealed	
and	that	the	appellate	court	panel	will	reverse	it.	Circuit	courts	of	appeals	sit	 in	panels	of	
three	 randomly	 assigned	 judges,	 so	 the	 chances	 of	 reversal	 can	 vary	with	 the	 particular	
panel	chosen.	The	large	amount	of	uncertainty	involved	can	make	this	a	difficult	prediction	
for	a	district	 court	 judge	 to	make.	However,	district	 judges	can	gather	 information	about	
the	appellate	judges	and	their	ideologies	and	preferences	based	on	their	experiences	with	
them	over	 time.	 Similarly,	 the	overall	 ideological	makeup	of	 a	 circuit	 court	of	 appeal	 can	
give	 a	 district	 court	 a	 good	 idea	 of	 how	 likely	 a	 case	 is	 to	 be	 overturned	 if	 it	 involves	
ideological	issues.	Circuit	courts	that	are	evenly	split	into	judges	appointed	by	Republican	
and	Democratic	presidents	will	not	provide	much	help	to	district	court	judges	attempting	
predictions,	but	those	circuit	courts	with	a	majority	(especially	a	strong	majority)	of	judges	
appointed	by	one	party	or	the	other	can	increase	the	percentage	changes	of	a	like‐minded	
(or	opposite‐minded)	appellate	panel.	For	circuit	courts	for	which	this	is	the	case,	district	
judges	may	be	more	likely	to	think	twice	before	deciding	on	the	basis	of	ideology	when	the	
intermediate	appellate	court	above	them	is	ideologically	different	from	them.	
In	order	to	test	my	hypothesis	that	strategic	factors	should	not	substantially	impact	
judicial	 decision	 making	 in	 highly	 salient	 and	 political	 areas,	 I	 include	 two	 alternative	
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measures	of	the	strategic	environment	faced	by	District	Court	judges.	The	first	is	a	Circuit	
Ideology	variable	measuring	the	ideology	of	the	circuit	court	as	a	whole	at	the	time	of	each	
lower	court	ruling.	I	include	two	different	measurements	for	circuit	court	ideology	in	order	
to	 line	 them	up	with	my	 two	measurements	 of	 district	 judge	 ideology.	 The	 first,	 “Circuit	
Ideology	 I”,	uses	party	of	 the	appointing	president	 to	determine	 the	majority	 ideology	of	
each	circuit.	If	the	majority	of	judges	in	a	circuit	were	appointed	by	a	Democratic	president,	
the	 court	 is	 coded	 a	 “0”,	 and	 if	 the	 majority	 of	 judges	 were	 appointed	 by	 a	 Republican	
president,	the	court	is	coded	a	“1”,	and	if	the	Circuit	were	split,	it	is	coded	a	“2”.	The	second	
variable,	“Circuit	Ideology	2”,	provides	a	more	accurate	measurement	of	the	composition	of	
a	circuit	court	by	supplying	the	median	Common	Space	score	of	each	circuit.	Each	variable	
will	be	included	in	the	corresponding	regression	model	(Party	of	the	Appointing	President	
model	or	Common	Space	Score	Model)	in	order	to	assess	the	impact	of	strategy	on	district	
court	judges	in	cases	involving	politically	charged	constitutional	issue	areas.		
The	 alternate	 measure	 I	 utilized	 for	 strategy,	 “Circuit	 Difference”,	 is	 meant	 to	
capitalize	 on	 the	 ideological	 conflict	 between	 a	 district	 court	 judge	 and	 those	 with	 the	
ability	 to	 reverse	 his	 or	 her	 decisions.	 As	 with	 Circuit	 Ideology,	 it	 is	 generated	 in	 two	
different	 ways	 for	 the	 two	 different	 regression	 models.	 For	 the	 Party	 of	 Appointing	
President	model,	I	generated	a	binary	variable	(“Circuit	Difference	1”)	–	0	if	the	majority	of	
judges	in	a	circuit	were	appointed	by	presidents	from	the	same	party	as	the	district	judge,	
or	 if	 the	 circuit	were	 split,	 and	1	 if	 the	majority	 of	 the	 circuit	 judges	were	 appointed	by	
presidents	from	a	different	party.	For	the	Common	Space	Score	model,	I	took	the	absolute	
difference	 between	 the	 median	 circuit	 common	 space	 score	 and	 the	 district	 judge’s	
common	 space	 score	 (“Circuit	Difference	 2”).	 Thus,	 as	 Circuit	Difference	 2	 increases,	 the	
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greater	the	distance	between	the	judge’s	ideology	and	that	of	his	or	her	reviewing	circuit.	I	
interact	 Circuit	Difference	with	 Judge’s	 Ideology	 to	 test	whether	 the	 influence	 of	 judicial	
ideology	is	dampened	when	he	or	she	sits	in	a	circuit	with	opposite	party	control,	or	when	
his	or	her	ideology	is	far	apart	from	the	reviewing	circuit’s	median	ideology.	For	both	of	my	
strategy	measures,	if	district	judges	do	not	participate	in	strategic	anticipation	as	described	
in	the	previous	chapter,	than	neither	the	ideology	of	the	appellate	court	above	them	nor	the	
difference	between	judicial	ideology	and	circuit	ideology	should	influence	case	outcomes.	If	
judges	do	operate	to	a	significant	extent	under	a	constant	“fear	of	reversal”,	one	or	both	of	
the	strategic	variables	in	my	regression	analysis	should	indicate	this	(Randazzo	2008).	
Other	Independent/Control	Variables	
In	 order	 to	 determine	 whether	 judicial	 ideology,	 strategic	 factors,	 and/or	 state	
public	opinion	are	 in	 fact	predictors	of	 judicial	decision	making,	 I	 include	several	control	
variables	in	my	analysis	that	may	also	impact	a	judge’s	decision	making.	
1. Personal	Characteristics	
Various	 personal	 characteristics	 could	 potentially	 influence	 judicial	 decision	
making.	In	general,	studies	focusing	on	the	personal	characteristics	of	judges	have	typically	
found	 little	 to	no	effect	on	decision	making	 in	most	 types	of	cases.	Race	and	gender	have	
been	most	extensively	studied,	and	little	evidence	of	any	variation	exists,	outside	of	limited	
findings	 in	 certain	 cases	 involving	 criminal	 sentencing	 (Cross	 2007).	 However,	 several	
scholars	have	found	personal	characteristics	to	have	a	significant	effect	in	one	issue	area	in	
particular	 –	 civil	 rights	 actions.	 For	 example,	 Pinello	 (2003)	 found	 gender,	 race,	 and	
religion	 all	 to	 have	 dramatic	 effects	 on	 judicial	 voting	 in	 gay	 rights	 cases	 spanning	 from	
1981	 to	 2000.	 However,	 his	 study	 encompassed	 both	 federal	 and	 state	 appellate	 courts,	
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and	the	role	of	these	background	characteristics	was	stronger	in	state	courts,	while	party	
affiliation	played	a	 larger	role	 in	 federal	courts.	Nevertheless,	background	characteristics,	
especially	 gender,	 race,	 and	 religious	 affiliation	 certainly	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 impact	
judicial	decision	making	 in	 cases	 involving	 civil	 rights	and	civil	 liberties	 issues,	 including	
gay	 rights,	 abortion,	 and	 affirmative	 action.	 For	 this	 reason	 and	 those	 indicated	 below,	 I	
include	each	of	these	characteristics	as	control	variables	in	my	quantitative	analysis.	
Gender	–	I	control	for	gender,	as	women	are	typically	more	supportive	of	gay	rights	
and	reproductive	rights	than	men.	Overall,	the	research	on	the	impact	of	gender	on	judicial	
decision	making	has	produced	mixed	findings.	However,	at	least	some	scholars	have	found	
a	 significant	 impact	 of	 gender	 on	 decisions	 in	 particular	 types	 of	 cases,	 specifically	 sex	
discrimination	 lawsuits.	 For	 example,	 Peresie	 (2005)	 examined	 federal	 appellate	 court	
cases	 from	1999‐2001	regarding	sexual	harassment	or	sex	discrimination	and	found	that	
female	 judges	were	 twice	as	 likely	 to	 find	 in	 favor	of	 the	plaintiff	 as	male	 judges.	Thus,	 I	
expect	that	female	judges	will	be	more	likely	to	rule	in	a	liberal	direction	in	each	issue	area,	
especially	 in	 gay	 rights	 and	abortion	 cases.	 I	 coded	each	 judge’s	 gender	 as	0	 (male)	or	1	
(female)	 based	 on	 the	 self‐reported	 data	 available	 from	 the	 Federal	 Judicial	 Center	
(www.fjc.gov)	database.		
Race	–	Some	scholars	have	asserted	that	judges	from	marginalized	racial	groups	are	
more	likely	to	rule	in	a	liberal	way	than	white	judges,	although	studies	generally	show	only	
insignificant	 correlations	 (Peresie	 2005).	 However,	 race	 has	 been	 a	 significant	 factor	 in	
particular	categories	of	cases,	especially	those	 involving	civil	rights	generally,	or	rights	of	
minority	groups	specifically	(see	e.g.	Ifill	2000;	Pinello	2003).	Since	my	issue	areas	involve	
civil	rights	and	civil	liberties	claims,	including	the	often	racially	charged	issue	of	affirmative	
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action,	I	decided	to	include	race	as	a	control.	I	expect	that	non‐white	judges	are	more	likely	
to	rule	in	favor	of	affirmative	action.	I	used	a	dummy	variable	to	code	racial	minority	judges	
as	1	and	everyone	else	0.	I	obtained	information	on	race	from	self‐reported	data	available	
from	the	Federal	Judicial	Center	database.		
Religion	–	It	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	sincerely	held	religious	beliefs	will	play	a	
role	in	the	value	choices	an	individual	makes,	including	judges’	decisions.	The	evidence	on	
the	 influence	 of	 religious	 affiliation	 on	 judicial	 decision	 making	 has	 generally	 been	 less	
compelling	than	evidence	of	ideological	effects.	However,	religion	has	been	shown	to	have	a	
powerful	effect	in	cases	involving	morality	policy	or	other	stereotypical	religious	concerns	
(Alumbaugh	 and	 Rowland	 1990).	 I	 expect	 a	 judge’s	 religion	 may	 influence	 his	 or	 her	
decision	 making	 in	 the	 cases	 examined	 here,	 especially	 those	 involving	 gay	 rights	 and	
abortion;	namely,	 that	 judges	 identifying	with	more	“conservative”	religions	will	be	more	
likely	 to	 rule	 against	 gay	 rights	 and	 abortion	 rights.	 I	 include	 a	measure	 of	 each	 district	
judge’s	 religion,	 coded	either	 as	Catholic,	Mainline	Protestant,	Other	Christian,	 Jewish,	 or	
Non‐affiliated,	 which	 includes	 judges	 that	 refused	 to	 provide	 their	 affiliation,	 based	 on	
information	that	I	obtained	from	The	American	Bench	(published	biennially	by	Reincke	and	
Wilhelmi).	
2. State	Culture	
The	political	culture	of	a	state	is	distinct	from	its	political	ideology	as	a	“red”	state	or	
“blue”	state.	Political	culture	is	deeper	and	broader	than	that	–	it	provides	individuals	with	
their	 social	 identities	 and	 provides	 societal	 norms	 and	 values	 regarding	 acceptable	
behavior	 of	 individuals,	 groups,	 and	 government	 institutions	 (Wildavsky	 1987).	 Culture	
entails	a	shared	set	of	values	regarding	the	proper	roles	of	citizens	and	elites	in	politics,	the	
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relationship	between	citizens	and	officials,	and	the	role	of	government	in	meeting	societal	
needs.	The	political	culture	of	a	state	is	based	on	historical	developments,	most	importantly	
the	patterns	of	westward	migration	occurring	after	the	colonial	period.			
Elazar’s	 (1984)	 typology	 is	 the	most	 prominent	measure	 of	 state	 political	 culture	
and	has	been	widely	used	in	many	different	types	of	studies	examining	differences	between	
states.	 He	 differentiated	 between	 three	 dominant	 political	 subcultures:	 moralistic,	
individualistic,	and	traditionalistic.	States	exhibiting	the	moralistic	culture	view	politics	as	
an	important	and	beneficial	activity	in	which	all	citizens	should	participate.	The	focus	is	on	
the	 collective	 public	 good	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 individual	 good,	 and	 the	 purpose	 of	
governmental	 institutions	 is	 to	 promote	 and	 protect	 the	 public	 welfare.	 Individualistic	
states	view	politics	as	a	marketplace.	Government	should	be	limited,	should	not	intervene	
in	the	marketplace,	and	should	not	restrict	private	activities.	For	this	reason,	the	public	has	
a	 limited	 role	 to	 play	 in	 government.	 Traditionalistic	 political	 culture	 focuses	 on	 the	
protection	 of	 elites	 –	 the	 government’s	 role	 should	 be	 limited	 to	 maintaining	 the	 social	
order,	and	should	be	left	to	those	with	the	ability	and	knowledge	to	do	so	properly.	
Although	relatively	simplistic,	scholars	have	consistently	found	Elazar’s	typology	to	
be	 a	 reliable	 predictor	 of	 variation	 in	 public	 policy,	 political	 decision	making,	 and	 other	
political	 phenomena	 among	 states.	 A	 recent	 study	 by	 Patrick	 Fisher	 (2010)	 found	 state	
political	 culture	 to	be	a	significant	predictor	of	vote	share	 for	Barack	Obama	 in	 the	2008	
presidential	 primaries,	 more	 so	 than	 state	 political	 characteristics	 and	 primary	
demographics.	He	found	that	states	characterized	by	a	moralistic	culture	were	more	likely	
to	support	Obama	instead	of	Hillary	Clinton,	while	traditionalistic	or	individualistic	states	
were	less	likely	to	support	Obama.			
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Erikson,	Wright,	and	McIver	(1993)	included	state	political	culture	in	their	analysis	
of	 state	 public	 opinion	 and	 legislative	 policy.	 They	 found	 strong	 support	 for	 Elazar’s	
typology	 as	 a	 separate	 and	 distinct	 influence	 from	 state	 ideology	 as	 it	 applies	 to	 policy	
outcomes.	Public	opinion	had	a	 significant	direct	effect	on	policy	 in	 individualistic	 states,	
which	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 individualistic	 culture	 of	 pragmatic	 politicians	 primarily	
concerned	 with	 re‐election.	 Conversely,	 state	 legislatures	 were	 much	 less	 responsive	 to	
public	 opinion	 in	 traditionalist	 states,	 where	 elites	 tend	 to	 ignore	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	
uninformed	 masses,	 and	 in	 moralistic	 states,	 where	 officials	 are	 more	 concerned	 with	
imposing	their	version	of	the	“public	good”	as	opposed	to	simply	following	public	opinion	
(Erikson	et	al.	1993).	
Hundreds	 of	 studies	 have	 included	 Elazar’s	 political	 culture	 typology	 as	 an	
independent	 variable	 in	 their	 analysis	 of	 political	 phenomena	 at	 the	 state	 level,	 often	
simply	 as	 a	 control	 variable.	 I	 include	 it	 in	 order	 to	 control	 for	 differences	 in	 political	
culture	 that	may	 be	 distinct	 from	 differences	 in	 state	 ideology.	My	 purpose	 in	 including	
state	 political	 culture	 as	 a	 variable	 is	 twofold.	 First,	 I	 want	 to	 analyze	 the	 relationship	
between	state	culture	type	and	state	public	opinion	in	these	three	highly	ideological	issue	
areas;	for	example,	whether	moralistic	states	have	more	liberal	viewpoints	on	these	issues,	
as	well	as	the	potential	impact	on	judges	in	those	states.	To	achieve	this,	I	include	a	variable	
interacting	state	public	opinion	with	state	political	culture.	Secondly,	I	want	to	examine	the	
impact	 of	 state	 culture	 on	 my	 primary	 dependent	 variable	 –	 judicial	 decision	 making.	
District	 court	 judges,	 as	 longtime	 residents	of	 the	 states	where	 they	preside,	presumably	
have	 been	 influenced	 by	 that	 state’s	 political	 culture	 and	may	 reflect	 the	 corresponding	
attitudes	 about	 the	 role	 of	 government,	 importance	 of	 public	 good,	 and	 citizens’	 rights.	
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Thus,	state	political	culture	could	impact	the	policy	decisions	of	judges	as	it	does	the	policy	
decisions	of	state	legislators.	I	expect	that	judges	in	traditionalistic	states	are	more	likely	to	
oppose	gay	rights,	abortion	rights,	and	affirmative	action	policies	than	judges	in	moralistic	
states,	and	that	judges	in	individualistic	states	are	more	likely	to	oppose	affirmative	action	
policies,	but	not	necessarily	gay	rights	or	abortion	rights,	than	judges	in	moralistic	states.		
3. Region	
A	number	of	studies	have	discovered	regional	variations	in	the	decisions	of	district	
judges.	Early	studies	of	the	district	courts	found	southern	judges	to	be	more	conservative	
on	issues	such	as	race	relations	(Peltason	1955;	Vines	1964;	Giles	and	Walker	1975)	and	
abortion	(Alumbaugh	and	Rowland	1990),	regardless	of	which	president	appointed	them.	
More	recent	studies	have	shown	the	difference	between	south	and	non‐south	decisions	to	
have	mostly	disappeared	since	1977,	with	the	exception	of	race	relations	cases,	which	still	
show	 substantial	 variation	 (Rowland	 and	 Carp	 1996).	 I	 suspect	 that	 judges	 located	 in	
southern	 states	may	 be	more	 likely	 to	 rule	 against	 gay	 rights,	 abortion,	 and	 affirmative	
action	policies	than	judges	in	other	states.	Therefore,	I	include	a	dummy	variable	indicating	
whether	the	district	court	is	located	in	the	south12	(coded	as	1)	or	not	(coded	as	0).	
4. Legal	Factors	
Perhaps	the	most	difficult	factors	to	accurately	capture	via	empirical	measurement	
are	legal	factors	influencing	a	judicial	decision.	Legal	factors	certainly	play	a	role	in	judicial	
decision	making	and	should	therefore	be	controlled	for	when	analyzing	the	impact	of	other	
factors.	However,	 it	 is	 impossible	for	a	researcher	to	code	a	case	as	correct	or	 incorrectly	
                                                            
12	 I	 used	 Rowland	 and	 Carp’s	 (1996)	 definition	 of	 southern	 courts	 and	 thus	 included	 Alabama,	 Arkansas,	 Delaware,	
Florida,	 Georgia,	 Kentucky,	 Louisiana,	 Maryland,	 Mississippi,	 Missouri,	 North	 Carolina,	 Oklahoma,	 South	 Carolina,	
Tennessee,	Texas,	Virginia,	and	West	Virginia.	
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decided	 without	 second	 guessing	 the	 judge	 and	 bringing	 the	 researcher’s	 own	
interpretations	 of	 law	 and	 biases	 into	 play.	 The	 vast	majority	 of	 cases	 (at	 least	 of	 those	
included	as	substantive,	relevant	cases	in	my	analysis)	have	non‐frivolous	legal	arguments	
on	both	sides.	Typically	both	sides	invoke	legal	precedent	from	upper	courts	as	a	guide	for	
how	and	why	the	district	court	should	rule	in	their	favor;	however,	the	parties	will	either	
cite	differing	precedent	from	each	other	or	differing	interpretations	of	the	same	precedent.	
Either	 way,	 the	 researcher	 cannot	 accurately	 distinguish	 which	 party,	 precedent,	 or	
interpretation	is	correct	without	making	a	purely	subjective	judgment	call.	More	objective	
measures	of	legal	factors,	including	case	type	and	decision	type,	can	shed	some	light	on	the	
role	of	law	in	decision	making	but	cannot	fully	control	for	precedent	or	other	legal	factors.	
However,	 this	 obstacle	 is	 not	 fatal	 to	 the	 study	 of	 judicial	 decision	making,	 as	 statistical	
analysis	allows	us	to	tease	out	the	impacts	of	ideological	and	strategic	factors	despite	not	
having	perfect	controls	for	legal	variables	(Cross	2007).	
Thus,	it	is	important	to	include	legal	factors	to	the	extent	possible	in	order	to	isolate	
the	potential	influence	of	the	law	on	judicial	decisions.	Following	the	literature	on	district	
court	decision	making,	I	have	included	three	legal	variables;	(1)	type	of	case,	(2)	whether	
the	 case	 was	 in	 front	 of	 the	 district	 court	 on	 remand	 from	 an	 appellate	 court,	 and	 (3)	
whether	the	judge’s	decision	was	based	primarily	on	findings	of	fact	or	conclusions	of	law.		
For	each	case	in	my	data	set,	I	coded	the	category	of	the	major	factual	and/or	legal	
issue	involved.	I	subsequently	reclassified	the	cases	into	a	quantity	of	categories	that	was	
amenable	 to	 inclusion	 as	 a	 variable.	 Initial	 categories	 that	 were	 closely	 related	 to	 one	
another	 were	 collapsed	 into	 one	 final	 category.	 I	 combined	 and	 eliminated	 as	 many	
categories	as	possible	in	this	way	until	I	was	left	with	discrete,	unique	categories	that	could	
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not	 be	 collapsed	 any	 further	 without	 distorting	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 case	 types.	 These	
classifications	help	control	for	the	role	of	precedent	in	judicial	decision	making.	If	one	type	
of	 case	 is	 more	 consistently	 decided	 in	 a	 particular	 way	 than	 the	 other	 case	 types,	 the	
reason	may	be	that	Supreme	Court	precedent	 is	clearer	in	that	area	of	 law,	 forcing	 lower	
court	judges	to	follow	precedent	despite	personal	preferences.	
As	 demonstrated	 by	 Table	 5	 below,	 for	 gay	 rights	 cases,	 there	 were	 eight	 final	
categories:	 (1)	employment	discrimination	or	harassment,	 (2)	gay	marriage,	 (3)	prisoner	
discrimination	or	harassment,	(4)	other	discrimination	or	harassment	(service	cost,	police	
treatment,	city	treatment,	school	harassment,	club	membership,	housing,	etc.),	(5)	privacy	
issues	 or	 defamation,	 (6)	 domestic	 partnerships	 and	 benefits/adoption	 (7)	 upholding	
action	protecting	gay	rights	(protect	non‐discrimination	policy,	hate	crimes,	give	same‐sex	
couples	 benefits,	 etc.),	 and	 (8)	 Military	 discrimination,	 including	 “Don’t	 Ask,	 Don’t	 Tell”	
cases.	Table	5	provides	a	 look	at	 the	percentages	of	each	case	 type	within	 the	gay	 rights	
data	set.		
 
Table	5	
Gay	Rights	Case	Types	1991‐2012	
 
Case	Type	 Frequency Percent	
Employment	 115 38.72	
Marriage	 15 5.05	
Prisoner	 26 8.75	
Other	Discrimination/Harassment	 67 22.56	
Privacy	 7 2.36	
Domestic	Benefits	 7 2.36	
Government/Private	Action	in	Support	 40 13.47	
Military/DADT	 20 6.73	
Total	 297 100.00	
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	As	shown	in	Table	6,	I	coded	five	different	types	of	abortion	cases:	(1)	restrictions	
to	 abortion	 access/undue	 burden	 on	 individuals	 and	 clinics,	 (2)	 challenging	 government	
and/or	 private	 action	 restricting	 abortion	 providers’	 rights,	 (3)	 individual	 rights	 to	
abortion,	(4)	upholding	government	action	to	protect	access	to	abortion	clinics	or	protect	
abortion	 providers,	 and	 (5)	 upholding	 action	 to	 not	 promote	 or	 allow	 anti‐abortion	
messages	&	to	restrict	protestors.	
 
Table	6	
Abortion	Case	Types	1991‐2012	
 
Case	Type	 Frequency Percent	
Undue	Burden	 78 41.71	
Government/Private	Restrictions	 29 15.51	
Individual	Rights	 7 3.74	
Access	to	Clinics	 50 26.74	
Government/Private	Action	in	Support	 23 12.30	
Total	 187 100.00	
	
Lastly,	 I	 coded	 three	 different	 types	 of	 affirmative	 action	 cases:	 (1)	 employment	
policies,	(2)	university	admissions	policies,	and	(3)	policies	regarding	priority	contractors.	
Table	7	breaks	these	case	types	into	percentages.	
 
Table	7	
Affirmative	Action	Case	Types	1991‐2012	
 
Case	Type	 Frequency Percent
Employment	 63 66.32
Education	 10 10.53
Contracting	 22 23.16
Total	 95 100.00
	
Each	case	that	was	on	remand	from	the	circuit	court	of	appeals	was	coded	as	1,	and	
all	 other	 cases	 (the	 vast	majority)	were	 coded	 as	 0.	 Lastly,	 decisions	 based	 primarily	 on	
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findings	of	fact,	which	typically	only	occurred	after	a	trial	was	conducted,	were	coded	as	1,	
while	 decisions	 based	 primarily	 on	 legal	 conclusions	 (the	 vast	 majority	 of	 cases),	 were	
coded	as	0.	Controlling	for	these	legal	variables	will	ensure	that	associations	between	my	
primary	 independent	 variables	 and	 the	 dependent	 variable	 are	 not	 simply	 “artifacts”	 of	
relationships	between	the	dependent	variable	and	certain	case	 types	or	procedures	(Sisk	
and	Heise	2012).	
Statistical	Analysis	
	 The	next	 two	 chapters	 reveal	 the	 results	of	my	analysis.	 Chapter	4	provides	basic	
descriptive	data	and	graphics	to	help	reveal	patterns	of	 judicial	behavior	and	trends	over	
time	 that	 cannot	 be	 easily	 discerned	 from	 regression	 analysis.	 Chapter	 5	 details	 the	
regression	analyses	for	each	of	the	issue	areas	and	examines	the	significant	and	interesting	
results	provided	by	these	analyses.		
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CHAPTER	4	–	TRENDS	IN	DATA	AND	PRELIMINARY	STATISTICS	
	
	 Before	turning	to	the	various	logistic	regression	models	and	analysis	for	each	issue	
area,	it	is	important	to	examine	the	data	more	in	depth.	My	data	set	consists	of	the	entire	
population	of	gay	 rights,	 abortion,	and	affirmative	action	cases	 substantively	 ruled	on	by	
district	court	 judges	 from	1991‐201213.	Thus,	we	can	 learn	quite	a	bit	about	how	district	
judges	have	treated	these	types	of	cases	over	the	last	few	decades	by	examining	trends	in	
the	 data.	 This	 chapter	 traces	 and	 analyzes	 trends	 in	 state‐level	 public	 opinion	 on	 these	
issues	 during	 this	 time	 period,	 as	well	 as	 trends	 in	 support	 of	 and/or	 opposition	 to	 gay	
rights,	 abortion,	 and	 affirmative	 action	 policies	 by	 district	 court	 judges	 by	 tracking	 the	
decisions	in	these	cases.	I	also	conduct	preliminary	statistical	analysis	of	the	relationships	
between	several	of	the	variables	of	interest	in	order	to	get	an	idea	of	how	these	variables	
may	or	may	not	be	associated	with	each	other.	
Gay	Rights	
State‐Level	Public	Opinion	over	Time	
	 One	of	the	primary	reasons	I	chose	gay	rights	as	one	of	my	issue	areas	of	interest	is	
because	 of	 the	 dramatic	 change	 in	 public	 opinion	 over	 a	 relatively	 short	 time	 span.	
Examining	the	differences	in	public	opinion	over	time	and	between	states	provides	context	
for	state‐level	public	opinion	as	a	potential	indicator	of	district	judge	decision	making.	The	
variance	 in	 level	of	support	 for	gay	rights	was	substantial,	ranging	 from	a	 low	of	7.2%	in	
Alabama	in	1991	to	80.3%	in	the	District	of	Columbia	in	2012.	The	average	opinion	across	
all	50	 states	and	Washington	D.C.	 increased	 steadily	every	year	except	 for	a	 small	dip	 in	
                                                            
13	This	is	true	for	at	least	all	of	the	cases	in	which	substantive	decisions	were	made	and	reported.	Certainly	there	are	cases	
not	included	in	this	data	set	that	were	settled	before	a	judge	was	asked	to	make	any	substantive	rulings	or	dismissed	early	
on,	however	those	cases	would	not	add	to	the	discussion	on	judicial	decision	making	and	thus	are	not	considered	part	of	
the	“population”	of	cases	heard	and	substantively	ruled	on	by	district	judges.	
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2004	and	200514,	after	which	it	continued	to	rise	every	year	through	2012,	as	can	be	seen	
in	Figure	2.		
 
Figure	2	
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Gay	Rights	over	Time	in	MA,	MN	&	AL,	Compared	to	the	
Average	Across	all	50	States	(and	DC)	from	1991‐2012		
 
 Sources:	GSS	Data	(1992‐2012)	and	ANES	Data	(1991‐2012)	
 
	
Instead	of	cluttering	up	the	graphics	by	showing	the	dynamic	nature	of	state‐level	
opinion	 in	 all	 states15,	 I	 produced	 a	 graph	 of	 the	 public	 opinion	 trends	 in	 three	
representative	 states:	 one	 state	 in	which	 public	 support	 for	 the	 issue	 has	 typically	 been	
higher	than	in	other	states,	one	state	in	which	the	level	of	support	has	remained	relatively	
                                                            
14	 Conventional	wisdom	 attributes	 this	 brief	 reversal	 in	 the	 upward	 trend	 of	 support	 for	 gay	 rights	 to	 the	 “backlash”	
resulting	 from	 the	 Massachusetts	 Supreme	 Court’s	 2003	 ruling	 that	 gay	 marriage	 could	 not	 be	 banned	 under	 the	
Massachusetts	Constitution,	thereby	making	gay	marriage	legal	in	Massachusetts	(Egan,	Persily,	and	Wallsten	2008).	This	
dip	 in	 public	 support	 disappears	 after	 approximately	 2	 years,	 at	 which	 point	 the	 national	 upward	 trend	 continues	
uninterrupted.	
15	Tables	containing	the	state‐level	opinion	data	for	all	states	for	all	years	can	be	found	in	Appendix	A.	
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moderate,	and	one	state	with	typically	lower	support	for	the	issue.	Figure	2	shows	support	
across	 the	 three	 representative	 states	 I	 chose	 to	 showcase	 gay	 rights	 –	 Massachusetts,	
Minnesota,	and	Alabama	–	compared	to	the	average	across	all	 the	states	and	Washington	
D.C.	The	trend	line	for	Massachusetts	(a	state	that	has	historically	been	more	supportive	of	
gay	rights	than	most	of	the	country)	is	well	above	the	average	level	of	support	across	the	
entire	 time	period.	Conversely,	as	a	state	with	historically	 low	support	 for	gay	rights,	 the	
trend	line	for	Alabama	is	substantially	below	the	average	level	of	support	across	the	entire	
time	period.	Minnesota	is	an	example	of	a	typically	moderate	state	where	the	support	for	
gay	rights	is	in	the	middle	of	the	pack.	In	Minnesota’s	case,	the	support	tracked	the	average	
fairly	closely	 for	 the	 first	 few	years	and	 then	rose	above	 it	 for	 the	 remainder	of	 the	 time	
period.		
Although	the	differences	in	support	between	some	of	the	states	can	be	interesting,	
for	the	most	part	there	are	no	surprises	here.	All	of	the	states	that	I	expected	to	have	higher	
support	 for	 gay	 rights	did,	 and	 those	 I	 expected	 to	have	 lower	 support	 also	matched	my	
expectations.	 The	 sharp	 rise	 in	 support	 held	 across	 all	 states;	 by	 2012,	 every	 state	 had	
significantly	greater	support	for	gay	rights	than	it	did	in	1991.		
District	Court	Decision	Making	over	Time	
	 Another	important	trend	that	can	be	discerned	from	the	data	is	the	frequency	and	
treatment	of	gay	rights	cases	over	time.	While	the	last	section	examined	the	extent	of	the	
public’s	 support	 for	gay	 rights	 from	1991‐2012,	 this	 section	essentially	examines	district	
court	 judge’s	support	 for	gay	rights	during	the	same	time	period.	The	primary	question	I	
seek	to	answer	here	is	whether	judges	“followed”	public	opinion	in	the	sense	that	they	have	
increasingly	ruled	in	favor	of	gay	rights	as	public	support	has	steadily	increased.		
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	 The	issue	of	gay	rights	itself	is	also	dynamic	in	nature,	with	different	types	of	cases	
arising	 in	 the	 courts	 at	 different	 times.	 For	 example,	while	 cases	 regarding	 gay	marriage	
and	 government	 action	 to	 protect	 gay	 rights	 were	 very	 rarely	 seen	 prior	 to	 the	 2000s,	
employment	 discrimination	 and	 harassment	 cases	 were	 common	 throughout	 the	 entire	
time	period	I	examined.	The	overall	number	of	gay	rights	cases	heard	by	district	courts	was	
relatively	low	throughout	the	1990s	with	a	few	spikes	in	1995	and	1999,	but	did	not	see	a	
sharp	increase	until	the	mid‐2000s.	As	Figure	3	shows,	gay	rights	cases	became	much	more	
frequent	after	2004;	indeed,	some	of	the	earlier	years	in	my	data	set	contain	only	a	handful	
of	cases.	
		
Figure	3	
Number	of	Total	Gay	Rights	Decisions	made	by	U.S.	District	Court	Judges	Each	Year	from	
1991‐2012		
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In	addition	to	the	overall	frequency	of	gay	rights	cases	heard	by	the	district	courts	in	
each	year,	it	is	important	to	determine	whether	district	court	judges	became	more	likely	to	
rule	 in	 favor	of	gay	rights	as	 time	progressed.	 	Figure	4	shows	 the	proportion	of	pro‐gay	
rights	decisions	each	year.		
 
Figure	4	
Percentage	of	Total	Cases	Decided	in	Support	of	Gay	Rights	vs.	Percentage	of	Total	Cases	
Decided	in	Opposition	to	Gay	Rights	Each	Year;	Column	Width	Represents	the	Total	
Number	of	Cases	Decided	(in	Either	Direction)	Each	Year 
 
  
	
It	can	be	quickly	discerned	by	looking	at	Figure	4	that	the	proportion	of	cases	with	pro‐gay	
rights	outcomes	did	not	increase	over	time.	In	fact,	some	of	the	earlier	years	in	the	data	set,	
namely	1994	and	1998,	saw	all	of	their	(albeit	small	number	of)	cases	decided	in	favor	of	
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gay	 rights.	 In	more	 recent	 years	we	 see	 a	 relatively	 even	 split	 between	 cases	 decided	 in	
favor	and	those	decided	in	opposition	to	gay	rights.	Overall,	judicial	support	for	gay	rights	
does	not	trend	upward	over	time,	but	remains	relatively	steady.	 	
This	 result	 is	 mildly	 surprising	 as	 I	 expected	 judicial	 support	 for	 gay	 rights	 to	
increase	 over	 time,	 at	 least	 moderately.	 After	 considering	 the	 sharp	 increase	 in	 public	
support	for	gay	rights	in	every	state	from	1991	to	2012,	as	well	as	the	significant	increase	
in	 the	 frequency	 of	 gay	 rights	 cases	 heard	 by	 the	 district	 courts	 over	 that	 time,	 I	 was	
anticipating	 that	 judges	 would	 increasingly	 decide	 cases	 in	 a	 pro‐gay	 rights	 manner	
alongside	 public	 opinion.	 The	 most	 interesting	 statistic	 to	 me	 is	 the	 high	 proportion	 of	
cases	decided	in	favor	of	gay	rights	in	the	1990s;	a	proportion	I	expected	would	be	lower.	
The	 absence	 of	 any	 such	 upward	 trend	 in	 the	 data	 foreshadows	 the	 likely	 results	 from	
including	 state‐level	 public	 opinion	 in	my	 regression	 analysis	 in	 the	 next	 chapter;	 state‐
level	opinion	does	not	appear	to	influence	district	court	judges	in	gay	rights	cases.	
Basic	Descriptive	Associations	
	 In	order	to	more	fully	describe	several	of	the	independent	variables	of	interest	and	
to	 understand	 some	 of	 the	 potential	 relationships	 between	 them	 and	 my	 dependent	
variable,	I	include	here	several	basic	descriptive	tables	and	measures	of	association.	One	of	
my	 primary	 variables	 of	 interest	 is	 judicial	 ideology,	 measured	 both	 by	 party	 of	 the	
appointing	 president	 and	 Common	 Space	 score.	 As	 a	 preliminary	 matter,	 a	 simple	
frequency	table	can	show	us	whether	 judges	appointed	by	Democratic	presidents	tend	to	
rule	 in	 favor	of	 gay	 rights	and	whether	 those	appointed	by	Republicans	more	 commonly	
rule	 against.	 Table	 8	 shows	 just	 that,	 as	 judges	 appointed	 by	 Democrats	 decided	
approximately	 76%	 of	 their	 cases	 in	 favor	 of	 gay	 rights,	 while	 judges	 appointed	 by	
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Republicans	decided	only	45%	of	their	cases	in	favor	of	gay	rights.	The	association	is	highly	
significant,	having	a	chi‐square	of	28.4	and	thus	achieving	significance	at	the	.001	level.	Of	
course,	regression	analysis	may	change	the	significance	of	this	association	when	controlling	
for	additional	variables,	however,	even	the	basic	descriptive	data	here	show	a	fairly	clear	
picture	of	a	relationship	between	judicial	ideology	and	decision	making.		
 
Table	8	
Gay	Rights	Decisions	by	Appointing	President	of	Judge	1991‐2012	
 
	 Decision	
Appointing	 Support	 Oppose	 Total
President	 Frequency	 Percentage Frequency Percentage	
Democrat	 98	 75.97 31 24.03	 129
Republican	 76	 45.24 92 54.76	 168
Total	 174	 58.59 123 41.41	 297
	 	 	
	 	 	 X2	=	28.4022	 Pr	=	0.000	
	 	 	 Cramer’s	V	=	0.3092	 	
 
 
	 Another	 variable	 of	 interest	 is	 case	 type	 and	whether	 it	 has	 any	 impact	 on	which	
cases	are	ruled	in	favor	of	or	against	gay	rights.	As	discussed	in	the	last	chapter,	in	order	to	
control	for	the	possible	effects	of	precedent	and	other	legal	factors,	I	break	down	each	issue	
area	 into	 several	 different	 case	 types.	 I	 attempted	 to	 keep	 the	 number	 of	 case	 types	 as	
minimal	 as	 possible,	 and	 ended	 up	 with	 eight	 discrete	 types	 of	 gay	 rights	 cases.	 I	 ran	
another	frequency	table	showing	how	many	of	each	type	of	case	were	decided	in	support	of	
or	 opposition	 to	 gay	 rights,	 along	 with	 a	 chi‐square	 statistic	 to	 gauge	 significance.	
Additionally,	 I	 created	 a	 horizontal	 bar	 chart	 to	 make	 the	 variation	 between	 case	 types	
more	 easily	 discernable	 at	 a	 glance.	 Throughout	 this	 chapter	 and	 the	 next,	 I	 follow	 the	
recent	trend	in	empirical	legal	research	of	producing	statistical	findings	in	a	more	easy‐to‐
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read	and	quickly	understood	manner,	making	them	accessible	to	legal	scholars	and	others	
who	are	not	social	scientist	empiricists16.		
 
Figure	5	
Numbers	of	Decisions	in	Support	of	Gay	Rights	vs.	Decisions	in	Opposition	to	Gay	Rights,	
Broken	Down	by	Case	Type	(Includes	all	Cases	from	1991‐2012) 
 
 	
Figure	5	shows	that	certain	types	of	cases	were	certainly	more	likely	to	be	decided	
in	 a	 pro‐gay	 rights	 manner,	 especially	 those	 involving	 government	 or	 private	 action	 to	
protect	gay	rights	or	those	involving	non‐employment	and	non‐prisoner	discrimination	or	
harassment	(by	school	officials,	by	the	police,	by	city	officials,	etc.).	Other	case	types	were	
split	 between	 support	 and	 opposition,	 most	 notably	 employment	 discrimination	 or	
harassment	 cases.	 Military	 discrimination	 cases	 (including	 those	 regarding	 the	
                                                            
16	This	idea	has	been	recently	endorsed	by	an	increasing	number	of	well‐known	and	highly	respected	political	scientists	
and	legal	scholars	and	is	considered	by	many	public	law	scholars	to	be	the	norm	going	forward	for	empirical	work	in	this	
field.	I	follow	the	specific	suggestions	and	guidelines	set	forth	by	some	of	these	scholars	throughout	this	dissertation	as	I	
report	my	findings	and	other	statistical	 information.	For	more	information,	see	Epstein	and	Martin	(2014),	King,	Tomz,	
and	Wittenburg	(2000),	and	Epstein	and	King	(2002).		
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constitutionality	 of	 Don’t	 Ask	 Don’t	 Tell)	 were	 the	 only	 subset	 of	 cases	 in	which	 judges	
were	 more	 likely	 to	 rule	 against	 gay	 rights.	 The	 chi‐square	 statistic	 in	 Table	 9	 below	
demonstrates	that	case	type	is	significantly	related	to	decisions	in	gay	rights	cases,	at	the	
.005	 level,	although	several	of	 the	case	 type	categories	have	very	 few	cases.	As	such,	 this	
association	will	be	tested	further	in	the	next	chapter.	
	
Table	9	
Gay	Rights	Decisions	by	Case	Type	1991‐2012	
 
	 Decision	
Case	Type	 Support Oppose	 Total
Employment	 57 58	 115
Marriage	 9 6	 15
Prisoner	 14 12	 26
Other	Discrimination/Harassment	 45 22	 67
Privacy	 5 2	 7
Domestic	Benefits	 4 3	 7
Government/Private	Action	in	Support	 32 8	 40
Military/DADT	 8 12	 20
Total	 174 123	 297
	 	
	 X2	=	17.0313	 Pr	=	0.017	
	 Cramer’s	V	=	0.2395	 	
 
	
Abortion	
	
State‐Level	Public	Opinion	over	Time	
	 Public	opinion	on	abortion	has	remained	remarkably	consistent	over	time,	with	the	
occasional	 spike	 in	 support	 or	 opposition	 to	 abortion	 that	 subsequently	 levels	 out.	 The	
average	support	for	abortion	across	all	the	states	ranged	from	a	low	of	38.6%	in	2004	to	a	
high	of	47.9%	in	1993.	Figure	6	demonstrates	this	stability	in	opinion	over	time,	as	well	as	
comparative	 trends	 in	 three	 representative	 states:	 California,	 Florida,	 and	 Tennessee.	
Similarly	 to	public	 support	 for	 gay	 rights,	 support	 for	 abortion	 in	 some	 states	 (including	
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California)	 is	 consistently	 higher	 than	 the	 average,	 while	 support	 in	 others	 (including	
Tennessee)	is	consistently	lower	than	the	average	across	all	years.	Florida	demonstrates	a	
pair	 of	 interesting	 spikes	 (low,	 then	 high)	 in	 recent	 years,	 but	 otherwise	 adheres	 to	 the	
overall	pattern	of	stability.		
 
Figure	6	
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Abortion	over	Time	in	CA,	FL	&	TN,	Compared	to	the	
Average	Across	all	50	States	(and	DC)	from	1991‐2012 
 
 Sources:	GSS	Data	(1992‐2012)	and	ANES	Data	(1991‐2012)	
	
	
Again,	 there	 is	 nothing	 surprising	 in	 these	data,	 but	 the	 trends	 across	 various	 states	 are	
worth	a	quick	glance	nonetheless,	especially	when	compared	to	trends	in	judicial	decision	
making	during	the	same	time	period.	
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District	Court	Decision	Making	over	Time	
	 Unlike	gay	rights	cases,	the	frequency	of	abortion	cases	heard	in	the	district	courts	
did	not	substantially	 increase	(or	decrease)	over	time.	Figure	7	shows	the	distribution	of	
district	 court	 abortion	 cases	 in	 my	 data	 set	 across	 each	 year	 from	 1991‐2012.	 The	
distribution	is	relatively	even	despite	several	spikes	in	particular	years.	
 
Figure	7	
Number	of	Total	Abortion	Decisions	made	by	U.S.	District	Court	Judges	Each	Year	from	
1991‐2012		
 
 	
	 Further,	 the	percentage	of	 abortion	 cases	decided	 in	 favor	of	 abortion	 rights	does	
not	appear	to	 increase	or	decrease	over	time	in	any	noteworthy	way.	Figure	8	shows	the	
proportion	 of	 cases	 decided	 each	 way	 (for	 or	 against)	 from	 1991	 to	 2012,	 and	 no	
discernable	pattern	stands	out.	Some	years	have	higher	proportions	of	decisions	opposing	
abortion	rights,	and	there	are	two	years	in	which	every	case	was	decided	a	particular	way.	
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However,	in	every	year	but	one	(with	very	few	cases),	the	judges	ruled	in	favor	of	abortion	
rights	in	at	least	50%	of	cases,	and	the	percentage	was	even	higher	in	most	years.	
 
Figure	8	
Percentage	of	Total	Cases	Decided	in	Support	of	Abortion	Rights	vs.	Percentage	of	Total	
Cases	Decided	in	Opposition	to	Abortion	Rights	Each	Year;	Column	Width	Represents	the	
Total	Number	of	Cases	Decided	(in	Either	Direction)	Each	Year	
 
  
	
	 A	 closer	 inspection	 of	 the	 state‐level	 public	 opinion	 regarding	 abortion	 compared	
against	 the	 proportions	 of	 pro‐	 and	 anti‐choice	 decisions	 over	 time	 did	 not	 reveal	 any	
obvious	correlations	between	public	opinion	and	rulings.	However,	these	charts	show	only	
overall	 trends	 in	 opinion	 and	 decision	making	 and	 cannot	 disaggregate	 these	 trends	 for	
each	of	the	states	individually	at	this	point.	Regression	analysis	will	reveal	whether	state‐
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level	 public	 opinion	 influences	 judicial	 decision	 making,	 while	 these	 preliminary	
descriptive	statistics	give	us	the	ability	to	visualize	trends	in	the	data	over	time.	
Basic	Descriptive	Associations	
	 As	 with	 gay	 rights	 above,	 I	 can	 use	 simple	 statistical	 analysis	 to	 conduct	 a	
preliminary	 test	 of	my	 hypothesis	 that	 judicial	 ideology	 significantly	 influences	 decision	
making	 in	 abortion	 cases.	 Table	 10	 indicates	 that	 judges	 appointed	 by	 Democratic	
presidents	were	significantly	more	 likely	to	uphold	abortion	rights	(to	a	 .001	significance	
level),	although	judges	from	both	parties	ruled	in	favor	of	abortion	rights	more	often	than	
not.	 Overall,	 73%	 of	 judicial	 decisions	 upheld	 abortion	 rights17.	 This	 may	 signify	 that	
although	judicial	ideology	remains	the	most	significant	predictor	of	decision	making,	legal	
precedent	may	also	have	a	role	to	play	in	abortion	cases.	
 
Table	10	
Abortion	Decisions	by	Appointing	President	of	Judge	1991‐2012	
	
	 Decision	
Appointing	 Support	 Oppose	 Total
President	 Frequency	 Percentage Frequency Percentage	
Democrat	 78	 83.87 15 16.13	 93
Republican	 59	 62.77 35 37.23	 94
Total	 137	 73.26 50 26.74	 187
	 	 	
	 	 	 X2	=	10.630	 Pr	=	0.001	
	 	 	 Cramer’s	V	=	0.2384	 	
 
	
The	fact	that	almost	3/4ths	of	abortion	cases	were	decided	the	same	way	results	in	
far	less	variation	in	decisions	among	case	type.	As	Figure	9	and	Table	11	show,	each	of	the	
five	case	 types	consisted	of	more	pro‐choice	 than	anti‐choice	decisions.	Unlike	 in	 the	gay	
rights	 cases,	 case	 type	 is	 not	 significantly	 associated	 with	 outcome	 in	 abortion	 cases.	
                                                            
17	A	fact	that	may	result	in	difficulty	finding	significance	when	conducting	regression	analysis.	
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However,	Figure	9	also	shows	more	subtle	differences	in	the	success	rate	of	certain	types	of	
abortion	cases,	 including	a	high	likelihood	of	pro‐choice	outcomes	in	undue	burden	cases	
during	this	time	period.	
 
Figure	9	
Numbers	of	Decisions	in	Support	of	Abortion	Rights	vs.	Decisions	in	Opposition	to	Abortion	
Rights,	Broken	Down	by	Case	Type	(Includes	all	Cases	from	1991‐2012)	
 
	
Table	11	
Abortion	Decisions	by	Case	Type	1991‐2012	
 
	 Decision	
Case	Type	 Support Oppose	 Total
Undue	Burden	 61 17	 78
Government/Private	Restrictions	 21 8	 29
Individual	Rights	 5 2	 7
Access	to	Clinics	 35 15	 50
Government/Private	Action	in	Support	 15 8	 23
Total	 137 50	 187
	 	
	 X2	=	2.0271	 Pr	=	0.731	
	 Cramer’s	V	=	0.1041	 	
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Affirmative	Action	
State‐Level	Public	Opinion	over	Time	
	 Public	opinion	on	affirmative	action	follows	the	same	trend	as	opinion	on	abortion	–	
it	 has	 remained	 remarkably	 stable	 over	 time.	 I	 initially	 expected	 support	 for	 affirmative	
action	 policies	 to	 decrease	 from	 the	 early	 1990s,	 when	many	 state	 and	 local	 hiring	 and	
contracting	policies	were	still	considered	necessary	and	were	upheld	by	the	courts,	to	the	
2000s	and	especially	recently,	as	more	and	more	government	agencies	and	courts	appear	
reluctant	 to	 consider	 such	 policies	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 equal	 opportunity.	 As	 I	 read	 the	
decisions	and	opinions	in	affirmative	action	cases,	the	change	in	language	and	tone	used	by	
district	 court	 judges	over	 time	was	evident,	 even	when	 the	outcome	of	 the	 case	was	not	
necessarily	 different.	 However,	 as	 Figure	 10	 shows,	 public	 support	 in	 the	 states	 has	 not	
decreased	in	any	discernable	way,	but	has	remained	low	over	time.	
	 The	average	level	of	support	for	all	states	covered	a	very	small	range	–	from	a	low	of	
14.9%	in	2002	to	a	high	of	18.7%	in	2012.	Most	individual	states	followed	a	similar	pattern	
of	 low	support	with	 little	variation	over	 the	years.	The	District	of	Columbia	was	 the	only	
outlier,	 as	 the	 support	 level	 there	 was	 consistently	 much	 higher	 than	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
country,	and	does	evidence	a	slight	downward	trend	from	1991‐2012	(with	a	more	recent	
upturn	since	2008).	While	the	support	level	in	D.C.	averaged	over	35%	during	this	time,	no	
other	state	averaged	over	25%,	and	the	vast	majority	averaged	in	the	teens.	Interestingly,	
the	 states	 with	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	 support	 after	 D.C.	 were	 often	 southern	 states;	 for	
example,	 Mississippi	 showed	 the	 second	 highest	 average	 at	 25%,	 and	 Georgia,	 South	
Carolina,	Alabama,	Virginia,	and	Maryland	all	had	averages	of	over	20%	support	during	this	
time	 period.	 The	 states	 that	 were	 least	 supportive	 of	 affirmative	 action	 policies	 were	
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located	 in	 the	mountain	west	 (including	Wyoming,	as	shown	 in	Figure	10),	midwest,	and	
northeast	regions.			
 
Figure	10	
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Affirmative	Action	over	Time	in	DC,	IL	&	WY,	Compared	to	
the	Average	Across	all	50	States	(and	DC)	from	1991‐2012	
 
 Sources:	GSS	Data	(1992‐2012)	and	ANES	Data	(1991‐2012)	
	
District	Court	Decision	Making	over	Time	
	 Although	 public	 opinion	 regarding	 affirmative	 action	 did	 not	 follow	 the	 trends	 I	
anticipated,	I	was	correct	about	the	frequency	patterns	of	affirmative	action	cases.	Unlike	
the	gay	rights	cases,	most	of	which	occurred	in	 later	years,	most	of	 the	affirmative	action	
cases	occurred	in	the	early	and	middle	years	of	my	data	set.	As	Figure	11	makes	clear,	the	
time	periods	that	saw	the	most	cases	were	1992‐1993	and	a	significant	spike	from	1999‐
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2001.	Since	2002,	 they	have	 tapered	off	 slowly,	with	only	a	handful	of	 cases	heard	every	
year	from	2007	on,	with	no	cases	at	all	in	the	last	year	of	the	data	set,	2012.		
 
Figure	11	
Number	of	Total	Affirmative	Action	Decisions	made	by	U.S.	District	Court	Judges	Each	Year	
from	1991‐2012		
	
	
	 	
Turning	 to	 the	proportion	of	cases	decided	 for	and	against	affirmative	action	over	
time,	Figure	12	fails	to	indicate	any	obvious	trends	in	district	court	decision	making	during	
this	time	frame.	In	any	given	year,	the	decisions	could	have	been	split	between	support	and	
opposition,	or	most	(or	all)	cases	decided	in	support,	or	most	(or	all)	in	opposition.	This	is	
somewhat	surprising	based	on	the	shift	in	language	and	tone	used	by	judges	in	affirmative	
action	 decisions	 as	 time	went	 on,	 as	 I	mention	 above.	 However,	 this	 shift	 demonstrated	
gradual	change	in	judicial	attitude	without	necessarily	indicating	change	in	outcomes.	For	
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example,	many	 of	 the	 judges	 in	 the	 early	 affirmative	 action	 cases	 involving	 government	
hiring	and	promotion	practices	upheld	these	programs	using	strongly	supportive	language	
and	by	pointing	 out	 the	 highly	 discriminatory	practices	 of	 the	 city	 or	 county	 in	 the	near	
past.	 In	more	recent	cases,	even	when	 the	programs	were	upheld,	 the	 judges	were	much	
more	reluctant	to	do	so,	and	pointed	to	progress	made	since	the	programs	were	put	 into	
place,	often	speculating	 that	such	programs	would	not	be	upheld	 for	much	 longer	 if	 they	
continued	to	exist	in	their	current	forms.		
 
Figure	12	
Percentage	of	Total	Cases	Decided	in	Support	of	Affirmative	Action	Policies	vs.	Percentage	
of	Total	Cases	Decided	in	Opposition	to	Affirmative	Action	Policies	Each	Year;	Column	
Width	Represents	the	Total	Number	of	Cases	Decided	(in	Either	Direction)	Each	Year	
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This	is	an	issue	area	that	will	be	interesting	to	continue	to	examine	into	the	future,	
to	see	how	recent	Supreme	Court	action	(and	inaction)	impact	the	already	reluctant	judges	
in	many	of	these	cases.	It	may	be	that	a	more	noticeable	shift	is	underway	currently	and	
can	be	seen	in	a	few	years	when	we	have	the	data	available	to	examine	contemporary	
trends	more	accurately.	
Basic	Descriptive	Associations	 
	 As	with	gay	rights	and	abortion,	I	expect	judicial	ideology	to	be	the	primary	driving	
force	 behind	 affirmative	 action	 decision	 making.	 Although	 affirmative	 action	 cases	
constitute	 the	 smallest	 subset	 of	 cases	 in	 my	 data	 set,	 a	 quick	 look	 at	 these	 variables	
confirms	 that	 party	 of	 the	 appointing	 president	 is	 a	 significant	 predictor	 of	 decisions	 in	
these	cases.	Table	12	shows	that	Democrat‐appointed	judges	decided	in	favor	of	affirmative	
action	policies	almost	3	to	1,	while	Republican‐appointed	judges	ruled	against	such	policies	
in	the	majority	of	the	cases	they	heard.	The	association	was	significant	at	the	.005	level;	a	
relationship	that	will	be	tested	more	extensively	in	the	next	chapter.	
 
Table	12	
Affirmative	Action	Decisions	by	Appointing	President	of	Judge	1991‐2012	
 
	 Decision	
Appointing	 Support	 Oppose	 Total
President	 Frequency	 Percentage Frequency Percentage	
Democrat	 27	 72.97 10 27.03	 37
Republican	 24	 41.38 34 58.62	 58
Total	 51	 53.68 44 46.32	 95
	 	 	
	 	 	 X2	=	9.0684	 Pr	=	0.003	
	 	 	 Cramer’s	V	=	0.3090	 	
 
 
Unlike	the	abortion	cases	discussed	above,	the	likelihood	of	success	for	affirmative	
action	 proponents	 depended	 to	 some	 extent	 on	 the	 type	 of	 policy	 they	were	 defending.	
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Figure	 13	 demonstrates	 how	 employment	 policies,	 including	 in	 hiring,	 promotion,	 and	
layoffs	were	much	more	likely	to	be	upheld	than	university	admissions	policies	or	minority	
contracting	requirements.	As	Table	13	indicates,	the	association	is	significant	at	the	more	
lenient	.10	level,	but	not	at	the	standard	.05	level	that	I	use	throughout	this	dissertation.	A	
data	 set	 containing	a	 larger	N	may	have	 the	effect	of	making	case	 type	 significant	at	 this	
level.	Nevertheless,	the	data	as	is	does	reveal	this	interesting	dichotomy	in	the	treatment	of	
affirmative	action	cases	by	judges	based	on	the	type	of	case	presented.				
 
Figure	13	
Numbers	of	Decisions	in	Support	of	Affirmative	Action	Policies	vs.	Decisions	in	Opposition	
to	Affirmative	Action	Policies,	Broken	Down	by	Case	Type	(Includes	all	Cases	from	1991‐
2012)	
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Table	13	
Affirmative	Action	Decisions	by	Case	Type	1991‐2012	
 
	 Decision	 	
Case	Type	 Support Oppose Total	
Employment	 39 24 63	
Education	 4 6 10	
Contracting	 8 14 22	
Total	 51 44 95	
	 	
	 X2	=	5.1198	 Pr	=	0.077	
	 Cramer’s	V	=	0.2321	 	
 
	
Conclusion	
	 The	 illustrative	data,	graphs,	and	basic	statistical	analysis	provided	 in	this	chapter	
are	 designed	 to	 provide	 deeper	 descriptions	 of	 the	 data	 within	 each	 issue	 area	 and	 to	
provide	richer	context	within	which	to	review	the	more	rigorous	regression	analyses	in	the	
next	 chapter.	 Several	 interesting	 trends	 can	 be	 seen	 by	 examining	 these	 figures	 and	
relationships,	 especially	 the	 nature	 of	 state‐level	 public	 opinion	 on	 each	 issue,	 the	
significance	 of	 ideology	 in	 all	 issue	 areas,	 and	 the	 significance	 of	 case	 type	 on	 decision	
making	 in	 gay	 right	 cases,	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 in	 affirmative	 action	 cases,	 but	 not	 in	
abortion	 cases.	 Many	 of	 the	 over‐time	 trends	 and	 frequency	 and	 proportion	 patterns	
cannot	discerned	by	simply	running	and	examining	regression	analysis,	so	including	them	
here	 is	 an	 important	 first	 step	 in	 explaining	 my	 results,	 inferences,	 and	 conclusions	
presented	in	the	next	chapter.	
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CHAPTER	5	–	REGRESSION	ANALYSIS	
	
	 The	 previous	 chapter	 indicated	 a	 significant	 role	 for	 certain	 variables	 in	 judicial	
decision	 making	 and	 pointed	 to	 the	 potential	 impact	 of	 others.	 This	 chapter	 provides	 a	
more	rigorous	and	thorough	examination	of	the	relationship	between	decision	making	and	
judicial	 ideology,	 strategy,	 legal	 factors,	 judicial	 characteristics,	 and	 state‐level	 opinion.	 I	
test	whether	judicial	ideology	is	still	significant	when	other	potential	explanatory	variables	
are	introduced	and	controlled	for.	Additionally,	regression	analysis	allows	us	to	determine	
whether	any	of	the	trends	or	patterns	over	time	exhibited	above	have	any	actual	relevance	
to	how	 judges	make	decisions	 in	 these	 issue	areas.	 I	 employ	multivariate	 regression	and	
run	several	models	with	differing	combinations	of	data	in	order	to	best	utilize	my	data	set	
to	further	our	understanding	of	judicial	decision	making.	I	will	explain	what	I	have	included	
and	why	as	I	go,	and	will	report	all	theoretically	and	substantively	interesting	findings.	
	 As	 described	 more	 fully	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 because	 of	 the	 dual	 measure	 of	 judicial	
ideology,	each	regression	will	have	two	different	models	–	one	with	party	of	the	appointing	
president	and	one	with	Common	Space	scores.	The	models	will	be	identical	in	every	other	
way,	 containing	 all	 of	 the	 same	 variables	 and	 same	 type	 of	 measurements	 for	 those	
variables.	 The	 one	 exception	 is	 Circuit	 Ideology,	 which	 also	 varies	 depending	 on	 which	
model	 I	 am	 running.	 The	 Party	 of	 the	 Appointing	 President	 model	 will	 use	 a	 dummy	
variable	 for	Circuit	 Ideology	indicating	whether	the	majority	of	 judges	 in	the	circuit	were	
appointed	by	Democrats	or	Republicans.	The	Common	Space	Score	model	will	employ	the	
median	Common	Space	score	of	the	judges	in	the	circuit	as	its	measure	of	Circuit	Ideology.	
As	the	tables	will	show,	most	of	the	regressions	had	very	similar	results	for	the	two	models,	
98	
 
	
 
with	only	a	handful	of	differences.	I	present	the	models	side	by	side	in	the	same	tables	to	
allow	easy	comparison	of	them.	
Throughout	 this	 chapter,	 I	 provide	 more	 than	 just	 regression	 tables	 reporting	
coefficients,	 standard	 errors,	 and	 significance.	As	briefly	mentioned	 in	Chapter	3,	 a	 “new	
wave”	of	more	accessible	and	user‐friendly	empirical	reporting	has	swept	into	the	field	of	
public	law.	Gary	King	and	colleagues	were	some	of	the	first	scholars	to	advance	the	concept	
of	 providing	more	 accessible	 presentations	 of	 data	 and	 statistical	 analysis	 in	 everything	
from	 journal	 articles	 and	 books	 to	 conference	 papers	 to	 teaching	 materials	 in	 order	 to	
heighten	the	impact	of	empirical	scholarship	on	other,	non‐traditional	audiences,	including	
lawyers,	judges,	policy	makers,	and	students.	Scholars	promoting	more	accessible	ways	of	
reporting	statistical	findings	provide	guidelines,	suggestions,	and	even	software	for	easily	
conveying	 results	 visually	 and	 in	more	 intuitive	ways	 that	 can	 be	 quickly	 examined	 and	
grasped	by	even	the	most	non‐statistically	inclined	reader	(e.g.,	Epstein	and	Martin	2014;	
King	 et	 al.	 2000).	 Most	 scholars	 do	 not	 conduct	 research	 simply	 to	 satisfy	 their	 own	
curiosity,	but	want	to	inform	others	of	their	results	and	conclusions.	Slight	modifications	to	
how	statistical	results	are	reported	can	help	empirical	scholars	reach	larger	audiences	and	
can	increase	the	degree	of	intellectual	discourse	in	the	field	(King	et	al.	2000).	
A	 related	 trend	 in	 the	 empirical	 legal	 literature	 (as	 well	 as	 in	 political	 science	
literature	 generally)	 is	 a	 renewed	 effort	 to	 make	 regression	 analysis	 more	 easily	
understood	by	 focusing	on	 the	substantive	effect	of	 the	results;	 in	other	words,	what	 the	
regression	 coefficients	 mean	 in	 the	 “real	 world”.	 Logistic	 regression	 coefficients	 are	
especially	difficult	to	interpret	since	they	represent	the	percentage	change	in	the	log	of	the	
odds	 ratio.	 A	 statistically	 significant	 logistic	 regression	 coefficient	 tells	 us	 simply	 that	 a	
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variable	 is	associated	with	 the	dependent	variable	 to	a	 certain	degree	of	 certainty	 (95%,	
99%,	etc.).	While	this	is	certainly	important	to	know	and	report,	it	says	nothing	about	the	
actual	 impact	 of	 the	 variable	 and	 the	 resulting	 implications.	 If	 a	 predictor	 variable	 is	
significant,	but	does	not	have	any	real	implications	in	practice,	those	academics,	students,	
practitioners,	 and	 other	 individuals	 reading	 the	 findings	 are	 going	 to	 ask,	 “Why	 should	 I	
care?”	
In	order	to	convey	the	substantive	impact	of	results,	and	to	do	so	in	a	manner	that	
makes	them	accessible	to	empiricists	and	non‐empiricists	alike,	I	provide	information	and	
graphics	on	the	actual	impact	of	the	independent	variables	of	interest	on	judge’s	decisions.	
I	 primarily	 use	 CLARIFY,	 a	 program	 for	 Stata	 created	 by	 Gary	 King,	 Michael	 Tomz,	 and	
Jason	 Wittenberg	 that	 simulates	 predicted	 probabilities	 from	 logistic	 regression	
coefficients18.	Since	my	dependent	variable	is	a	dichotomous	measure	of	how	a	judge	rules	
in	a	particular	case	(either	in	support	of	the	issue,	or	against	it),	the	predicted	probabilities	
generated	 by	 CLARIFY	 show	 how	 likely	 each	 outcome	 is	 as	 the	 independent	 variable	 of	
interest	 changes.	 For	 each	 of	 my	 issue	 areas,	 I	 report	 the	 predicted	 probabilities	 using	
intuitive	 and	 user‐friendly	 graphs	 and	 discuss	 the	 implications	 of	 these	 findings	 for	 the	
parties	involved	in	these	cases	and	the	judicial	system	as	whole.	
Gay	Rights	
Primary	Models	
	 For	each	issue	area,	I	ran	a	hierarchal	model,	beginning	with	judicial	characteristics	
alone	(ideology,	gender,	race,	and	religion)19,	then	adding	strategic	(circuit	ideology)20	and	
                                                            
18	For	further	explanation	of	how	the	simulation	method	works,	see	King	et	al.	(2000).	
19	I	began	the	hierarchy	with	ideology	and	other	individual‐level	variables	in	the	first	level	because	of	the	strong	impact	
that	ideology	has	consistently	been	shown	to	have	on	decision	making,	especially	in	polarizing	issues.	Thus,	it	is	crucial	to	
include	ideology	in	all	levels	of	the	hierarchal	models	or	risk	invalid	results	for	the	other	variables.	
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legal	(case	type)21	variables,	and	finally	adding	state‐level	variables	(state	opinion	and	state	
political	 culture22)23.	 I	 decided	 to	 estimate	 hierarchal	 models	 instead	 of	 just	 one	 all‐
inclusive	model	because	I	wanted	to	clearly	delineate	the	impact	of	each	additional	set	of	
independent	variables	on	the	dependent	variable.	I	also	wanted	to	observe	and	investigate	
any	 significant	 changes	 to	 the	 primary	 independent	 variables’	 coefficients	 from	 one	
hierarchal	 model	 to	 the	 next,	 possibly	 providing	 a	 more	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 the	
relationships	between	variables.	However,	 I	did	not	 report	 the	regression	 tables	 for	each	
level	of	 the	hierarchal	model	here	unless	there	were	substantively	interesting	differences	
between	 them.	The	hierarchal	 regressions	 for	 the	gay	 rights	 cases	were	 straightforward;	
each	addition	of	variables	added	to	the	overall	strength	of	the	model	and	did	not	alter	the	
significance	 of	 any	previously	 included	 variables.	 Therefore	 I	 report	 just	 the	 final,	 “best”	
model	that	includes	all	variables	in	Table	14	below.		
	
	
	
                                                                                                                                                                                               
20	For	each	issue	area,	I	ran	models	that	replaced	circuit	ideology	with	my	alternate	interaction	variable	for	strategy	
(judge’s	ideology*circuit	difference).	The	interaction	was	not	significant	in	any	of	the	models.	Since	the	interaction	
included	one	of	my	primary	variables	of	interest	(judge’s	ideology),	the	coefficients	(and	the	meaning	of	the	coefficients)	
for	judge’s	ideology	were	changed	in	the	interactive	models.	I	was	primarily	interested	in	the	effect	of	judge’s	ideology	on	
decision	making	across	all	districts	and	circuits,	and	thus	I	removed	the	interaction	variable	to	get	the	appropriate	
coefficients	for	judge’s	ideology.	Additionally,	the	role	of	circuit	difference	alone	has	no	value	(as	it	only	measures	the	
distance,	or	party	differences,	between	district	and	circuit	judges,	but	not	the	direction	of	those	differences),	so	I	
ultimately	dropped	both	circuit	difference	and	the	interaction	variable	and	report	the	original	model	(using	circuit	
ideology	as	the	strategic	variable)	here.	Appendix	B	contains	tables	showing	each	of	the	alternative	interactive	models.	
21	 Due	 to	 the	miniscule	 number	 of	 cases	 that	 were	 heard	 on	 remand,	 I	 dropped	 the	 legal	 variable	 “Remanded”	 from	
regression	analysis.	Similarly,	very	few	cases	were	decided	on	factual,	as	opposed	to	legal,	grounds;	thus	I	also	dropped	
“Decision	Type”	from	my	analysis.	
22	As	suspected,	Elazar’s	state	political	culture	types	and	region	were	too	strongly	correlated	to	include	both	in	regression	
analysis.	 I	decided	to	 include	state	culture	and	omit	region	for	several	reasons:	State	culture	has	greater	variation	than	
region	(3	categories	 instead	of	2);	 the	state	culture	categories	effectively	encompass	region	 fairly	comprehensively	(all	
but	a	handful	of	southern	states	are	in	the	“traditionalistic”	category,	and	all	non‐south	states	are	part	of	the	“moralistic”	
and	 “individualistic”	 categories),	 and	 state	 culture	 is	 less	 correlated	 with	 state‐level	 opinion	 (although	 neither	 state	
culture	nor	 region	was	 significantly	 correlated	with	opinion).	Running	 each	of	 the	models	with	 region	 instead	of	 state	
culture	did	not	substantively	change	the	results	or	show	any	interesting	differences.	
23	Additionally,	 I	 ran	 each	model	with	 an	 interaction	effect	between	 state	opinion	and	 state	 culture	 in	order	 to	 assess	
whether	the	effect	of	state	opinion	on	judicial	decisions	varied	with	each	type	of	state	culture.	None	of	the	 interactions	
were	significant;	thus	I	did	not	include	the	interactions	in	the	final	models.	
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Table	14	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Gay	Rights	Cases	on	all	Independent	Variables,	
including	all	Cases	from	1991‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
1.422	(.310)**	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
2.026	(.438)**	
Judge’s	Gender	 ‐1.069	(.411)**	 ‐1.091	(.406)**		
Judge’s	Race	 .155	(.470)	 .138	(.472)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 ‐.241	(.404)	 ‐.152	(.402)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 .189	(.414)	 .281	(.419)	
					Other	Christian	 ‐.104	(.493)	 .081	(.486)	
					Jewish	 ‐.439	(.630)	 ‐.298	(.601)	
Circuit	Ideology	1	(Reference	–	Majority	Dem)	
					Majority	Republican	
					Circuit	is	Evenly	Split	
Circuit	Ideology	2	–	Median	C.S.	Score	
	
.114	(.337)	
‐1.123	(.790)	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
‐‐‐	
.661	(.721)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Cases)	
					Gay	Marriage	
					Prisoner	Discrimination	
					Other	Discrimination/Harassment	
					Privacy/Defamation	
					Domestic	Benefits	
					Gov’t	or	Private	Protections	
					Military/Don’t	Ask	Don’t	Tell	
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Gay	Rights	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States	
Constant	
	
‐946	(.650)	
‐.044	(.521)	
‐.933	(.376)*	
‐1.055	(.958)	
‐.716	(.911)	
‐1.722	(.491)**	
.755	(.659)	
.020	(.013)	
	
.526	(.337)	
.881	(.429)*	
‐2.090	(1.047)	
	
‐1.080	(.658)	
‐.117	(.523)	
‐.873	(.372)*	
‐1.015	(.946)	
‐.668	(.889)	
‐1.826	(.497)**	
.896	(.661)	
.020	(.013)	
	
.569	(.339)	
.572	(.448)	
‐1.281	(.918)	
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n	
X2	of	Model	
Percent	Reduction	in	Error	
28024
69.79	
35.04%	
280	
68.61	
33.33%	
 
 
  As	Table	14	indicates,	judicial	ideology	was	strongly	statistically	significant	for	both	
the	 Party	 of	 the	 Appointing	 President	 model	 and	 the	 Common	 Space	 Score	model.	 This	
means	 that	 liberal	 (Democrat‐appointed)	 judges	 are	 significantly	 more	 likely	 than	 their	
conservative	 (Republican‐appointed)	 counterparts	 to	 uphold	 gay	 rights,	 even	 when	
controlling	 for	 many	 other	 potential	 explanatory	 variables.	 This	 finding	 supports	 my	
hypothesis	that	judicial	ideology	is	significantly	associated	with	decision	making	in	federal	
district	 courts.	 Gender	 was	 also	 strongly	 significant,	 indicating	 that	 female	 judges	 were	
substantially	more	likely	to	uphold	gay	rights	than	male	judges.	Both	of	these	findings	are	
in	 line	 with	 the	 literature	 generally	 as	 it	 discusses	 the	 roles	 of	 ideology	 and	 gender	 in	
decision	making,	but	also	confirm	their	importance	at	the	district	court	level,	a	contention	
that	the	district	court	literature	has	debated	at	length.	
Two	of	the	case	types	were	significant	when	compared	to	the	reference	category	of	
employment	cases.	The	descriptive	statistics	reported	in	Chapter	4	showed	that	decisions	
in	employment	discrimination	and/or	harassment	cases	were	evenly	split	between	pro‐gay	
rights	and	anti‐gay	rights.	Comparatively,	cases	involving	other	types	of	discrimination	or	
harassment	 (all	 cases	 not	 involving	 employment	 or	 prisoners)	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 be	
decided	 in	 favor	 of	 gay	 rights	 (typically	 the	 person	 being	 discriminated	 against	 or	
harassed).	Common	examples	in	this	category	of	cases	include	students	treated	unequally	
by	school	officials	(not	allowed	to	form	LGBT	support	groups,	not	protected	from	bullying	
                                                            
24	Most	of	the	regression	models	in	this	chapter	include	fewer	than	the	total	number	of	cases	in	each	issue	area	because	of	
missing	data	in	the	Elazar	variable	(for	Washington	D.C.	and	Puerto	Rico	cases)	and	in	each	of	the	state	opinion	alternate	
variables	(for	Puerto	Rico	cases).	
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and/or	 assault),	 harassment	 by	 police	 and	 unlawful	 arrest,	 unequal	 treatment	 by	 city	 or	
state	officials,	and	housing	discrimination.	This	 finding	of	significance	 is	not	surprising	to	
me	as	someone	who	has	read	the	facts	of	all	of	these	cases.	For	cases	in	this	category,	the	
levels	of	bias	and	resulting	discrimination	were	noticeably	more	overt	and	more	extreme	
than	 in	 discrimination	 and/or	 harassment	 cases	 in	 the	other	 categories25.	 Further,	many	
(although	not	 all)	 of	 the	 cases	 in	 this	 category	 dealt	with	 government	 officials	 and	 units	
(police,	 public	 schools,	 cities	 or	 counties,	 etc.)	who	 face	 a	 lower	 threshold	 for	 actionable	
treatment	 than	 private	 entities,	 who	 made	 up	 a	 large	 percentage	 (but	 not	 all)	 of	 the	
employment	discrimination	cases.		
Judges	hearing	challenges	to	protections	afforded	to	LGBT	individuals	or	groups	by	
either	government	or	private	actors	were	also	much	more	likely	to	uphold	such	protections	
than	 to	 strike	 them	 down.	 This	 category	 included	 city	 or	 county	 ordinances	 prohibiting	
anyone	 from	 discriminating	 against	 individuals	 based	 on	 sexual	 orientation,	 as	 well	 as	
similar	 rules	 put	 into	 place	 by	 private	 organizations.	 As	 pointed	 out	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 these	
cases	 were	 overwhelmingly	 decided	 in	 favor	 of	 gay	 rights	 32‐8,	 a	 result	 that	 remains	
significant	when	controlling	for	ideology	and	other	predictor	variables.	The	significance	of	
these	 two	 case	 categories,	 as	well	 as	 the	overall	 significance	 of	 Case	Type	 as	 a	predictor	
variable	 in	a	post‐regression	test,	 indicates	 that	 legal	 factors	do	 influence	 judges	 to	some	
extent.	 Conversely,	 controlling	 for	 case	 type	 and	 still	 finding	 statistical	 significance	 for	
judicial	ideology	affirms	the	important	role	of	ideology	in	decision	making	as	well.			
                                                            
25	 For	 example,	 cases	 in	 this	 category	 included	 LGBT	 students	 that	 were	 bullied	 to	 extremes,	 sometimes	 resulting	 in	
vicious	 assaults,	 during	which	 the	 schools	 often	 did	 nothing	 to	 protect	 them	or	 to	 punish	 the	 offenders.	 Similarly,	 the	
cases	of	police	harassment	often	included	assaults	on	suspects	and	bullying	of	LGBT	individuals	on	the	street	or	in	other	
public	places,	and	discrimination	by	city	officials	or	housing	boards	often	involved	flat‐out	refusals	to	accommodate	an	
individual	 or	 group	 because	 of	 their	 sexual	 orientation.	 Very	 few	 of	 these	 cases	 involved	 subtle	 or	 nuanced	 forms	 of	
harassment	 or	 discrimination,	 unlike	many	 of	 the	 employment	 cases,	 in	which	 the	 employers	 could	 attempt	 to	 blame	
employees’	poor	performance	 for	 firings	or	demotions	or	argue	 that	workplace	harassment	did	not	meet	 the	stringent	
standards	required	for	it	to	be	actionable.	
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	 The	 only	 other	 statistically	 significant	 variable	was	Elazar’s	 “traditionalistic”	 state	
culture	 type.	 Compared	 to	 the	 reference	 category	 of	 moralistic	 states,	 judges	 in	
traditionalistic	 states,	 almost	all	 of	which	are	 located	 in	 the	 south,	 are	 significantly	more	
likely	to	rule	against	gay	rights.	This	is	not	a	surprising	result,	as	southern	states	have	been	
slower	 to	 recognize	 and	 support	 gay	 rights	 overall.	 However,	 it	 is	 interesting	 that	 the	
variable	is	significant	in	the	Party	of	the	Appointing	President	model	but	not	the	Common	
Space	Score	model.	I	attribute	this	difference	to	the	fact	that	Common	Space	scores	already	
account	 for	 the	 variation	 in	 ideology	 for	 judges	 in	 different	 states,	 especially	 judges	 in	
southern	 states	 and	non‐southern	 states.	As	described	 in	Chapter	3,	 it	 does	 so	by	 taking	
into	account	the	ideology	of	each	state’s	senators	at	the	time	of	appointment,	as	opposed	to	
simply	 the	 party	 of	 the	 appointing	 president.	 The	 result	 here	 is	 useful	 evidence	 of	 the	
superior	accuracy	of	Common	Space	scores	when	measuring	judicial	ideology.	
	 The	 non‐significance	 of	 explanatory	 variables	 can	 be	 just	 as	 interesting	 as	 the	
significance	of	others.	Among	the	most	notable	were	religion	and	state	opinion.	The	issue	of	
gay	 rights	 is	 a	 prime	 example	 of	 morality	 policy,	 and	 many	 religions	 proclaim	 strong	
stances	 on	 this	 issue.	 However,	 none	 of	 the	 categories	 of	 religion	 were	 statistically	
significant,	nor	was	it	significant	as	a	whole.	Two	factors	could	be	contributing	to	religion’s	
lack	 of	 impact	 on	 judges.	 First,	 it	 is	 a	 variable	with	 one	 very	 large	 category	 and	 several	
small	ones	–	over	48%	of	judges	in	the	gay	rights	data	set	either	consider	themselves	non‐
affiliated	 with	 any	 religion	 or	 refused	 to	 respond.	 Thus,	 it	 may	 be	 difficult	 to	 find	
significance	 for	 this	 variable	 at	 all26.	 Secondly,	much	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 religion	may	 be	
encompassed	 by	 judicial	 ideology.	 Judges	 falling	 within	 certain	 religion	 categories	 are	
                                                            
26	Although,	as	discussed	later	in	this	chapter,	at	least	one	religion	category	was	found	to	be	significant	in	one	of	the	time‐
bound	gay	rights	models.	
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typically	more	 conservative	 (especially	 Other	 Christian)	while	 those	 falling	within	 other	
categories	are	typically	more	liberal	(Jewish,	Mainline	Protestant),	although	this	is	certainly	
not	true	for	all	 judges.	Additionally,	Catholic	 judges	tend	to	run	the	gamut	from	liberal	to	
conservative.	Therefore,	the	explanation	for	religion’s	non‐significance	here	could	be	one,	
both,	or	neither	of	 these	reasons,	or	 religion	could	simply	not	be	associated	with	 judicial	
decision	making	to	a	significant	degree.	
	 State‐level	 opinion	 is	 one	 of	 my	 primary	 variables	 of	 interest	 and	 bases	 for	 my	
research	 question,	 thus	 its	 non‐significance	 here	 is	 important	 to	 consider.	 I	 ran	 models	
using	all	three	alternate	measures	of	state	opinion	described	in	Chapter	3	–	specific	state‐
level	opinion	on	the	issue,	Erikson,	Wright,	and	McIver’s	measure	of	the	general	ideology	of	
state	 residents,	 and	Berry	et	 al.’s	measure	of	 state	 citizen	 ideology.	There	was	very	 little	
difference	between	the	three	measures,	so	I	include	specific	state	opinion	in	my	final	model	
as	that	is	my	primary	(and	most	appropriate)	measure	of	state	opinion27.	Although	I	did	not	
expressly	 hypothesize	 that	 state‐level	 public	 opinion	 would	 influence	 district	 court	
decision	making,	I	did	anticipate	that	it	may	matter	to	judges	enough	to	mitigate	ideology	
or	 other	 important	 explanatory	 variables.	 However,	 the	 addition	 of	 state	 opinion	 in	my	
model	did	not	alter	the	coefficients	of	the	other	significant	variables	in	any	substantial	way;	
in	 fact,	 the	 coefficient	 for	 judicial	 ideology	 increased	 in	 both	models	with	 the	 addition	of	
state‐level	opinion	as	a	control	variable.	At	least	in	the	issue	area	of	gay	rights,	it	appears	
that	district	court	judges	do	not	follow	the	opinion	of	the	residents	within	their	states,	but	
instead	adhere	strongly	to	their	own	ideological	beliefs.		
                                                            
27	In	order	to	be	as	thorough	as	possible,	and	to	satisfy	my	own	curiosity,	I	ran	several	different	variations	of	the	models	
to	see	whether	state	opinion	by	itself	was	significant,	or	whether	removing	the	other	state‐level	variable	(state	culture)	
increased	its	significance	(even	though	I	also	tested	to	make	sure	they	were	not	too	highly	correlated	with	each	other),	
among	other	combinations.	None	of	these	models	made	any	substantive	difference	and	all	ended	up	explaining	less	about	
the	dependent	variable	than	the	final	model	I	present	here.	
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	 Understanding	 that	 judicial	 ideology	 is	 related	 to	 judicial	 decision	 making	 to	 a	
statistically	 significant	degree	 is	only	half	 the	battle.	What	we	really	want	 to	know	 is	 the	
magnitude	 of	 the	 effect	 –	 does	 ideology	 actually	 make	 a	 noticeable	 difference	 in	 how	 a	
judge	rules	in	a	gay	rights	case?	As	discussed	above,	the	best	way	to	test	the	magnitude	of	
the	effect	in	logistic	regression	is	to	simulate	predicted	probabilities.	Figure	14	shows	the	
predicted	probabilities	of	a	decision	opposing	gay	rights	for	judges	appointed	by	each	party	
while	holding	all	other	independent	variables	constant.		
 
Figure	14	
Predicted	Probability	of	Anti‐Gay	Rights	Decision	in	U.S.	District	Court	Cases	(1991‐2012),	
by	Party	of	Appointing	President,	with	95%	Confidence	Intervals	
 
  
 
All	else	being	equal,	the	mean	likelihood	of	a	Democrat	appointee	ruling	against	gay	
rights	was	22.9%,	while	the	mean	likelihood	of	a	Republican	appointee	ruling	in	the	same	
way	jumped	up	to	53.5%.	This	is	quite	a	substantive	and	dramatic	difference,	especially	for	
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the	parties	 involved	 in	 these	 cases.	 For	 a	 LGBT	 individual	 or	 advocate	 filing	 a	 lawsuit	 in	
federal	 district	 court	 to	 uphold	 protections	 or	 strike	 down	 discriminatory	 actions,	 the	
likelihood	 of	 winning	 the	 case	 decreases	 by	 30%	 percentage	 points	 when	 assigned	 a	
Republican‐appointed	 judge.	 The	 vertical	 lines	 above	 and	below	 the	dots	 represent	 95%	
confidence	intervals	for	the	predictions.	The	large	difference	between	the	highest	point	for	
Democrat	appointees	and	the	lowest	point	for	Republican	appointees	further	substantiates	
the	 substantive	 differences	 between	 judges	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	 an	 anti‐gay	 rights	
outcome.	 	
It	is	perhaps	even	more	beneficial	to	depict	the	predicted	probabilities	for	decisions	
based	 on	 the	 more	 accurate	 measure	 of	 judicial	 ideology	 –	 Common	 Space	 scores.	 This	
analysis	 is	 not	 quite	 as	 straightforward	 since	 Common	 Space	 scores	 are	 a	 continuous	
variable	 with	many	 different	 values.	 Holding	 all	 other	 independent	 variables	 constant,	 I	
generate	average	predicted	probabilities	for	a	ruling	opposing	gay	rights	for	each	Common	
Space	 score	 in	 the	 range	 of	 ‐0.6	 to	 0.6	 (the	 complete	 range	 of	 actual	 judicial	 scores)	 at	
increments	 of	 0.1	 and	 connect	 them	with	 a	 solid	 line.	 The	 shaded	 area	 around	 the	 line	
signifies	 the	 high	 and	 low	 parameters	 of	 the	 95%	 confidence	 intervals	 for	 each	 .01	
increment	 along	 the	 continuum.	 Figure	 15	 depicts	 the	 considerable	 variation	 in	
probabilities	depending	on	judicial	Common	Space	score.	As	we	move	from	the	most	liberal	
judges	 to	 those	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 ideological	 spectrum,	 the	 likelihood	 of	 an	 anti‐gay	
rights	decision	more	than	doubles,	from	15.5%	to	37.7%.	As	we	move	further	to	the	most	
conservative	 judges,	 the	 likelihood	of	an	anti‐gay	rights	decision	almost	doubles	again,	 to	
66.8%.		
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Figure	15	
Predicted	Probability	of	Anti‐Gay	Rights	Decision	in	U.S.	District	Court	Cases	(1991‐2012),	
by	Common	Space	Score	of	Judge,	with	95%	Confidence	Intervals	
 
 	 	
I	also	ran	predicted	probabilities	for	the	effect	of	gender	on	decisions	in	gay	rights	
cases.	Although	the	coefficient	was	highly	significant,	I	am	more	interested	in	the	practical	
effect	 of	 gender	 on	 judicial	 decision	making.	 As	 described	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 women	 tend	 to	
demonstrate	higher	 levels	of	support	 for	gay	rights	 than	men;	 thus	the	perception	 is	 that	
female	judges	will	be	more	sympathetic	to	LGBT	individuals	and	gay	rights	advocates	than	
male	judges.	Indeed,	Figure	16	indicates	a	rather	substantial	difference	between	male	and	
female	 judges	 in	 these	 cases.	 Holding	 all	 other	 independent	 variables	 constant28,	 the	
                                                            
28	I	used	the	Common	Space	Score	Model	when	computing	predicted	probabilities	for	gender.	
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
Pr
ob
ab
ility
 of
 D
ec
isio
n O
pp
os
ing
 G
ay
 R
igh
ts
-.6 -.5 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Common Space Score of Judge (Liberal < 0; Conservative > 0)
109	
 
	
 
average	 probability	 that	 a	male	 judge	 will	 rule	 against	 gay	 rights	 was	 44.0%,	 while	 the	
average	probability	that	a	female	judge	would	do	the	same	was	only	21.5%29.		
 
Figure	16	
Predicted	Probability	of	Anti‐Gay	Rights	Decision	in	U.S.	District	Court	Cases	(1991‐2012),	
by	Gender	of	Judge,	with	95%	Confidence	Intervals 
 
 	
This	difference	is	certainly	large	enough	to	be	noteworthy,	and	to	catch	the	attention	of	the	
parties	in	these	cases,	in	which	ideology	and	gender	both	apparently	play	significant	roles	
in	the	outcomes.	
Time‐Bound	Models	
	 Gay	rights	is	unique	among	the	issue	areas	I	include	because	of	the	drastic	change	in	
public	 opinion	 during	 the	 time	 period	 examined.	 Although	 state‐level	 public	 opinion	 did	
                                                            
29	 The	 95%	 confidence	 interval	 range	was	 significantly	 larger	 for	 female	 judges	 than	males	 because	 only	 20%	 of	 the	
judges	in	the	gay	rights	data	set	are	female.	
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not	appear	to	have	any	direct	effect	on	decision	making,	I	thought	it	may	be	interesting	to	
see	if	there	were	any	disparities	in	the	impact	of	explanatory	variables	between	the	earlier	
years	 of	my	 data	 set	 and	 the	 later	 years,	 keeping	 in	mind	 the	 large	 difference	 in	 public	
support	 for	 gay	 rights	between	 the	 two	 time	 frames.	 Therefore,	 I	 split	 the	 data	 into	 two	
time	 periods	 –	 1991	 to	 2005	 and	 2006	 to	 2012.	 I	 chose	 2005/2006	 as	 the	 split	 point	
because	it	was	right	around	the	time	that	the	number	of	gay	rights	cases	heard	every	year	
markedly	jumped	up	(see	Figure	3	in	Chapter	4)	and	also	when	state‐level	public	support	
for	gay	rights	began	its	 final	steady	 incline,	with	no	 further	dips	(see	Figure	2	 in	Chapter	
4)30.	 The	 number	 of	 cases	 in	 each	 subset	 was	 also	 sufficient	 to	 run	 viable	 regression	
analyses.	
	 The	two	time‐bound	models	did	 in	 fact	 indicate	several	 interesting	contrasts,	both	
between	each	other	and	when	compared	to	the	overall	model.	I	present	the	results	of	both	
regressions	first	and	then	evaluate	the	differences.	Table	15	shows	the	logistic	regression	
results	 from	 the	 first	 time‐bound	 model	 (1991‐2005).	 While	 ideology	 was	 still	 highly	
significant	(for	both	the	Party	model	and	the	Common	Space	Score	model),	gender	and	case	
type	 were	 not.	 Further,	 one	 of	 the	 Religion	 categories	 (Mainline	 Protestant),	 as	 well	 as	
Circuit	Ideology	(in	the	Common	Space	Score	model	only),	did	have	significant	impacts	on	
decision	 making	 during	 this	 time	 period.	 Similarly	 to	 the	 overall	 model,	 Elazar’s	
traditionalistic	state	culture	type	was	significant	in	the	Party	model,	but	not	in	the	Common	
Space	Score	model.	
	
	
                                                            
30	As	mentioned	in	Chapter	4,	public	backlash	after	the	Massachusetts	Supreme	Court	legalized	gay	marriage	in	that	state	
resulted	in	a	(brief)	nationwide	dip	in	public	support	for	gay	rights	in	2004‐2005.	The	highly	publicized	case,	which	made	
Massachusetts	the	first	state	to	legalize	gay	marriage,	also	likely	acted	as	a	trigger	that	placed	the	issue	of	gay	rights	more	
firmly	on	the	radar	of	the	public,	the	media,	and	the	political	parties.	
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Table	15	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Gay	Rights	Cases	on	all	Independent	Variables,	
including	only	Cases	from	1991‐2005,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
2.15	(.610)**	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
2.909	(.854)**	
Judge’s	Gender	 ‐1.006	(.896)	 ‐1.137	(.853)		
Judge’s	Race	 .655	(.904)	 .519	(.904)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 .254	(.738)	 .827	(.735)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 1.512	(.715)*	 1.482	(.703)*	
					Other	Christian	 .771	(.781)	 .994	(.814)	
					Jewish	 ‐.176	(1.123)	 .188	(1.007)	
Circuit	Ideology	1	(Reference	–	Majority	Dem)	
					Majority	Republican	
					Circuit	is	Evenly	Split	
Circuit	Ideology	2	–	Median	C.S.	Score	
	
1.047	(.633)	
2.922	(1.686)	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
‐‐‐	
2.720	(1.290)*	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Cases)	
					Prisoner	Discrimination	
					Other	Discrimination/Harassment	
					Domestic	Benefits	
					Gov’t	or	Private	Protections	
					Military/Don’t	Ask	Don’t	Tell	
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Gay	Rights	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States	
Constant	
	
1.385	(1.664)	
‐.405	(.709)	
1.654	(1.392)	
‐.726	(.763)	
1.053	(.920)	
.045	(.029)	
	
.813	(.661)	
2.805	(1.038)**	
‐5.982	(2.242)	
	
1.097	(1.404)	
‐.347	(.706)	
1.092	(1.365)	
‐.685	(.748)	
1.055	(.914)	
.036	(.027)	
	
.897	(.673)	
1.556	(.937)	
‐3.547	(1.784)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
Percent	Reduction	in	Error	
115
49.79	
33.33%	
115	
49.24	
35.56%	
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Table	 16	 depicts	 the	 results	 for	 the	 2006‐2012	 model.	 This	 model	 looks	 more	
similar	to	the	results	from	the	overall	model,	with	ideology	and	several	case	types	having	
significant	effects	on	the	outcomes	of	gay	rights	cases	(with	the	addition	of	gay	marriage	to	
that	list).	However,	gender	was	not	significant	in	this	model,	nor	was	Elazar’s	state	culture.	
	
Table	16	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Gay	Rights	Cases	on	all	Independent	Variables,	
including	only	Cases	from	2006‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
1.595	(.466)**	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
1.809	(.599)**	
Judge’s	Gender	 ‐1.004	(.584)	 ‐1.093	(.568)		
Judge’s	Race	 .003	(.644)	 ‐.156	(.626)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 ‐.814	(.578)	 ‐.711	(.561)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 ‐.502	(.667)	 ‐.319	(.667)	
					Other	Christian	 ‐.408	(.700)	 ‐.244	(.681)	
					Jewish	 ‐.515	(.976)	 ‐.469	(.913)	
Circuit	Ideology	1	(Reference	–	Majority	Dem)	
					Majority	Republican	
					Circuit	is	Evenly	Split	
Circuit	Ideology	2	–	Median	C.S.	Score	
	
‐.328	(.485)	
‐2.216	(1.056)*	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
‐‐‐	
‐.647	(1.026)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Cases)	
					Gay	Marriage	
					Prisoner	Discrimination	
					Other	Discrimination/Harassment	
					Privacy/Defamation	
					Gov’t	or	Private	Protections	
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Gay	Rights	
	
‐2.427	(.845)**	
‐.921	(.651)	
‐1.755	(.538)**	
‐1.671	(1.026)	
‐2.881	(.781)**	
.025	(.034)	
	
‐2.503	(.828)**	
‐.904	(.627)	
‐1.480	(.507)**	
‐1.588	(1.004)	
‐2.695	(.769)**	
.048	(.030)	
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State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States	
Constant	
	
.554	(.467)	
.458	(.620)	
‐1.387	(2.421)	
	
.459	(.457)	
.626	(.637)	
‐2.448	(2.067)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
Percent	Reduction	in	Error	
158
52.89	
42.65%	
158	
46.42	
42.65%	
	
	
The	results	from	the	earlier	time	period	(1991‐2005)	demonstrated	several	
surprising	results.	Judges	identifying	as	Mainline	Protestant	were	significantly	more	likely	
to	rule	against	gay	rights	than	judges	claiming	no	affiliation	or	refusing	to	respond.	This	
result	is	counter‐intuitive	as	Mainline	Protestants	are	typically	considered	more	liberal	on	
morality	policy	issues31.	Further,	although	significant	in	these	models,	none	of	the	religion	
variables	were	significant	over	the	entire	time	period	(or	in	the	later	models),	suggesting	
that	the	religion	of	the	deciding	judge	(at	least	for	Mainline	Protestants)	had	an	influence	
on	him	or	her	in	the	early	years	of	gay	rights,	but	not	after	2005	or	so.	Circuit	Ideology	was	
also	significant	in	the	earlier	time	period,	indicating	that	judges	were	attentive	to	the	
ideology	of	the	judges	on	the	circuit	above	them	and	ruled	accordingly,	probably	in	an	
effort	to	avoid	reversal.	Circuit	Ideology	also	dropped	off	the	list	of	significant	variables	in	
both	the	later	models32	and	overall	models,	suggesting	that	strategy	as	a	factor	in	decision	
making	was	influential	to	judges	early	on,	perhaps	as	they	confronted	these	issues	for	the	
first	time	and	were	learning	to	navigate	their	own	stances	on	them.	In	later	years,	because	
of	increasing	party	polarization	or	the	increasing	attention	paid	to	gay	rights	issues,	district	
                                                            
31	Since	 the	category	of	 “Mainline	Protestant”	 is	 somewhat	of	a	 catch‐all	 category,	 including	Methodists,	Presbyterians,	
Lutherans,	 and	 others,	 it	 is	 conceivable	 that	 certain	 denominations,	 especially	 those	 located	 in	 the	 South,	 may	 be	
conservative	on	gay	rights	issues,	despite	being	relatively	liberal	on	other	issues.	
32	Except	in	the	“split”	circuits,	of	which	there	were	relatively	few;	though	mildly	interesting,	this	result	has	little	bearing	
here	as	strategy	would	not	come	into	play	in	evenly	split	circuits,	as	opposed	to	circuits	controlled	by	Republican‐
controlled	judges	and	those	controlled	by	Democrat‐appointed	judges.	
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judges	appeared	to	be	less	concerned	with	being	overturned	on	appeal	and	ruled	more	in	
line	with	their	own	ideologies,	depending	also	on	case	type.	
	 Indeed,	 case	 type	did	not	 have	much	of	 an	 effect	 until	 2006	and	beyond,	 perhaps	
because	 precedent	 was	 not	 established	 in	 any	 of	 these	 areas	 of	 law	 early	 on,	 but	 was	
established	(albeit	to	a	limited	extent)	slowly	as	time	went	on,	causing	judges	to	rule	more	
similarly	with	each	other	on	certain	case	types.	The	impact	of	this	evolving	precedent	did	
not	 make	 judicial	 ideology	 less	 significant	 in	 later	 years;	 however	 the	 coefficients	 were	
noticeably	 lower	 in	 the	 later	models,	 possibly	 indicating	 the	mitigating	 influence	of	 legal	
factors	on	 ideology	as	time	wore	on.	 It	 is	also	possible	 that	public	opinion	contributed	to	
some	of	the	variation	between	time‐bound	models	in	an	indirect	way.	As	public	support	for	
gay	marriage	 grew,	 judges	were	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 influenced	 by	 religion	 or	 strategy,	 and	
were	 more	 likely	 to	 follow	 the	 lead	 set	 by	 other	 judges	 in	 similar	 types	 of	 cases.	
Discrimination	by	public	officials	based	on	sexual	orientation	was	 increasingly	viewed	as	
almost	 always	 inappropriate,	 and	 protections	 for	 LGBT	 individuals	 were	 increasingly	
viewed	as	necessary	and	appropriate	in	the	eyes	of	the	public	and	judges.		
The	 other	 two	major	 differences	 between	 the	 time‐bound	models	 and	 the	 overall	
model	I	attribute	to	a	simple	numbers	game.	Gender	is	not	significant	in	either	time‐bound	
model,	but	is	significant	overall,	likely	because	the	number	of	female	judges	in	each	subset	
of	cases	is	just	too	small	to	be	significant.	Likewise,	gay	marriage	cases	are	only	significant	
in	later	years	as	the	number	of	cases	involving	gay	marriage	was	very	small	prior	to	2006.	
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Abortion	
Primary	Models	
	 Back	in	Chapter	4,	I	predicted	that	the	large	proportion	of	abortion	cases	decided	in	
favor	of	abortion	rights	would	cause	difficulties	in	regression	analysis.	Since	only	50	cases	
between	 1991‐2012	 had	 anti‐choice	 outcomes,	 the	 variation	 among	 the	 independent	
variables	in	those	cases	will	likely	not	be	sufficient	to	find	many	significant	results.	As	Table	
17	 shows,	 this	 prediction	 was	 mostly	 accurate.	 However,	 while	 no	 other	 explanatory	
variables	 exhibit	 significant	 effects,	 judicial	 ideology	 was	 still	 highly	 significant	 in	 both	
models,	providing	further	evidence	of	the	substantial	role	ideology	plays	in	morality	policy	
decisions.			
	
Table	17	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Abortion	Cases	on	all	Independent	Variables,	
including	all	Cases	from	1991‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
1.062	(.409)**	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
1.550	(.548)**	
Judge’s	Gender	 ‐.176	(.593)	 ‐.255	(.590)		
Judge’s	Race	 ‐1.426	(.835)	 ‐1.296	(.834)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 .460	(.508)	 .516	(.505)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 ‐.434	(.532)	 ‐.371	(.525)	
					Other	Christian	 .960	(.622)	 .895	(.632)	
					Jewish	 ‐.320	(.909)	 ‐.336	(.909)	
Circuit	Ideology	1	(Reference	–	Majority	Dem)	
					Majority	Republican	
	
‐.144	(.449)	
	
‐‐‐	
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					Circuit	is	Evenly	Split	
Circuit	Ideology	2	–	Median	C.S.	Score	
‐.501	(1.213)	
‐‐‐	
‐‐‐	
‐.722	(.919)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Undue	Burden	Cases)	
					Gov’t	or	Private	Restrictions	
					Individual	Rights	
					Access	to	Clinics	
					Gov’t	or	Private	Protections		
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Abortion	Rights	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States		
Constant	
	
‐.407	(.574)	
.278	(1.010)	
.207	(.511)	
.636	(.593)	
‐.004	(.027)	
	
.208	(.509)	
.931	(.578)	
‐1.854	(1.424)	
	
‐.450	(.572)	
.183	(1.025)	
.176	(.510)	
.459	(.597)	
.002	(.027)	
	
.304	(.515)	
.900	(.583)	
‐1.658	(1.374)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
Percent	Reduction	in	Error	
182
24.43	
0%	
182	
25.79	
4.17%	
	
	
	 Although	 judicial	 ideology	 was	 significant,	 each	 model	 as	 a	 whole	 was	 barely	
significant	at	the	0.05	level	and	showed	little	to	no	reduction	in	error33.	This	is	also	a	result	
of	 that	 fact	 that	 almost	 3/4ths	 of	 cases	 were	 decided	 the	 same	 way;	 the	 inclusion	 of	
ideology	(and	the	rest	of	the	independent	variables)	in	a	regression	analysis	provides	only	
a	 slight	 increase	 in	predictive	power.	Thus,	 the	question	 that	remains	 is	whether	 judicial	
ideology	 has	 any	 substantive,	 discernable	 impact	 on	 decision	 making	 in	 abortion	 cases.	
Figure	17	demonstrates	that	the	magnitude	of	ideology’s	effect	is	indeed	substantial,	if	not	
as	 large	 as	 its	 effect	 in	 gay	 rights	 cases.	 As	 Figure	 17	 shows,	 when	 holding	 all	 other	
independent	variables	constant,	the	average	predicted	probability	of	a	Democrat	appointee	
                                                            
33	 I	 ran	 several	 variations	 of	 regression	models	 on	 abortion	 decisions,	 including	 hierarchal	 models,	 models	 including	
region	 instead	 of	 state	 culture	 or	 eliminating	 state	 culture	 altogether,	 and	 models	 utilizing	 the	 Erikson,	 Wright,	 and	
McIver	 measures	 or	 Berry	 et	 al.	 measures	 instead	 of	 state‐level	 opinion.	 None	 of	 the	 variations	 demonstrated	 any	
substantive	or	even	merely	interesting	differences	in	effects.	
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ruling	 against	 abortion	 rights	 is	 15.1%,	 while	 the	 average	 predicted	 probability	 of	 a	
Republican	appointee	ruling	in	the	same	manner	jumps	to	33.2%.			
 
Figure	17	
Predicted	Probability	of	Anti‐Choice	Decision	in	U.S.	District	Court	Cases	(1991‐2012),	by	
Party	of	Appointing	President,	with	95%	Confidence	Intervals	
 
 	
Figure	18	demonstrates	the	predicted	probabilities	for	anti‐choice	rulings	based	on	
Common	Space	scores.	As	we	move	from	the	most	liberal	judges	to	the	most	conservative,	
the	likelihood	of	an	anti‐choice	decision	quadruples,	from	10.5%	to	41.9%.	While	the	curve	
is	 not	 as	 dramatic	 as	 that	 in	 gay	 rights	 cases,	 it	 still	 exhibits	 substantive	 differences	
between	 liberal	 and	 conservative	 judges	 that	 are	 of	 practical	 interest	 to	 judicial	 scholars	
and	practitioners	alike.	
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Figure	18	
Predicted	Probability	of	Anti‐Choice	Decision	in	U.S.	District	Court	Cases	(1991‐2012),	by	
Common	Space	Score	of	Judge,	with	95%	Confidence	Intervals	
 
 	
Affirmative	Action	
Primary	Models	
	 Although	consisting	of	the	smallest	subset	of	cases	at	only	95,	the	affirmative	action	
regression	 models	 provide	 some	 of	 the	 most	 intriguing	 results.	 The	 first	 interesting	
deviation	from	the	gay	rights	and	abortion	results	was	the	usefulness	of	hierarchal	models.	
Table	18	shows	both	regression	models	without	any	state‐level	variables	included.		
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Table	18	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Affirmative	Action	Cases	on	all	Independent	
Variables	except	State‐Level	Variables,	including	all	Cases	from	1991‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	
Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
1.242	(.533)*	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
2.063	(.692)**	
Judge’s	Gender	 ‐.260	(.831)	 ‐.540	(.823)		
Judge’s	Race	 ‐.767	(.874)	 ‐.614	(.895)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 1.080	(.759)	 1.042	(.741)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 .246	(.600)	 .527	(.613)	
					Other	Christian	 ‐.662	(.801)	 ‐.455	(.817)	
					Jewish	 ‐.165	(.898)	 .144	(.903)	
Circuit	Ideology	1	(Reference	–	Majority	Dem)	
					Majority	Republican	
					Circuit	is	Evenly	Split	
Circuit	Ideology	2	–	Median	C.S.	Score	
	
‐.346	(.755)	
‐1.447	(1.468)	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
‐‐‐	
.167	(1.282)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Policies)	
					Education	Policies	
					Contracting	Policies	
Constant	
	
1.104	(.878)	
1.299	(.639)*	
‐.982	(.907)	
	
1.117	(.884)	
1.293	(.647)*	
‐1.880	(.507)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
Percent	Reduction	in	Error	
95
21.51	
25.00%	
95	
24.53	
34.09%	
	
	
At	 this	 first	hierarchal	 level,	 judicial	 ideology	was	significant	(although	to	a	higher	
degree	in	the	Common	Space	Scores	model),	as	was	case	type	both	generally	and	for	cases	
involving	 minority	 contracting	 policies.	 Such	 cases	 were	 significantly	 more	 likely	 to	 be	
ruled	 in	 an	 anti‐affirmative	 action	 manner	 than	 the	 reference	 category	 of	 employment	
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cases.	The	results	here	support	my	hypothesis	 that	 judicial	 ideology	significantly	 impacts	
judicial	decision	making	in	affirmative	action	cases,	as	it	does	in	the	other	two	issue	areas.	
None	of	the	other	variables	have	a	notable	effect	except	case	type,	which	is	not	surprising	
given	 the	 content	 of	 the	 judges’	 opinions	 in	 these	 cases.	 The	 tone	 and	 language	 used	 by	
judges	in	these	cases	(which	involved	policies	requiring	certain	proportions	of	government	
contractors	and/or	subcontractors	to	be	minority	companies)	was	often	blatantly	negative,	
especially	 in	more	 recent	 years34.	 The	most	 surprising	 omission	 in	 the	 list	 of	 significant	
variables	is	that	of	race;	however	the	low	percentage	of	non‐white	judges	(15%)	in	the	data	
set	makes	a	significant	result	very	difficult	to	achieve.	
Adding	 state‐level	 variables	 (state	 opinion	 and	 state	 culture35)	 caused	 several	
substantive	 changes	 in	 the	 coefficients	 of	 the	 significant	 variables	 discussed	 above.	 As	
Table	19	demonstrates,	 the	 state‐level	 variables	 themselves	were	not	 significant,	 but	did	
decrease	the	coefficients	 for	 judicial	 ideology	in	both	models.	The	result	was	that	 judicial	
ideology	 is	no	 longer	 significant	at	 all	 in	 the	Party	model,	 and	 is	 still	 significant,	but	 to	a	
lesser	 degree,	 in	 the	 Common	 Space	 Score	model.	 Conversely,	 the	 addition	 of	 state‐level	
variables	resulted	in	increased	coefficients	for	each	of	the	case	types,	increasing	the	degree	
of	 significance	 for	 the	 variable	 overall	 as	 well	 for	 contracting	 cases	 in	 the	 Party	model.	
Thus,	adding	state‐level	variables	appears	to	mitigate	the	effect	of	 judicial	 ideology	while	
simultaneously	heightening	the	effect	of	case	type.	Further,	it	is	the	addition	of	both	state	
opinion	and	state	culture	that	result	in	these	effects.	When	adding	these	variables	one	at	a	
                                                            
34	Indeed,	an	in‐depth	analysis	of	the	case	opinions	revealed	a	consistent	reluctance	on	the	part	of	most	judges	to	uphold	
policies	 requiring	 a	 certain	 percentage	 of	 contractors	 or	 subcontractors	 to	 consist	 primarily	 of	 minorities	 or	 to	 be	
minority‐owned	 entities.	 Judges	 often	 found	 it	 difficult	 to	 extend	 the	 history	 of	 past	 discrimination	 rationale	 to	
contracting	polices,	finding	that	they	are	one	step	removed	from	the	government	itself.	
35	Again,	state	culture	was	used	as	opposed	to	region	when	the	two	were	highly	correlated	with	each	other.	Running	the	
same	regressions	with	region	instead	led	to	very	similar	results.			
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time,	 each	 appeared	 to	 be	 only	 partially	 responsible	 for	 the	 changes	 in	 coefficients	 for	
ideology	and	case	type.	
	
Table	19	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Affirmative	Action	Cases	on	all	Independent	
Variables,	including	all	Cases	from	1991‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
1.011	(.578)	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
1.695	(.779)*	
Judge’s	Gender	 .472	(.977)	 ‐.020	(.920)		
Judge’s	Race	 ‐.879	(.970)	 ‐.689	(.985)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 1.617	(.923)	 1.435	(.873)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 .534	(.687)	 .893	(.682)	
					Other	Christian	 ‐.718	(.907)	 ‐.426	(.876)	
					Jewish	 .130	(.942)	 .469	(.957)	
Circuit	Ideology	1	(Reference	–	Majority	Dem)	
					Majority	Republican	
					Circuit	is	Evenly	Split	
Circuit	Ideology	2	–	Median	C.S.	Score	
	
‐1.413	(.990)	
‐2.705	(1.779)	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
‐‐‐	
‐1.938	(1.772)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Policies)	
					Education	Policies	
					Contracting	Policies	
State‐Level	Support	for	Affirmative	Action	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States	
Constant	
	
1.981	(1.091)	
1.992	(.756)**	
.049	(.103)	
	
.436	(.780)	
1.247	(.879)	
‐1.812	(1.806)	
	
2.028	(1.082)	
1.849	(.748)*	
.035	(.102)	
	
.281	(.752)	
1.142	(.901)	
‐2.053	(1.790)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
Percent	Reduction	in	Error	
87
28.83	
37.5%	
87	
29.06	
40%	
122	
 
	
 
Since	judicial	ideology	was	either	not	significant	or	barely	significant	in	the	models	
containing	all	 independent	variables,	which	were	the	hierarchal	models	of	best	 fit	 (based	
on	 percent	 reduction	 in	 error,	X2	 of	model,	 and	 pseudo‐R2),	 I	 did	 not	 generate	 predicted	
probabilities.	However,	affirmative	action	cases	proved	to	be	unique	in	another	way;	state	
opinion	 did	 have	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 decision	 making	 when	 I	 included	 one	 of	 my	
alternate	state	opinion	variables	–	Berry	et	al.’s	measure	of	citizen	ideology.	Further,	these	
regression	models	ended	up	being	 the	“best”	models	of	 fit	overall.	 I	describe	my	 findings	
and	generate	predicted	probabilities	for	these	regression	analyses	in	the	next	section.		
Alternative	Models	–	Citizen	Ideology	
	 As	described	more	fully	in	Chapter	3,	Berry	et	al.	developed	a	measure	in	1998	that	
they	 now	 refer	 to	 as	 “citizen	 ideology”.	 Unlike	 Erikson,	Wright,	 and	McIver’s	measure	 of	
state	 citizen	 ideology	 on	 a	 liberal	 to	 conservative	 continuum	 that	 shows	 remarkable	
stability	over	time	within	states,	Berry	et	al.’s	measure	is	more	dynamic	in	nature.	For	this	
reason,	it	has	been	described	by	other	scholars	as	more	accurately	capturing	the	ideology	
of	elites	in	the	state	instead	of	the	mass	public.	Berry	and	colleagues	in	subsequent	articles	
(2007,	 2010)	 have	 staunchly	 defended	 their	 measure	 as	 representative	 of	 the	 public’s	
ideology,	specifically	 its	mood	toward	the	government,	politics,	and	policies	of	 their	state	
during	any	given	year,	and	insist	it	is	the	best	comprehensive	measure	of	citizen	ideology	in	
the	states.	
	 As	noted	 in	each	of	 the	prior	sections,	Berry	et	al.’s	measure	made	no	discernable	
difference	 in	 the	 regression	 models	 for	 gay	 rights	 or	 abortion	 when	 including	 it	 as	 an	
alternative	 to	 specific	 state‐level	 opinion.	 However,	 in	 the	 affirmative	 action	 regression	
models	it	is	not	only	statistically	significant	itself,	but	its	inclusion	gave	the	overall	model	a	
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better	 fit36	 and	 revealed	 interesting	 relationships	 between	 several	 other	 variables	 and	
decision	making.	Table	20	provides	the	regression	results.	
	
Table	20	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Affirmative	Action	Cases	on	all	Independent	
Variables,	using	Berry	et	al.’s	Citizen	Ideology	Measure	instead	of	State‐Level	Public	
Support	for	Affirmative	Action,	including	all	Cases	from	1991‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	
Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
1.210	(.607)*	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
1.833	(.822)*	
Judge’s	Gender	 .626	(.998)	 .267	(.949)		
Judge’s	Race	 ‐.485	(.981)	 ‐.364	(1.004)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 1.732	(.938)	 1.647	(.892)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 .739	(.721)	 1.023	(.724)	
					Other	Christian	 ‐1.271	(1.043)	 ‐.934	(.967)	
					Jewish	 ‐.105	(1.000)	 .256	(1.004)	
Circuit	Ideology	1	(Reference	–	Majority	Dem)	
					Majority	Republican	
					Circuit	is	Evenly	Split	
Circuit	Ideology	2	–	Median	C.S.	Score	
	
‐1.840	(1.075)	
‐2.308	(1.740)	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
‐‐‐	
‐2.775	(1.876)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Policies)	
					Education	Policies	
					Contracting	Policies	
Citizen	Ideology	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States	
	
3.251	(1.371)*	
1.708	(.730)*	
‐.094	(.045)*	
	
.936	(.805)	
.125	(1.001)	
	
3.163	(1.304)*	
1.621	(.727)*	
‐.092	(.044)*	
	
.812	(.792)	
.160	(1.003)	
                                                            
36	Running	the	same	regressions	with	Erikson,	Wright,	and	McIver’s	alternative	measure	did	not	result	in	significance	or	
provide	a	good	model	fit,	so	it	is	not	reported	here.	
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Constant	 4.184	(2.755)	 3.454	(2.452)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
Percent	Reduction	in	Error	
87
33.56	
47.5%	
87	
33.91	
45%	
 
	
The	first	notable	difference	between	these	alternate	models	and	the	primary	models	
is	the	significance	of	state	citizen	ideology	itself.	As	states	become	more	“liberal”	on	Berry	
et	 al.’s	 scale,	 the	 likelihood	 of	 an	 anti‐affirmative	 action	 decision	 decreases	 significantly.	
However,	the	coefficient	itself	does	not	tell	us	very	much	about	the	magnitude	of	the	effect,	
especially	 at	 a	 seemingly	minimal	 ‐.094	 and	 ‐.092	 for	 the	 Party	model	 and	 the	 Common	
Space	 Score	 model,	 respectively.	 Thus,	 I	 generated	 predicted	 probabilities	 for	 anti‐
affirmative	action	 rulings	based	on	citizen	 ideology	and	graphed	 the	 results	 in	Figure	19	
below.	
As	 Figure	 19	 demonstrates,	 the	 effect	 of	 citizen	 ideology	 on	 affirmative	 action	
decisions	is	quite	dramatic.	Although	the	95%	confidence	intervals	are	comparatively	large,	
the	 sizable	decrease	 in	 likelihood	of	 an	anti‐affirmative	action	decision	over	 the	 range	of	
citizen	 ideologies	 is	 easily	 apparent.	The	 liberalism	scale	provided	by	Berry	 et	 al.	 ranges	
from	 approximately	 20	 (representing	 the	 most	 ideologically	 “conservative”	 states)	 to	
approximately	80	(representing	the	most	ideologically	“liberal”	states)	in	each	year.	In	my	
data	 set,	 the	 two	 states	 with	 the	 most	 conservative	 citizens	 in	 a	 particular	 year	 are	
Louisiana	with	scores	of	28.24	and	28.54	in	various	years,	and	Arkansas,	with	a	low	score	
of	 29.17.	 The	 two	 states	 with	 the	 most	 liberal	 citizens	 in	 a	 particular	 year	 are	
Massachusetts,	with	a	high	score	of	79.04,	and	Hawaii,	with	a	high	score	of	77.92.	According	
to	Figure	19,	holding	all	other	variables	constant,	as	we	move	from	the	states	with	the	most	
conservative	 citizen	 ideologies	 to	 the	 most	 liberal,	 the	 likelihood	 of	 an	 anti‐affirmative	
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action	ruling	plummets	from	a	high	of	89.3%	to	10.3%.	At	the	middle	of	the	citizen	ideology	
range,	 the	 likelihood	 of	 an	 anti‐affirmative	 action	 ruling	 is	 approximately	 50/50.	 Thus,	
while	 the	 coefficients	 for	 Citizen	 Ideology	 reveal	 very	 little	 about	 the	 substantive	
relationship	 between	 the	 variable	 and	 judicial	 decisions,	 the	 predicted	 probabilities	
evidence	a	striking	association	between	the	two.	
 
Figure	19	
Predicted	Probability	of	Anti‐Affirmative	Action	Decision	in	U.S.	District	Court	Cases	(1991‐
2012),	by	Berry	et	al.’s	“Citizen	Ideology”	Measure	of	the	State	Containing	the	District	
where	the	Judge	Presides,	with	95%	Confidence	Intervals	
 
 	
The	Berry	models	also	demonstrate	the	significant	effect	of	several	other	variables,	
including	judicial	ideology	and	both	case	types.	The	coefficient	for	judicial	ideology	is	in	the	
anticipated	direction,	meaning	that	Republican	appointees	were	more	likely	to	rule	against	
affirmative	action	policies	and	vice	versa.	 Similarly,	 the	more	 conservative	 the	 judge,	 the	
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more	likely	he	or	she	will	rule	against	affirmative	action	policies	and	vice	versa.	In	an	effort	
to	determine	 the	practical	 effects	of	 judicial	 ideology,	 I	 generated	predicted	probabilities	
and	report	them	here.		
Figure	 20	 evidences	 a	 substantial	 difference	 between	 the	 rulings	 of	 judges	
appointed	by	Republicans	and	Democrats.	Holding	other	 independent	variables	constant,	
the	average	likelihood	of	a	Democrat	appointee	ruling	against	an	affirmative	action	policy	
is	 29.9%,	 while	 the	 average	 likelihood	 of	 a	 Republican	 appointee	 ruling	 against	 such	 a	
policy	is	57.1%.							
 
Figure	20	
Predicted	Probability	of	Anti‐Affirmative	Action	Decision	in	U.S.	District	Court	Cases	(1991‐
2012),	by	Party	of	Appointing	President,	with	95%	Confidence	Intervals	
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	 Similarly,	 the	 predicted	 probability	 of	 an	 anti‐affirmative	 action	 decision	 varies	
substantially	based	on	the	Common	Space	score	of	the	judge.	As	Figure	21	shows,	holding	
other	independent	variables	constant,	as	we	move	from	the	most	liberal	judges	to	the	most	
conservative,	 the	 likelihood	of	an	anti‐affirmative	action	decision	more	 than	 triples,	 from	
21.6%	 to	68.8%.	Thus,	 even	when	 controlling	 for	 citizen	 ideology	 and	other	 explanatory	
variables,	 and	 despite	 the	 relatively	 low	 number	 of	 cases	 decided	 from	 1991	 to	 2012,	
judicial	ideology	has	a	significant	and	substantive	effect	on	decision	making	in	affirmative	
action	cases.		
	
Figure	21	
Predicted	Probability	of	Anti‐Affirmative	Action	Decision	in	U.S.	District	Court	Cases	(1991‐
2012),	by	Common	Space	Score	of	Judge,	with	95%	Confidence	Intervals	
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	 The	significance	of	both	case	types	indicates	that	legal	factors,	especially	precedent,	
play	 a	 role	 in	 affirmative	 action	 decision	making	 as	well.	 Judges	were	 significantly	more	
likely	to	rule	against	both	minority	contracting	policies	and	affirmative	action	admissions	
policies	 than	 employment	policies,	 even	when	 controlling	 for	 ideology	 and	other	 factors.	
Thus,	when	it	comes	to	affirmative	action	cases,	judges	appear	to	be	influenced	by	several	
factors,	including	ideology,	precedent,	and	the	predominant	ideology	of	the	citizens	in	the	
state	in	which	the	judge	presides.	
Conclusions	
	 The	three	issue	areas	I	chose	as	most	appropriate	to	test	my	hypotheses	and	shed	
light	on	my	research	questions	show	sizable	variation	but	also	some	striking	similarities	in	
the	effect	of	particular	variables	on	judges’	rulings.	 Judicial	 ideology	was	consistently	and	
substantially	related	to	decision	making	 in	all	 three	 issue	areas	when	the	best	regression	
models,	 controlling	 for	 the	 “correct”	 variables,	were	analyzed.	This	 confirms	my	primary	
hypotheses.	While	not	a	necessarily	surprising	result,	 it	does	run	contrary	to	much	of	the	
district	court	literature	which	finds	little	to	no	relationship	between	ideology	and	decision	
making.	However,	as	I	point	out	 in	Chapter	2,	most	of	the	studies	reporting	such	findings	
examined	a	wide	variety	of	(or	sometimes	all)	case	types,	including	many	not	touching	on	
moral	or	politically	divisive	 issues.	As	all	 three	of	my	 issues	are	polarizing	and	politically	
divisive,	and	my	data	set	covers	the	population	of	reported	decisions	from	1991‐2012,	I	can	
safely	 conclude	 that	 judicial	 ideology	 is	 strongly	 associated	 with	 district	 court	 decision	
making	in	areas	of	salient	and	controversial	civil	liberties	and	civil	rights	such	as	these.	
	 The	other	findings	reported	here	deliver	mixed	results	that	show	several	intriguing	
disparities	 between	 issue	 areas.	 Legal	 factors	 (case	 type)	 and	 strategic	 factors	 (circuit	
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ideology)	appeared	to	effect	decision	making	in	certain	issue	areas;	these	findings	bolster	
one	 side	 or	 the	 other	 in	 the	 scholarly	 debate	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 these	 factors	 to	
district	court	judges.	However,	their	influence	did	little	to	mitigate	the	significant	effects	of	
judicial	ideology.	Similarly,	the	significant	impacts	of	gender	in	gay	rights	cases	and	religion	
in	the	subset	of	older	gay	rights	cases	were	noteworthy	and	should	be	of	interest	to	judicial	
scholars	studying	the	roles	of	gender	and/or	religion	on	decision	making.	
My	 other	 primary	 variable	 of	 interest,	 state‐level	 public	 opinion,	 demonstrated	
some	of	 the	most	 thought‐provoking	disparities	between	the	 three	 issue	areas.	 It	did	not	
appear	to	have	any	direct	impact	on	decision	making	in	gay	rights	cases	or	abortion	cases,	
but	did	perhaps	indirectly	impact	decision	making	through	its	effects	on	other	variables	in	
the	issue	area	of	gay	rights.	The	time‐bound	models	demonstrated	substantial	differences	
in	 the	effect	of	particular	variables	on	decision	making	during	 the	same	 time	period	 that	
support	for	gay	rights	in	every	state	increased	at	extraordinary	levels.	Additionally,	state‐
level	opinion	had	both	direct	and	indirect	effects	in	affirmative	action	cases.	Adding	specific	
state‐level	opinion	on	affirmative	action	in	conjunction	with	Elazar’s	state	culture	types	as	
indicator	 variables	 in	 the	 regression	 analyses	 substantially	 changed	 the	 effects	 of	 both	
judicial	ideology	and	case	type	on	decision	making.	Further,	state	opinion	had	a	direct	and	
substantial	 impact	on	decision	making	 in	affirmative	action	cases	when	utilizing	Berry	et	
al.’s	citizen	ideology	as	its	measure.	Perhaps	the	best	conclusion	to	reach	regarding	state‐
level	 opinion	 is	 that	 certain	 types	 of	 state‐level	 opinion	may	 matter,	 in	 certain	 types	 of	
cases.	 Although	 vague,	 the	 implication	 here	 is	 that	 further	 research	 should	 be	 done	 to	
clarify	 the	 role	 of	 state‐level	 opinion	 on	 district	 court	 judges.	 Certainly,	 this	 chapter	 has	
shown	enough	evidence	of	a	relationship	between	the	two	variables	to	encourage	scholars	
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to	incorporate	state‐level	public	opinion	into	studies	of	judicial	politics	at	the	district	court	
level.			
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CHAPTER	6	–	CONCLUSION		
	
	 The	 results	 I	 have	 presented	 in	 this	 dissertation	 help	 to	 answer	 my	 research	
questions,	but	also	raise	some	new	questions.	Several	of	the	findings,	including	the	strong	
effect	of	judicial	ideology	on	decision	making,	are	directly	relevant	and	provide	evidence	to	
further	 the	 scholarly	 debates	 on	 these	 topics,	 but	 are	 not	 altogether	 unexpected.	 Other	
findings	are	both	unexpected	and	substantively	interesting	and	deserve	further	speculation	
and	study.	In	this	concluding	chapter,	I	revisit	the	results	and	conclusions	from	the	various	
analyses	and	discuss	the	implications	for	the	greater	question	involved	here,	namely	what	
these	results	mean	for	our	judiciary	and	our	legal	system	as	a	whole.	I	also	ponder	some	of	
the	new	questions	raised	by	these	results	and	why	they	may	be	of	import	to	scholars	and	
practitioners.	 Lastly,	 I	 describe	 the	 research	 I	 anticipate	 conducting	 as	 a	 follow‐up	 to	
address	 the	 limitations	 of	 my	 study	 and	 expand	 on	 my	 findings	 here,	 as	 well	 as	 other	
potential	 studies	 that	could	help	 shed	 further	 light	on	district	 court	decision	making	and	
additional	relevant	queries	that	have	emerged.					
A	“Neutral”	Federal	Judiciary?	
	
	 As	described	in	Chapter	2,	whether	the	judiciary	acts	in	an	appropriately	“apolitical”	
or	 neutral	 way	 is	 of	 great	 consequence	 to	 our	 legal	 system,	 and	 thus	 has	 been	 studied	
extensively.	 An	 increasingly	 hyperpartisan	 political	 atmosphere	 has	 led	 to	 even	 greater	
concern	that	judges	may	be	unwilling	or	unable	to	simply	adhere	to	legal	principles	when	
ruling,	 resulting	 in	 a	politicized	 judiciary.	 Federal	 judges	 are	partially	 insulated	 from	 the	
political	 process	 because	 they	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 elections	 or	 re‐elections	 and	 all	 of	 the	
accompanying	 campaigning,	money‐raising,	 and	 promise‐making.	 However,	 every	 time	 a	
federal	judge	eschews	legal	principles	to	rule	in	a	way	that	aligns	with	his	or	her	ideology	
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or	the	ideology	of	other	elites,	he	or	she	is	not	acting	in	a	neutral	way,	but	is	acting	just	as	
politically	as	politicians	in	the	other	two	branches	of	government.	Further,	the	judiciary	has	
historically	been	considered	the	institution	that	provides	protections	and	upheld	the	rights	
of	 certain	 minority	 or	 marginalized	 groups	 in	 society	 when	 the	 other	 branches	 of	
government	refuse	to	do	so	(e.g.,	Romero	2000).	If	judges	are	driven	primarily	by	their	own	
ideological	 beliefs	 and	 not	 by	 legal	 principles	 such	 as	 consistent	 constitutional	
interpretation	and	precedent,	 the	 concern	arises	whether	 the	 judiciary	 can	really	 fill	 this	
role37.			
	 The	evidence	presented	here	supports	the	theory	that	the	federal	judiciary	is	not	an	
impartial,	 neutral	 branch	when	deciding	 ideologically	 charged	 cases.	Although	 this	 study	
does	 not	 speak	 to	 how	 judges	may	 behave	 in	 other	 types	 of	 cases,	 the	 results	 here	 are	
indicative	of	how	judges	rule	in	the	types	of	salient	and	ideological	cases	in	which	it	is	most	
crucial	that	judges	to	act	in	an	impartial	manner,	as	the	rest	of	the	government	at	all	levels	
continues	to	handle	these	policies	 in	very	partisan	ways.	The	strong	effect	of	 ideology	on	
judges	 in	 all	 three	 issue	 areas	 and	 the	 drastic	 differences	 in	 predicted	 probabilities	 of	
outcomes	 based	 on	 ideology	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 policies	 in	 question	 as	 well	 as	 the	
parties	involved	in	these	cases	are	to	some	extent	subject	to	the	luck	of	the	draw.	When	a	
gay	 rights,	 abortion,	 or	 affirmative	 action	 case	 is	 filed	 in	 federal	 court	 and	 a	 judge	 is	
randomly	 assigned,	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 positive	 outcome	 for	 either	 party	 is	 highly	
dependent	 on	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 judge	 assigned38.	 Other	 extralegal	 factors	 can	 also	
                                                            
37	This	concern	has	been	raised	repeatedly	by	scholars	over	the	years,	with	no	clear‐cut	answers	provided	(e.g.	Rosenberg	
1991,	2008).	
38	In	fact,	my	in‐depth	analysis	of	the	cases	themselves	revealed	the	extent	to	which	opposing	outcomes	in	cases	with	very	
similar	facts	can	be	handed	down	by	judges	with	differing	ideologies.	For	example,	in	many	of	the	“access	to	clinics”	cases	
in	the	abortion	data	set,	the	facts	were	virtually	identical,	regarding	how	far	protesters	wanted	to	stand,	their	actions	in	
blocking	entrances	and	speaking	to	women,	and	the	federal	statute	that	controlled	these	issues	(the	Freedom	of	Access	to	
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significantly	influence	the	likelihood	of	outcomes	in	certain	cases,	including	the	gender	or	
the	 religion	 of	 the	 assigned	 judge,	 the	 predominant	 ideology	 of	 the	 reviewing	 appellate	
court,	the	enduring	state	culture,	or	citizen	ideology	of	the	state	in	which	the	judge	sits.	The	
significant	effect	of	any	one	or	more	of	these	variables	on	judges	violates	the	concept	of	a	
neutral	judiciary	that	decides	cases	based	on	precedent	and	other	legal	principles	alone.	
	 Beyond	 ideology,	 I	 was	 also	 very	 interested	 in	 the	 influence,	 if	 any,	 of	 state‐level	
public	 opinion	 on	 district	 court	 judges.	 There	 is	 little	 disagreement	 that	 the	 judiciary	
should	behave	as	 the	neutral	branch	of	government;	however,	as	 I	describe	 in	Chapter	2,	
the	 issue	 of	 whether	 courts	 should	 always	 follow	 public	 opinion	 or	 instead	 act	 as	
countermajoritarian	 institutions	 in	 certain	 circumstances	 is	 a	 hotly	 debated	 topic.	 The	
results	 presented	 here	 show	 little	 to	 no	 impact	 of	 specific	 public	 opinion	 on	 the	 judges	
deciding	cases	in	the	three	issue	areas	examined.	These	results	add	to	the	scholarly	debate	
by	showing	that	district	court	judges	–	those	judges	that	are	closest	to	the	people	in	a	state	
and	 most	 familiar	 with	 the	 political	 environment	 and	 history	 of	 a	 state	 –	 are	 not	
significantly	 impacted	 by	 the	 opinion	 of	 state	 residents,	 even	 in	 highly	 ideological	 issue	
areas	 in	 which	 the	 public	 is	 most	 likely	 to	 hold	 strong	 opinions.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	
evidence	to	indicate	that	district	courts	are	instead	acting	in	a	countermajoritarian	manner	
or	 that	 they	are	acting	 to	protect	 the	rights	of	politically	disadvantaged	groups,	only	 that	
they	do	not	appear	to	follow	public	opinion	in	the	states.	
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Clinic	Entrances	Act).	The	decisions	in	these	cases,	despite	being	based	on	the	same	facts	and	the	same	precedent,	varied	
dramatically,	with	different	outcomes	occurring	sometimes	in	the	same	state	or	even	in	the	same	district.	The	common	
denominator	 in	 these	disparate	outcomes	was	 the	opposing	 ideology	of	 the	 judges.	As	 I	 discuss	 later	 in	 this	 chapter,	 I	
intend	to	conduct	further	analysis	of	the	different	case	types	in	each	data	set	(including	access	to	clinic	cases)and	judicial	
behavior,	 in	 order	 to	 illuminate	 and	 fully	 detail	 exactly	 how	 judicial	 ideology	 presents	 itself	 in	 case	 language	 and	
outcomes.				
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	 The	 only	 exception	 to	 this	 general	 finding	 of	 public	 opinion’s	 irrelevance	 was	
intriguing	and	raises	important	questions:	Berry	et	al.’s	measure	of	state	liberalism	was	a	
significant	 factor	in	affirmative	action	cases.	 Initially,	 this	 finding	supports	my	hypothesis	
that	 public	 opinion	 may	 have	 a	 stronger	 role	 in	 less	 ideological	 issue	 areas.	 Since	
affirmative	action	does	not	fall	squarely	within	morality	policy	and	is	the	least	ideological	
of	 the	 three	 issue	areas,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 judges	do	not	 feel	 as	 strongly	 about	 the	 issue	
either,	and	instead	adhere	more	closely	to	public	opinion	in	their	respective	states.	It	is	also	
possible	 that	when	 judges	do	not	 feel	strongly	about	 this	or	another	 issue	area,	 they	will	
adhere	 to	elite	 ideology	 in	 the	 state,	 since	 elites	 are	more	 likely	 to	be	 in	 the	 same	 social	
circles	as	judges	and	are	to	some	extent	responsible	for	district	judges’	ascension	to	higher	
office.	In	my	view,	the	findings	here	support	the	latter	explanation	more	so	than	the	former.	
I	agree	with	the	many	scholars	who	find	Berry	et	al.’s	liberalism	scores	more	appropriate	as	
a	measure	of	elite	ideology	in	a	state	than	of	citizen	ideology.	As	described	in	Chapter	3,	the	
liberalism	score	for	each	state	consists	of	an	index	that	primarily	includes	measures	of	the	
party	 makeup	 of	 a	 state	 legislature	 and	 the	 vote	 shares	 received	 by	 incumbents	 and	
opposite‐party	 challengers	 during	 each	 election	 cycle	 (Berry	 et	 al.	 1998).	 Whether	 this	
constitutes	a	better	of	measure	of	elite	 ideology	or	citizen	 ideology,	 its	 significance	as	an	
explanatory	 variable	 provokes	 speculation	 about	 its	 role	 in	 decision	 making	 and	 the	
potential	implication	of	elite	theory	in	this	topic	area.	I	will	discuss	ideas	for	how	to	explore	
this	further	in	the	next	section.	
	 Overall,	the	primary	conclusions	to	be	drawn	from	this	study	are	that	federal	district	
judges	are	just	as	ideologically	driven	as	judges	on	higher	courts,	and	that	legal	principles	
appear	to	take	a	backseat	to	a	variety	of	extralegal	factors	when	judges	are	confronted	with	
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cases	involving	highly	ideological	issues.	The	differences	in	the	three	issue	areas,	as	well	as	
the	 variation	 found	 between	 regression	 models	 within	 each	 issue	 area,	 reveal	 nuanced	
distinctions	 in	 how	 extralegal	 factors	 affect	 case	 outcomes	 that	 can	 help	 us	 to	 better	
understand	 and	 explain	 judicial	 decision	 making.	 The	 findings	 presented	 here	 both	
enhance	 current	 knowledge	 about	 district	 court	 judges	 and	 act	 as	 stepping	 stones	 to	
further	research	and	analysis	on	this	important	topic.	
Future	Avenues	of	Study	
	
	 Several	new	avenues	of	study	emerge	based	on	the	many	questions	raised	from	the	
results	of	 these	analyses.	The	 limitations	of	 this	 study	also	point	 to	 further	 research	 that	
could	help	to	fill	 in	gaps	and	to	answer	some	of	the	questions	raised.	The	chief	 limitation	
facing	my	research	design	is	the	use	of	imputed	values	to	capture	state‐level	public	opinion.	
As	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	several	scholars	have	tested	the	MRP	method	and	found	that	it	is	
capable	 of	 generating	 very	 accurate	 estimates	 of	 state‐level	 opinion;	 in	 fact,	 it	 has	
consistently	 been	 found	 to	 be	 the	most	 precise	method	 for	 capturing	 specific	 state‐level	
public	opinion	across	all	 states	currently	available	 (e.g.,	Pacheco	2014;	Lewis,	Wood,	and	
Jacobsmeier	 2014;	 Enns	 and	 Koch	 2013;	 Lax	 and	 Phillips	 2009).	 However,	 the	 use	 of	
imputed	 values	 still	 has	 inherent	 deficiencies	 that	 cannot	 be	 avoided;	 primarily	 that	
opinion	 is	 generated	 based	 on	 demographic	 and	 geographic	 factors,	 which	 are	 not	
necessarily	strongly	predictive	of	specific	opinion.	Thus,	 it	 is	possible	that	my	measure	of	
state‐level	opinion	generated	using	MRP	contains	 substantial	error.	 Indeed,	 this	 could	be	
one	 reason	 for	 the	 lack	 of	 any	 significant	 linkage	 between	 specific	 public	 opinion	 and	
judicial	decision	making.	
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	 Another	potential	 limitation	of	 this	 study	 is	 its	generalizability	 to	 judicial	decision	
making	overall.	It	is	likely	that	if	expanded	to	include	non‐salient	and	less	ideological	issue	
areas,	the	result	may	vary	substantially,	especially	the	strong	influence	of	judicial	ideology	
on	 decision	making.	 However,	 as	 described	 throughout	 this	 dissertation,	 I	 am	 primarily	
interested	 in	 the	 decision	 making	 of	 judges	 in	 cases	 involving	 politically	 charged	 and	
ideological	 constitutional	 rights.	 The	 increasingly	 hyper‐partisan	 environment	 of	 the	 last	
few	decades	has	led	to	concern	among	judicial	scholars	that	judges	may	be	becoming	more	
“partisan”	 and	 ideological	 as	well.	 In	my	view,	 examining	decision	making	 in	 issue	 areas	
that	are	 likely	 to	trigger	 ideological	responses	and	partisan	allegiances	 is	 the	best	way	to	
measure	the	state	of	the	judiciary	and	its	neutrality	(or	lack	thereof).	In	order	to	make	my	
results	as	generalizable	as	possible,	I	include	three	issue	areas	that	share	some	similarities	
but	that	differ	 in	 important	ways	as	well.	Thus,	 I	believe	that	my	findings	would	apply	to	
other	 salient,	 ideologically	 charged	 issues,	 but	 not	 necessarily	 issues	 that	 do	 not	 fit	 this	
characterization.	As	I	describe	below,	I	intend	to	further	address	both	of	these	limitations	
by	 conducting	 additional	 analyses,	 specifically	 the	 inclusion	 of	 additional	 variables	 and	
issue	areas.			
My	 future	 avenues	 of	 study	 are	 also	 designed	 to	 answer	 questions	 raised	 by	my	
findings.	Among	the	more	 intriguing	results	here	are	those	regarding	the	time‐bound	gay	
rights	 models.	 Between	 1991	 and	 2005,	 the	 effects	 of	 individual	 ideology	 and	 other	
extralegal	 factors,	 including	 religion,	 circuit	 ideology,	 and	 state	 culture,	 were	 all	
significantly	 related	 to	 judicial	 decision	 making.	 However,	 from	 2006	 on,	 most	 of	 those	
factors,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 individual	 ideology,	 were	 no	 longer	 significant,	 and	 legal	
factors	 took	 their	 place	 as	 significant	 predictors	 of	 case	 outcomes.	 I	 speculate	 that	 this	
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change	is	a	consequence	of	the	changing	legal	and	political	environments	surrounding	gay	
rights	issues.		
As	mentioned	previously,	 the	mid‐2000s	were	a	 turning	point	 for	media	 coverage	
and	politicians’	attention	to	these	issues	after	the	Massachusetts	gay	marriage	decision.	As	
evidenced	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 the	 number	 of	 gay	 rights	 cases	 filed	 in	 federal	 courts	 began	 to	
increase	exponentially	during	 this	 time	 frame	as	well.	Thus,	not	only	was	an	 increasingly	
polarized	 political	 realm	 starting	 to	 pay	 closer	 attention	 to	 these	 issues,	 but	 groups	 and	
individuals	in	support	of	and	opposition	to	these	issues,	particularly	gay	marriage,	appear	
to	 have	 increased	 mobilization	 efforts,	 including	 filing	 many	 more	 cases	 in	 an	 effort	 to	
change	the	legal	environment.	Perhaps	district	court	 judges	were	not	only	more	aware	of	
these	 issues	 in	 the	2000s	 than	 in	 the	1990s,	 but	were	 cognizant	 of	 both	public	 and	 elite	
attitudes	on	these	issues.	It	is	also	possible	that	newly‐appointed	judges	were	less	inclined	
to	 follow	 their	 own	 ideology,	 religious	 beliefs,	 and	 predominant	 state	 culture	 in	 favor	 of	
established	 precedent	 (even	 from	 other	 districts)	 and	 legal	 principles.	 Still	 another	
possibility	is	that	judges	do	indeed	behave	as	proponents	of	the	legal	model	predict	–	when	
the	law	or	issue	is	new	and	unsettled,	judges	may	decide	based	on	their	own	sincerely‐held	
beliefs	and	experiences;	but	as	more	courts	tackle	the	issue	and	clarify	the	law	in	regard	to	
it,	judges	put	aside	their	own	policy	preferences	and	follow	the	lead	of	other	judges	in	cases	
with	similar	case	facts	and	issues	presented.	However,	since	individual	ideology	was	still	a	
highly	significant	factor	in	the	later	model,	it	does	not	seem	that	judges	put	aside	their	own	
preferences	entirely.	Although	I	can	only	speculate	here,	these	are	questions	that	should	be	
considered	and	investigated	further.	
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In	my	view,	there	exist	several	avenues	of	research	that	could	further	explain	these	
differences	 over	 time.	 The	 literatures	 on	 party	 polarization	 and	 interest	 group	
mobilization,	 especially	 as	 it	 pertains	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 gay	 rights,	 could	 be	 very	 helpful	 in	
explaining	the	extent	to	which	this	occurred	and	the	extent	to	which	elites	reacted	to	it	in	
the	mid‐2000s.	Examining	the	official	party	platforms	for	both	Republicans	and	Democrats	
throughout	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s	 could	 show	 when	 the	 parties	 decided	 to	 make	 these	
issues	a	bigger	part	of	their	campaigns	and	rhetoric.	This	research	may	also	help	shed	light	
on	the	greater	roles	of	partisanship	and	polarization	on	judicial	policymaking	in	general.	
The	 data	 set	 I’ve	 created	 could	 also	 be	 expanded	 in	 several	ways	 to	 help	 answer	
these	questions.	Certainly	a	greater	number	of	cases	would	increase	accuracy	of	statistical	
results	and	may	help	to	explain	some	of	the	nuance	in	the	cases.	Since	gay	rights	cases	were	
relatively	 scarce	 in	 the	1990s	and	before,	expanding	 the	data	 set	 to	 include	earlier	years	
will	 only	 add	 a	 few	 cases.	 However,	 adding	 cases	 that	 were	 decided	 after	 2012	 would	
increase	the	N	substantially.	A	larger	set	of	cases	would	also	allow	for	additional	regression	
models	 to	be	run,	 including	variations	on	 the	 time‐bound	models	 I	 include	here.	Another	
variable	that	may	prove	useful	 is	 the	age	cohort	of	each	 judge	in	the	data	set,	specifically	
the	year	they	were	appointed	to	the	bench.	I	suspect	that	in	the	rapidly‐changing	arena	of	
gay	rights,	younger	judges	(most	likely	those	appointed	more	recently)	may	rule	differently	
than	 judges	 who	 have	 presided	 for	 two	 or	 three	 decades.	 My	 data	 set	 includes	 judges	
appointed	 by	 presidents	 as	 far	 back	 as	 Kennedy	 up	 to	 those	 appointed	 by	 Obama.	 One	
other	 possible	 modification	 to	 the	 data	 set	 is	 to	 expand	 it	 to	 include	 other	 issue	 areas,	
especially	 those	 involving	politically	charged	 issue	areas	 that	have	experienced	a	notable	
increase	 or	 possibly	 a	 decline	 in	 media	 and	 elite	 attention	 and/or	 interest	 group	
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mobilization	over	time.	The	results	in	additional	issue	areas	may	help	clarify	whether	party	
polarization	and	mobilization	can	result	in	changing	significance	of	predictor	variables	on	
decision	making,	or	whether	gay	rights	is	an	outlier	in	explaining	judicial	behavior.	
Among	the	other	findings	that	merit	closer	attention,	perhaps	the	most	intriguing	is	
the	 significant	 role	 of	 citizen	 ideology/elite	 ideology	 in	 affirmative	 action	 cases.	 As	 I	
mention	above,	the	measure	provided	by	Berry	et	al.	 is	subject	to	much	debate	itself,	and	
thus	makes	it	difficult	to	interpret	its	effect	on	judges.	If	the	policy	preferences	of	the	party	
elites	in	a	state	are	indeed	influencing	judicial	behavior	in	certain	types	of	cases,	it	would	
have	 great	 implications	 for	 our	 legal	 system.	 Further	 examination	 of	 this	 effect	 could	
include	 including	more	 case	 types	 and	 additional	 alternative	measures	 of	 elite	 ideology.	
Since	Berry	et	al.’s	measure	was	significant	in	the	affirmative	action	data	set	alone,	it	may	
be	useful	to	add	issue	areas	that	are	similar	in	that	they	are	politically	sensitive	and	tend	to	
fall	along	the	typical	Republican/Democrat	ideological	divide,	but	are	not	based	primarily	
on	 moral	 or	 religious	 values.	 Similarly,	 generating	 models	 with	 alternative	 measures	 of	
elite	 ideology	 can	 show	 whether	 Berry	 et	 al.’s	 measure	 is	 an	 anomaly,	 and	 thus	 truly	
represents	mass	public	ideology	or	something	else	entirely,	or	whether	elite	ideology	does	
in	fact	play	a	role	in	decision	making	in	these	types	of	cases.	Such	a	finding	could	add	to	the	
literature	on	elite	theory	as	it	pertains	to	judges	and	reveal	new	inquiries	and	theories.	
The	 next	 stages	 of	 my	 research	 agenda	 will	 tackle	 some	 of	 these	 questions	 as	 I	
expand	my	study	in	light	of	the	findings	presented	here.	First,	I	plan	to	enhance	my	data	set	
by	adding	the	variables	I	mentioned	above	as	well	as	several	others.	I	will	go	back	and	code	
for	the	age	cohorts	of	the	judges	based	on	year	of	appointment	to	determine	whether	time	
on	the	bench	is	associated	with	case	outcomes.	I	expect	this	variable	to	be	most	relevant	in	
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the	gay	rights	and	affirmative	action	cases,	as	the	decisions	in	those	cases	evidenced	a	clear	
shift	in	tone	and	language	over	time.	I	am	also	interested	to	see	whether	judges	appointed	
in	 the	current	hyperpartisan	era	behave	differently	 than	 judges	appointed	 in	earlier	 time	
periods.	 Additionally,	 I	 will	 code	 for	 the	 type	 of	 law	 school	 each	 judge	 in	 the	 data	 set	
graduated	from,	primarily	to	check	for	any	association	between	judges	attending	elite	law	
schools	 and	 ideology,	or	 law	 school	 type	and	 case	outcome.	 I	 am	especially	 interested	 in	
how	law	school	type	may	or	may	not	impact	case	outcomes	in	affirmative	action	cases.	
Although	 my	 data	 set	 covered	 a	 relatively	 large	 period	 of	 time	 and	 included	 all	
district	court	cases	decided	during	that	time,	the	resulting	N	was	somewhat	low	compared	
to	 the	 number	 of	 predictor	 variables	 included.	 This	 was	 especially	 true	 in	 the	 limited	
number	 of	 affirmative	 action	 cases	 overall,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 small	 number	 of	 anti‐choice	
outcomes	 in	abortion	cases.	 It	 is	possible	 that	 these	models	 cannot	quite	 capture	 the	 full	
effect	 of	 the	 predictor	 variables	 due	 to	 low	 statistical	 power.	 Increasing	 the	 number	 of	
cases	would	certainly	address	this	problem.	Additionally,	we	have	witnessed	quite	a	bit	of	
change	over	the	last	few	years	in	gay	rights	(especially	gay	marriage)	and	abortion	policy.	
Since	my	data	set	only	goes	through	2012	(due	to	availability	of	public	opinion	data),	it	fails	
to	 capture	 the	 most	 recent	 developments	 and	 intense	 polarization	 and	 mobilization	
surrounding	 these	 issues.	 Affirmative	 action	has	 gone	 through	 a	 bit	 of	 a	 resurgence	 as	 a	
controversial	 political	 issue	 of	 late	 as	 well.	 Thus,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 relevant	 ways	 I	 can	
expand	my	data	set	and	further	my	research	in	these	areas	is	to	add	cases	up	to	the	present.	
This	will	not	only	add	to	the	total	number	of	cases	in	the	data	set	and	improve	statistical	
analyses,	but	may	provide	further	insight	into	how	shifts	over	time	in	attitudes,	media	and	
elite	attention,	and	polarization	in	each	of	these	issue	areas	has	affected	decision	making.	In	
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combination	with	an	examination	of	judicial	age	cohort	as	an	explanatory	variable,	it	may	
be	 possible	 to	 discern	 some	 impact	 of	 elite	 polarization	 and	 ideology	 on	 judges	 in	 these	
intense	issue	areas.		
Another	way	to	expand	the	data	set	and	the	study	would	be	to	add	cases	involving	
additional	issue	areas.	As	I	mention	above,	in	order	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	what	
role	elite	ideology	may	play	in	district	court	decision	making,	finding	other	issues	that	are	
similar	 to	affirmative	action	may	help.	 It	 is	possible	 that	elite	 ideology	 trumps	 individual	
ideology	 as	 a	 consideration	 for	 judges	 when	 ruling	 on	 issues	 that	 are	 political	 but	 not	
necessarily	 very	 moral	 in	 nature.	 Further,	 although	 state‐level	 mass	 public	 opinion	 had	
little	substantive	impact	in	the	three	issue	areas	analyzed	here,	it	is	possible	it	could	have	
an	effect	in	other,	less	ideological	issue	areas,	where	judges	may	not	feel	quite	as	strongly	
about	the	issues	personally.	In	those	cases,	district	judges	may	be	more	likely	to	take	either	
mass	 public	 opinion	 or	 elite	 opinion,	 or	 both,	 into	 account.	 Additionally,	 as	 mentioned	
above,	 analyzing	 other	 issue	 areas	 will	 make	 the	 results	 and	 conclusions	 more	
generalizable	and	provide	even	greater	insight	into	decision	making	overall.		
	In	 addition	 to	 expanding	 my	 data	 set	 to	 help	 answer	 some	 of	 these	 unresolved	
questions,	 there	are	 several	other	avenues	of	 research	 I	wish	 to	embark	on.	 Some	of	 the	
most	interesting	findings	to	me	were	the	distinctions	that	emerged	between	different	case	
types	within	each	issue	area.	Certain	case	types	were	significantly	more	likely	to	be	decided	
in	either	a	conservative	or	liberal	way.	For	example,	gay	rights	cases	involving	government	
or	private	protections	as	well	as	those	involving	discrimination	or	harassment	in	situations	
other	 than	employment,	of	prisoners,	or	 in	 the	military,	were	significantly	more	 likely	 to	
result	in	a	pro‐gay	rights/liberal	outcome	than	employment	cases.	In	the	more	recent	time‐
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bound	model	(2006‐2012),	where	almost	all	of	the	gay	marriage	cases	in	the	data	set	were	
decided,	the	likelihood	of	a	ruling	in	favor	of	gay	marriage	was	significantly	higher	than	a	
ruling	in	favor	of	the	plaintiff	in	employment	cases.	In	the	affirmative	action	data	set,	both	
minority	 contracting	 policies	 and	 education	 policies	were	 significantly	more	 likely	 to	 be	
struck	 down	 than	 employment	 policies.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 certain	 types	 of	 cases	 had	
stronger	or	clearer	precedent	for	district	judges	to	follow,	and	were	thus	decided	similarly.	
It	is	also	possible	that	certain	types	of	cases	are	treated	differently	by	judges.	In	my	reading	
of	the	case	decisions	themselves,	I	witnessed	vast	differences	in	tone	and	language	used	by	
judges	 in	different	 types	of	cases.	 I	want	 to	examine	 these	case	 type	distinctions	more	 in	
depth	by	conducting	separate	statistical	analyses	of	each	case	 type	 in	order	to	determine	
the	 significance	 of	 predictor	 variables	 on	 judges	 deciding	 each	 type	 of	 case.	Many	of	 the	
case	types	within	issue	areas	do	not	contain	an	adequate	number	of	cases	on	which	to	run	
regression	analysis,	but	increasing	the	overall	number	of	cases	in	the	data	set	by	bringing	it	
current	will	improve	my	ability	to	examine	individual	case	types.	
Lastly,	 as	 I	make	 several	 references	 to	 throughout	 this	 dissertation,	 I	will	 provide	
richer	context	 to	my	analysis	by	conducting	 in‐depth	case	study	analysis	of	 the	decisions	
and	 the	 judges	 themselves.	 I	 will	 closely	 examine	 the	 case	 opinions	 and	 evaluate	 the	
language	and	tone	used	by	judges	when	making	these	decisions.	I	will	also	investigate	the	
judges	themselves	and	their	differences	in	background	and	political	environments,	as	well	
as	 changes	 in	 these	environments	over	 time.	The	purpose	of	 these	analyses	 is	 to	explore	
two	distinct	phenomena.	The	first	is	how	two	judges	deciding	almost	identical	cases	in	the	
same	 time	 frame	 can	 reach	 vastly	 different	 conclusions	 and	 rulings.	 Secondly,	 when	
creating	the	data	set	I	noticed	that	several	judges	spending	decades	on	the	bench	appear	to	
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have	 shifted	 their	 attitudes	 toward	 these	 issues	 over	 time.	 Further	 examination	 of	 these	
judges	 and	 the	 language	 and	 details	 of	 the	 cases	 can	 provide	 insight	 on	 why	 these	
phenomena	may	 occur.	 Thus,	 case	 studies	 can	 provide	 richer	 detail	 and	 answers	 to	my	
research	 questions	 and	 can	 examine	 factors	 that	 cannot	 be	 adequately	 captured	 by	
statistical	analysis	alone.		
The	 analyses	 conducted	 and	 presented	 here	 add	 to	 the	 judicial	 decision	 making	
literature	 in	 numerous	 ways	 and	 help	 to	 increase	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 variety	 of	
factors	that	appear	to	influence	judges.	Through	the	future	avenues	of	study	detailed	in	this	
chapter,	I	hope	to	continue	my	research	into	judicial	behavior	and	to	provide	judicial	and	
legal	scholars	with	increased	insight	into	why	judges	make	the	decisions	they	make	as	well	
as	the	implications	for	our	legal	system	and	consequences	on	state	policy	and	on	the	rights	
of	marginalized	groups	in	the	states.	
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APPENDIX	A	
STATE‐LEVEL	PUBLIC	OPINION	
	
	 Below	(beginning	on	the	next	page)	are	tables	containing	the	state‐level	public	
opinion	generated	using	MRP	for	all	50	states	and	Washington	D.C.	The	tables	are	too	large	
to	include	all	years	for	all	states	in	one	table,	so	I	split	them	into	two	tables	per	issue	area;	
the	first	table	for	each	issue	includes	all	states	from	1991	to	2001,	the	second	for	2002‐
2012.	The	numbers	represent	the	estimated	proportion	of	state	residents	that	support	the	
issue	presented	(gay	rights,	abortion	rights,	or	affirmative	action).	
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Table	A‐1	
State‐level	Public	Support	for	Gay	Rights	in	all	States	and	Washington	D.C.	from	1991‐2001	
	
State	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000	 2001	
AL	 7.2	 11.1	 14.9	 19.1	 25.9 32.6 35.9 39.2 37.5 35.7	 40.6	
AK	 23.5	 27.0	 30.5	 38.0	 43.9 49.7 49.2 48.7 44.8 40.8	 48.7	
AZ	 26.4	 27.2	 28.1	 36.3	 46.3 56.3 48.8 41.4 42.1 42.8	 52.9	
AR	 8.3	 12.1	 15.8	 26.9	 31.9 36.9 34.4 31.9 36.0 40.1	 41.7	
CA	 25.4	 29.2	 33.0	 51.2	 51.0 50.7 51.9 53.1 53.7 54.2	 58.5	
CO	 22.5	 27.1	 31.7	 46.9	 49.4 51.9 52.3 52.7 52.8 52.8	 58.6	
CT	 22.1	 26.2	 30.4	 57.7	 52.2 46.8 46.9 47.0 48.4 49.8	 54.0	
DE	 10.1	 16.6	 23.2	 26.6	 31.2 35.8 30.0 24.1 29.5 34.8	 38.8	
DC	 22.6	 26.1	 29.6	 49.3	 50.2 51.1 52.2 53.4 53.3 53.2	 51.4	
FL	 9.3	 16.0	 22.6	 29.9	 34.0 38.1 38.1 38.1 43.7 49.3	 51.5	
GA	 8.8	 13.2	 17.6	 35.6	 36.3 37.0 36.2 35.5 35.5 35.5	 37.2	
HA	 22.0	 25.2	 28.5	 37.8	 44.9 52.0 53.5 55.0 51.7 48.5	 53.3	
ID	 20.8	 24.3	 27.9	 39.9	 44.5 49.1 50.6 52.0 49.8 47.6	 52.6	
IL	 17.2	 20.2	 23.2	 38.4	 41.8 45.2 44.6 44.0 47.1 50.1	 57.2	
IN	 14.9	 17.0	 19.1	 24.5	 28.1 31.6 33.6 35.6 35.1 34.5	 38.2	
IA	 12.9	 16.3	 19.6	 40.6	 42.8 45.0 50.9 56.8 55.0 53.2	 51.6	
KS	 11.2	 14.0	 16.7	 36.6	 41.3 46.0 39.7 33.4 36.5 39.6	 46.0	
KY	 10.6	 14.5	 18.4	 19.5	 22.8 26.2 23.7 21.3 26.8 32.3	 34.2	
LA	 7.6	 13.9	 20.2	 32.6	 35.3 38.0 34.9 31.7 33.0 34.2	 34.7	
ME	 20.8	 25.2	 29.5	 43.1	 43.8 44.5 47.1 49.8 52.7 55.5	 56.9	
MD	 14.3	 19.6	 24.8	 40.7	 41.2 41.7 50.0 58.3 55.0 51.6	 56.4	
MA	 23.1	 31.4	 39.7	 55.3	 54.1 52.9 55.3 57.7 60.0 62.3	 63.8	
MI	 8.3	 15.9	 23.4	 40.5	 39.9 39.3 40.3 41.2 45.4 49.7	 46.7	
MN	 13.6	 18.0	 22.3	 43.6	 41.7 39.9 47.1 54.3 56.7 59.1	 59.2	
MS	 10.1	 11.8	 13.5	 25.7	 28.2 30.7 26.6 22.5 24.0 25.5	 27.0	
MO	 12.7	 14.7	 16.7	 27.4	 31.6 35.8 33.6 31.5 33.2 35.0	 42.0	
MT	 21.0	 24.3	 27.6	 33.2	 37.7 42.2 41.5 40.8 40.8 40.8	 43.7	
NE	 13.6	 16.9	 20.2	 31.3	 34.0 36.8 40.1 43.5 47.2 51.0	 53.7	
NV	 21.1	 24.5	 27.8	 39.3	 44.8 50.3 50.8 51.3 49.3 47.3	 50.8	
NH	 26.2	 28.9	 31.5	 48.4	 50.7 53.0 55.2 57.5 60.9 64.3	 63.9	
NJ	 22.2	 27.9	 33.6	 46.4	 49.9 53.4 54.2 55.0 55.3 55.6	 60.6	
NM	 21.1	 24.5	 27.9	 39.0	 45.5 52.0 57.2 62.4 56.4 50.5	 53.4	
NY	 21.7	 27.0	 32.4	 43.2	 43.2 43.2 46.8 50.3 51.4 52.4	 56.0	
NC	 10.1	 13.3	 16.5	 22.2	 25.0 27.9 23.0 18.1 22.2 26.3	 31.5	
ND	 13.4	 14.7	 16.1	 28.7	 30.9 33.2 36.6 40.1 42.1 44.2	 46.9	
OH	 9.5	 15.2	 20.8	 30.2	 33.6 37.0 40.1 43.2 45.0 46.7	 52.6	
OK	 7.6	 13.3	 19.0	 23.1	 28.0 32.9 31.7 30.4 31.5 32.5	 35.0	
OR	 25.8	 25.2	 24.6	 49.5	 53.0 56.5 58.5 60.4 54.6 48.7	 54.1	
PA	 21.7	 23.5	 25.3	 27.5	 30.3 33.1 37.5 41.9 44.5 47.0	 50.5	
RI	 20.1	 25.1	 30.1	 43.9	 44.6 45.3 48.0 50.6 51.2 51.8	 57.3	
SC	 11.2	 14.3	 17.5	 24.4	 25.9 27.5 28.4 29.3 31.0 32.7	 35.4	
SD	 13.2	 16.3	 19.5	 28.9	 34.4 39.8 38.4 36.9 42.9 48.8	 47.6	
TN	 7.6	 11.3	 15.1	 20.1	 24.7 29.2 28.9 28.6 29.7 30.8	 31.2	
TX	 8.0	 12.4	 16.7	 27.2	 31.5 35.7 36.2 36.6 38.1 39.6	 44.1	
UT	 17.6	 23.9	 30.3	 42.7	 47.9 53.0 64.4 75.7 65.2 54.7	 56.7	
VT	 21.8	 26.4	 31.0	 43.9	 42.7 41.4 49.9 58.5 56.0 53.4	 58.9	
VI	 20.2	 20.7	 21.2	 39.6	 41.5 43.4 44.7 46.1 47.3 48.4	 50.0	
WA	 22.0	 26.9	 31.8	 38.7	 44.1 49.6 50.4 51.3 51.8 52.3	 53.0	
WV	 10.2	 13.1	 16.1	 30.7	 31.9 33.1 32.2 31.2 36.4 41.6	 40.3	
WI	 25.3	 23.1	 20.8	 27.9	 36.0 44.2 49.0 53.7 55.9 58.0	 58.1	
WY	 20.9	 24.6	 28.3	 36.5	 42.2 48.0 50.0 52.1 51.6 51.0	 56.4	
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Table	A‐2	
State‐level	Public	Support	for	Gay	Rights	in	all	States	and	Washington	D.C.	from	2002‐2012	
	
State	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011	 2012	
AL	 45.4	 42.4	 39.3	 42.9	 46.6 50.2 53.8 54.8 55.8 56.8	 57.9	
AK	 56.5	 53.9	 51.3	 53.8	 56.4 59.0 61.6 64.3 67.0 69.7	 72.4	
AZ	 63.0	 55.4	 47.9	 52.8	 57.6 62.5 67.4 68.0 68.6 69.3	 69.9	
AR	 43.2	 39.6	 35.9	 36.0	 36.0 36.1 36.2 41.0 45.8 50.6	 55.4	
CA	 62.8	 59.5	 56.2	 59.3	 62.5 65.6 68.7 70.1 71.4 72.8	 74.1	
CO	 64.5	 61.3	 58.2	 62.6	 67.0 71.4 75.7 74.8 73.9 73.0	 72.0	
CT	 58.2	 56.2	 54.3	 57.1	 60.0 62.9 65.8 68.8 71.9 74.9	 78.0	
DE	 42.7	 42.5	 42.3	 46.6	 50.9 55.2 59.5 59.3 59.1 58.9	 58.7	
DC	 49.5	 53.7	 57.8	 60.6	 63.4 66.2 69.1 71.9 74.7 77.5	 80.3	
FL	 53.8	 55.2	 56.6	 57.6	 58.7 59.8 60.8 62.7 64.7 66.6	 68.5	
GA	 38.9	 33.5	 28.0	 33.7	 39.3 44.9 50.6 52.6 54.7 56.7	 58.8	
HA	 58.1	 50.4	 42.7	 46.1	 49.5 52.9 56.3 60.5 64.6 68.8	 72.9	
ID	 57.5	 51.4	 45.2	 45.1	 45.0 44.8 44.7 50.2 55.7 61.2	 66.6	
IL	 64.3	 57.9	 51.6	 54.1	 56.7 59.2 61.8 63.2 64.6 66.0	 67.5	
IN	 41.9	 43.6	 45.3	 47.5	 49.7 51.9 54.1 56.8 59.6 62.4	 65.2	
IA	 50.0	 45.9	 41.8	 44.8	 47.8 50.7 53.7 57.5 61.3 65.1	 68.9	
KS	 52.4	 49.3	 46.3	 51.7	 57.1 62.5 67.9 68.2 68.6 68.9	 69.3	
KY	 36.2	 36.5	 36.9	 39.1	 41.3 43.5 45.7 49.8 54.0 58.1	 62.2	
LA	 35.2	 37.7	 40.2	 43.1	 46.1 49.1 52.1 55.1 58.1 61.2	 64.2	
ME	 58.3	 55.6	 52.9	 53.4	 53.8 54.2 54.6 59.1 63.7 68.2	 72.7	
MD	 61.2	 56.1	 51.0	 53.6	 56.2 58.7 61.3 62.6 63.9 65.2	 66.5	
MA	 65.2	 63.9	 62.6	 62.2	 61.9 61.5 61.2 65.7 70.2 74.7	 79.2	
MI	 43.7	 44.2	 44.7	 50.8	 56.8 62.9 69.0 69.7 70.5 71.2	 71.9	
MN	 59.3	 62.1	 64.9	 63.9	 62.9 61.9 60.9 63.2 65.4 67.7	 70.0	
MS	 28.6	 34.9	 41.2	 44.6	 48.0 51.4 54.8 55.1 55.3 55.6	 55.9	
MO	 49.1	 46.8	 44.4	 45.0	 45.5 46.0 46.6 50.3 54.0 57.8	 61.5	
MT	 46.6	 49.5	 52.4	 54.2	 56.0 57.8 59.6 62.6 65.5 68.5	 71.5	
NE	 56.4	 52.8	 49.3	 51.6	 54.0 56.4 58.8 60.0 61.2 62.4	 63.6	
NV	 54.4	 51.9	 49.4	 51.7	 54.0 56.3 58.6 62.1 65.5 68.9	 72.4	
NH	 63.6	 60.9	 58.3	 58.8	 59.3 59.8 60.3 64.1 67.8 71.6	 75.3	
NJ	 65.6	 59.1	 52.6	 56.0	 59.5 62.9 66.4 69.3 72.2 75.1	 78.0	
NM	 56.4	 50.8	 45.2	 50.1	 55.0 59.9 64.8 65.4 66.0 66.6	 67.3	
NY	 59.6	 59.4	 59.1	 60.5	 61.9 63.3 64.6 67.4 70.2 72.9	 75.7	
NC	 36.7	 39.2	 41.6	 42.6	 43.7 44.8 45.9 50.2 54.5 58.9	 63.2	
ND	 49.7	 49.6	 49.6	 52.1	 54.6 57.1 59.7 61.4 63.1 64.8	 66.5	
OH	 58.6	 49.0	 39.4	 42.3	 45.1 48.0 50.8 54.9 59.0 63.1	 67.2	
OK	 37.5	 38.3	 39.2	 44.1	 49.0 53.9 58.8 57.3 55.8 54.2	 52.7	
OR	 59.4	 58.4	 57.5	 58.2	 58.9 59.6 60.3 62.1 64.0 65.8	 67.7	
PA	 54.0	 48.5	 43.0	 44.8	 46.6 48.3 50.1 54.8 59.6 64.4	 69.1	
RI	 62.8	 57.9	 53.0	 55.0	 56.9 58.9 60.9 65.3 69.6 73.9	 78.2	
SC	 38.1	 38.8	 39.4	 41.9	 44.4 46.9 49.4 52.4 55.5 58.6	 61.7	
SD	 46.4	 47.1	 47.8	 50.3	 52.8 55.2 57.7 58.5 59.3 60.1	 60.9	
TN	 31.6	 37.6	 43.6	 42.7	 41.8 40.9 40.0 44.6 49.2 53.7	 58.3	
TX	 48.6	 45.1	 41.5	 46.9	 52.2 57.6 62.9 63.0 63.0 63.0	 63.1	
UT	 58.7	 58.8	 58.8	 59.8	 60.7 61.7 62.7 62.8 63.0 63.2	 63.3	
VT	 64.3	 59.6	 54.9	 56.2	 57.5 58.8 60.1 63.9 67.7 71.5	 75.3	
VI	 51.5	 49.9	 48.2	 49.7	 51.1 52.6 54.1 56.8 59.5 62.2	 64.9	
WA	 53.7	 54.7	 55.6	 57.0	 58.5 59.9 61.4 63.2 65.0 66.9	 68.7	
WV	 39.0	 32.8	 26.6	 30.3	 34.0 37.7 41.5 43.4 45.2 47.1	 49.0	
WI	 58.1	 54.5	 50.9	 52.5	 54.1 55.7 57.4 59.0 60.7 62.4	 64.0	
WY	 61.9	 55.3	 48.7	 48.8	 48.9 49.0 49.1 54.1 59.1 64.1	 69.1	
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Table	A‐3	
State‐level	Public	Support	for	Abortion	Rights	in	all	States	and	Washington	D.C.	from	1991‐2001	
	
State	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000	 2001	
AL	 32.4	 38.4	 33.9	 23.8	 28.3 32.9 31.1 29.2 28.4 27.5	 31.3	
AK	 51.0	 52.9	 55.5	 54.1	 50.7 47.2 47.9 48.7 49.4 50.0	 50.9	
AZ	 49.1	 52.8	 54.8	 43.5	 45.4 47.3 47.3 47.3 43.6 40.0	 45.4	
AR	 34.5	 38.0	 41.2	 34.9	 33.9 32.8 33.6 34.3 32.9 31.6	 33.2	
CA	 57.9	 53.6	 53.3	 58.7	 56.4 54.0 55.8 57.5 55.8 54.2	 52.4	
CO	 56.3	 54.2	 54.3	 62.2	 55.9 49.6 48.8 48.0 48.4 48.8	 50.4	
CT	 39.1	 57.7	 62.3	 51.4	 48.6 45.7 43.7 41.7 46.8 51.8	 53.9	
DE	 34.9	 40.0	 45.3	 38.1	 39.1 40.1 39.9 39.7 38.0 36.3	 36.3	
DC	 40.3	 58.2	 54.9	 53.5	 51.1 48.8 48.2 47.5 48.7 49.9	 53.2	
FL	 38.9	 39.9	 43.8	 41.4	 40.3 39.1 41.6 44.0 41.6 39.2	 37.6	
GA	 34.4	 36.9	 42.1	 38.9	 39.7 40.6 37.6 34.6 35.2 35.9	 35.8	
HA	 49.7	 48.6	 54.4	 45.1	 45.2 45.2 47.2 49.2 46.8 44.5	 47.8	
ID	 50.0	 52.8	 53.7	 49.6	 48.8 48.1 48.4 48.7 46.2 43.7	 47.4	
IL	 49.9	 42.7	 49.9	 45.6	 46.0 46.3 46.1 45.8 43.6 41.4	 41.1	
IN	 39.3	 38.8	 45.4	 28.6	 29.2 29.8 29.9 30.0 29.7 29.4	 34.7	
IA	 41.8	 41.5	 44.5	 35.2	 36.2 37.2 37.1 36.9 35.8 34.7	 37.7	
KS	 41.2	 41.7	 41.4	 39.6	 41.3 42.9 40.1 37.2 36.0 34.7	 37.9	
KY	 32.1	 38.9	 40.8	 40.8	 35.7 30.6 28.9 27.3 27.7 28.0	 31.4	
LA	 31.7	 39.1	 42.2	 27.1	 30.9 34.8 32.2 29.6 27.4 25.3	 30.0	
ME	 38.6	 55.2	 55.7	 51.5	 49.8 48.2 46.8 45.3 47.1 48.8	 52.0	
MD	 45.0	 43.4	 45.8	 41.5	 42.5 43.4 44.4 45.4 45.4 45.4	 41.3	
MA	 35.5	 57.7	 58.3	 61.8	 56.9 51.9 50.7 49.4 51.2 52.9	 54.6	
MI	 33.8	 41.8	 44.3	 38.9	 36.7 34.4 36.1 37.9 38.0 38.1	 39.4	
MN	 41.3	 43.0	 44.6	 40.2	 38.5 36.8 35.1 33.4 35.3 37.1	 39.3	
MS	 30.3	 39.0	 33.6	 30.9	 34.5 38.1 34.4 30.8 30.6 30.3	 32.5	
MO	 36.9	 43.0	 38.0	 38.6	 37.3 36.0 34.5 32.9 33.3 33.8	 37.0	
MT	 50.6	 52.9	 53.7	 45.9	 45.1 44.4 46.5 48.6 44.3 40.0	 45.7	
NE	 41.1	 43.1	 45.2	 34.2	 34.5 34.8 35.8 36.8 37.0 37.1	 39.1	
NV	 49.9	 52.2	 53.4	 48.6	 48.6 48.6 48.3 48.0 45.8 43.7	 46.9	
NH	 43.4	 55.2	 57.5	 56.2	 53.6 51.1 50.2 49.3 48.0 46.8	 51.4	
NJ	 41.1	 57.6	 56.5	 50.8	 49.9 49.0 51.6 54.2 50.5 46.8	 51.1	
NM	 49.5	 51.2	 53.0	 47.6	 46.3 44.9 45.0 45.1 44.5 44.0	 47.3	
NY	 38.3	 56.4	 60.4	 56.4	 56.3 56.2 50.8 45.4 47.5 49.7	 52.4	
NC	 30.2	 38.0	 38.6	 33.2	 34.6 36.1 35.6 35.2 32.9 30.6	 33.1	
ND	 39.1	 41.6	 39.8	 29.9	 33.3 36.7 34.8 32.9 33.7 34.6	 37.7	
OH	 36.1	 43.2	 48.6	 38.7	 39.3 39.9 39.5 39.2 34.6 30.1	 35.2	
OK	 35.5	 39.1	 42.3	 42.3	 36.6 30.9 32.8 34.7 33.8 32.8	 34.2	
OR	 54.6	 55.1	 58.5	 46.7	 48.6 50.4 52.7 54.9 50.9 46.8	 49.1	
PA	 35.5	 53.1	 52.3	 39.8	 40.8 41.8 40.5 39.2 40.2 41.3	 48.0	
RI	 38.1	 55.3	 55.6	 50.6	 49.2 47.7 46.5 45.3 45.2 45.1	 50.0	
SC	 32.3	 39.6	 41.3	 46.6	 42.4 38.2 38.5 38.7 36.3 33.9	 34.6	
SD	 40.2	 41.3	 44.2	 34.9	 39.5 44.1 39.3 34.5 35.6 36.7	 38.6	
TN	 27.4	 36.6	 39.2	 31.0	 32.8 34.5 35.7 36.9 34.2 31.6	 33.4	
TX	 34.6	 40.5	 37.1	 40.9	 39.4 37.9 33.9 29.9 32.6 35.3	 35.3	
UT	 43.8	 54.8	 55.8	 51.2	 48.6 46.1 49.3 52.4 47.5 42.6	 47.2	
VT	 39.4	 56.3	 56.8	 50.6	 51.0 51.4 49.6 47.7 50.1 52.4	 54.2	
VI	 42.3	 43.6	 41.1	 45.4	 43.5 41.6 39.3 37.0 38.5 40.0	 38.4	
WA	 52.4	 53.2	 55.3	 54.5	 55.4 56.4 52.5 48.6 48.5 48.4	 50.1	
WV	 29.6	 39.5	 36.1	 34.5	 33.6 32.8 33.3 33.9 32.3 30.7	 32.7	
WI	 47.7	 42.3	 46.7	 33.2	 35.6 38.0 36.7 35.5 32.1 28.8	 34.7	
WY	 51.8	 52.8	 54.4	 39.1	 42.6 46.1 47.5 49 46.1 43.2	 47.4	
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Table	A‐4	
State‐level	Public	Support	for	Abortion	Rights	in	all	States	and	Washington	D.C.	from	2002‐2012	
 
State	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011	 2012	
AL	 35.1	 30.1	 25.2	 29.3	 33.3 32.5 31.6 37.4 43.2 38.3	 33.3	
AK	 51.8	 50.2	 48.6	 49.6	 50.6 48.4 46.3 46.3 46.3 46.7	 47.1	
AZ	 50.8	 52.9	 55.0	 52.2	 49.4 47.5 45.7 40.3 35.0 37.7	 40.4	
AR	 34.8	 27.7	 20.6	 26.3	 32.0 31.3 30.6 36.6 42.5 35.1	 27.8	
CA	 50.6	 48.1	 45.7	 48.5	 51.4 51.3 51.3 54.1 56.8 53.7	 50.6	
CO	 52.1	 53.4	 54.7	 53.8	 52.9 48.4 44.0 49.0 54.0 51.2	 48.4	
CT	 56.0	 46.3	 36.7	 41.8	 46.9 49.4 51.9 50.7 49.6 52.9	 56.2	
DE	 36.3	 34.3	 32.4	 33.5	 34.6 35.6 36.7 38.7 40.8 42.7	 44.7	
DC	 56.5	 54.4	 52.4	 50.9	 49.4 52.6 55.8 52.4 49.0 56.5	 64.1	
FL	 35.9	 39.6	 43.3	 39.3	 35.3 34.8 34.3 41.4 48.6 48.4	 48.2	
GA	 35.6	 35.3	 35.0	 34.4	 33.7 35.1 36.4 37.0 37.6 39.3	 41.0	
HA	 51.1	 49.4	 47.7	 48.7	 49.7 48.5 47.4 49.7 51.9 46.2	 40.5	
ID	 51.1	 50.6	 50.1	 49.2	 48.3 45.1 41.9 39.6 37.3 41.7	 46.1	
IL	 40.7	 38.8	 36.9	 40.8	 44.6 45.2 45.7 48.4 51.2 50.5	 49.9	
IN	 40.0	 30.6	 21.1	 29.9	 38.6 39.1 39.6 40.2 40.9 38.5	 36.2	
IA	 40.7	 36.2	 31.8	 35.9	 40.0 42.7 45.5 44.0 42.4 44.9	 47.4	
KS	 41.1	 37.6	 34.0	 38.0	 41.9 42.6 43.4 45.6 47.8 45.9	 44.0	
KY	 34.9	 30.9	 27.0	 29.9	 32.8 32.6 32.4 35.8 39.2 40.5	 41.9	
LA	 34.8	 26.2	 17.7	 24.8	 31.9 31.5 31.0 32.9 34.8 38.0	 41.3	
ME	 55.3	 54.5	 53.7	 50.3	 46.9 50.3 53.7 53.2 52.7 51.7	 50.8	
MD	 37.1	 42.4	 47.7	 42.2	 36.7 38.2 39.8 40.2 40.7 44.4	 48.2	
MA	 56.3	 54.6	 52.9	 50.3	 47.8 47.2 46.5 49.8 53.1 59.1	 65.1	
MI	 40.7	 34.5	 28.2	 34.4	 40.6 42.7 44.8 41.6 38.4 44.0	 49.6	
MN	 41.5	 34.5	 27.6	 35.7	 43.7 46.1 48.6 49.0 49.4 45.8	 42.1	
MS	 34.7	 32.4	 30.0	 31.3	 32.7 31.6 30.5 35.6 40.7 36.6	 32.6	
MO	 40.3	 32.5	 24.7	 32.1	 39.5 41.3 43.0 40.6 38.2 37.4	 36.7	
MT	 51.4	 49.8	 48.3	 49.3	 50.2 47.9 45.6 45.6 45.5 46.6	 47.8	
NE	 41.0	 35.4	 29.9	 35.9	 42.0 43.0 43.9 43.4 42.9 40.2	 37.5	
NV	 50.2	 48.2	 46.2	 47.1	 48.1 44.9 41.6 43.1 44.5 47.9	 51.3	
NH	 56.1	 51.9	 47.6	 47.7	 47.7 49.8 51.9 48.9 45.8 49.5	 53.2	
NJ	 55.4	 52.8	 50.2	 48.1	 46.0 51.0 56.1 50.0 43.9 49.8	 55.8	
NM	 50.5	 44.6	 38.6	 43.1	 47.7 43.3 38.9 38.7 38.4 37.9	 37.4	
NY	 55.2	 51.7	 48.1	 47.2	 46.2 51.4 56.7 50.7 44.6 49.9	 55.1	
NC	 35.6	 35.0	 34.5	 33.9	 33.3 33.1 32.9 40.5 48.1 43.0	 37.9	
ND	 40.9	 35.1	 29.4	 35.7	 41.9 40.0 38.0 40.5 43.0 42.3	 41.6	
OH	 40.2	 34.0	 27.8	 34.2	 40.6 41.9 43.3 38.0 32.6 38.1	 43.5	
OK	 35.6	 34.9	 34.1	 33.2	 32.3 35.5 38.7 35.5 32.3 33.5	 34.8	
OR	 51.4	 53.1	 54.8	 52.3	 49.8 48.9 48.0 55.2 62.5 54.8	 47.1	
PA	 54.7	 51.6	 48.5	 47.5	 46.5 46.3 46.2 43.9 41.6 41.0	 40.5	
RI	 54.9	 50.5	 46.2	 46.0	 45.8 48.2 50.7 47.8 44.9 52.2	 59.6	
SC	 35.3	 34.6	 33.8	 33.7	 33.5 34.1 34.6 40.4 46.1 43.2	 40.2	
SD	 40.5	 35.0	 29.5	 35.5	 41.5 42.5 43.5 43.1 42.7 41.4	 40.1	
TN	 35.2	 33.4	 31.7	 32.0	 32.2 31.2 30.3 31.0 31.8 34.6	 37.5	
TX	 35.4	 32.8	 30.2	 32.1	 34.1 34.8 35.4 34.9 34.4 34.3	 34.2	
UT	 51.8	 48.5	 45.2	 47.7	 50.3 48.2 46.1 46.1 46.1 39.8	 33.5	
VT	 56.0	 52.2	 48.3	 48.0	 47.6 49.8 51.9 48.8 45.7 50.8	 55.9	
VI	 36.7	 38.7	 40.7	 38.4	 36.1 39.3 42.6 44.4 46.3 45.2	 44.1	
WA	 51.8	 50.1	 48.5	 49.1	 49.7 49.5 49.2 48.0 46.7 48.3	 49.9	
WV	 34.6	 27.2	 19.8	 26.6	 33.5 32.8 32.1 36.4 40.6 34.5	 28.5	
WI	 40.6	 34.6	 28.7	 36.2	 43.7 43.9 44.0 38.9 33.8 35.8	 37.8	
WY	 51.5	 48.4	 45.3	 47	 48.8 46.9 45.1 45.1 45.1 45.1	 45.2	
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Table	A‐5	
State‐level	Public	Support	for	Affirmative	Action	in	all	States	and	Washington	D.C.	from	1991‐2001	
	
State	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000	 2001	
AL	 24.4	 24.4	 22.5	 20.6	 20.1 19.7 18.5 17.3 19.3 21.2	 18.5	
AK	 17.5	 17.5	 16.0	 14.5	 14.5 14.4 16.1 17.9 16.1 14.3	 15.7	
AZ	 15.1	 15.1	 14.5	 13.9	 14.7 15.4 17.0 18.5 17.0 15.6	 15.9	
AR	 18.9	 18.9	 17.7	 16.6	 17.6 18.6 16.8 15.1 16.5 17.9	 15.4	
CA	 21.6	 21.6	 19.3	 17.0	 17.2 17.5 19.8 22.2 19.3 16.4	 18.1	
CO	 15.7	 15.7	 14.5	 13.2	 14.0 14.9 15.2 15.5 15.0 14.6	 15.0	
CT	 16.6	 16.6	 15.9	 15.1	 15.1 15.1 14.6 14.1 15.4 16.6	 15.7	
DE	 20.5	 20.5	 18.9	 17.3	 17.7 18.0 17.5 17.0 18.4 19.8	 17.0	
DC	 42.4	 42.4	 41.2	 40.0	 39.1 38.2 37.1 36.0 35.5 35.0	 32.9	
FL	 16.9	 16.9	 16.2	 15.4	 17.1 18.7 16.2 13.7 15.6 17.5	 15.2	
GA	 23.1	 23.1	 22.6	 22.1	 21.1 20.0 20.6 21.3 21.5 21.8	 19.4	
HA	 20.7	 20.7	 18.8	 16.8	 18.2 19.7 21.4 23.1 20.3 17.6	 20.8	
ID	 14.1	 14.1	 12.8	 11.5	 11.7 11.9 13.1 14.3 13.3 12.4	 12.9	
IL	 20.3	 20.3	 18.0	 15.7	 16.3 16.9 17.5 18.2 18.1 18.0	 17.6	
IN	 18.2	 18.2	 15.6	 13.0	 12.7 12.4 13.0 13.6 14.7 15.7	 14.9	
IA	 14.1	 14.1	 12.1	 10.0	 11.3 12.7 11.4 10.1 11.3 12.6	 12.2	
KS	 15.1	 15.1	 13.4	 11.8	 13.3 14.8 13.6 12.5 13.1 13.7	 13.7	
KY	 17.3	 17.3	 15.5	 13.7	 13.7 13.8 13.1 12.3 13.9 15.4	 13.0	
LA	 26.0	 26.0	 24.7	 23.3	 24.0 24.7 22.9 21.0 22.8 24.6	 21.1	
ME	 13.7	 13.7	 12.6	 11.5	 11.5 11.5 11.3 11.1 11.5 12.0	 11.4	
MD	 22.4	 22.4	 21.5	 20.6	 21.8 22.9 21.7 20.4 22.7 25.0	 21.1	
MA	 16.8	 16.8	 15.4	 13.9	 14.6 15.2 15.0 14.8 14.7 14.6	 14.2	
MI	 18.6	 18.6	 16.6	 14.7	 14.8 15.0 14.7 14.4 15.2 16.1	 16.0	
MN	 13.8	 13.8	 12.2	 10.6	 11.5 12.4 11.7 11.0 12.5 14.1	 13.4	
MS	 29.9	 29.9	 27.9	 25.9	 26.8 27.6 24.6 21.5 23.7 25.9	 22.2	
MO	 18.0	 18.0	 15.9	 13.9	 15.8 17.6 15.2 12.7 13.7 14.7	 14.8	
MT	 13.9	 13.9	 12.6	 11.2	 11.2 11.3 13.0 14.8 13.4 12.0	 12.7	
NE	 14.6	 14.6	 12.7	 10.7	 11.3 11.9 11.7 11.5 12.4 13.3	 13.0	
NV	 17.5	 17.5	 16.2	 15.0	 15.1 15.1 16.6 18.1 16.8 15.5	 16.4	
NH	 13.3	 13.3	 12.5	 11.6	 11.7 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.9 12.1	 11.7	
NJ	 18.2	 18.2	 17.9	 17.5	 17.0 16.4 16.3 16.3 16.8 17.3	 17.1	
NM	 17.6	 17.6	 16.1	 14.6	 14.7 14.9 17.9 20.9 18.2 15.4	 16.3	
NY	 22.5	 22.5	 20.4	 18.4	 19.5 20.7 19.2 17.8 19.1 20.3	 19.2	
NC	 23.5	 23.5	 21.4	 19.3	 20.3 21.2 18.5 15.9 17.0 18.1	 16.5	
ND	 13.9	 13.9	 11.9	 10.0	 10.9 11.8 10.8 9.8 11.5 13.1	 12.4	
OH	 16.7	 16.7	 15.3	 14.0	 14.5 15.1 14.5 13.9 14.9 15.9	 15.4	
OK	 17.1	 17.1	 15.4	 13.6	 13.7 13.8 13.2 12.7 14.0 15.2	 13.5	
OR	 15.5	 15.5	 13.8	 12.1	 13.0 14.0 14.1 14.2 13.1 12.1	 13.2	
PA	 15.9	 15.9	 15.2	 14.6	 14.3 14.1 14.8 15.6 15.2 14.8	 14.5	
RI	 16.1	 16.1	 15.0	 13.9	 14.0 14.2 13.9 13.6 14.0 14.3	 13.8	
SC	 26.5	 26.5	 24.6	 22.7	 23.3 23.9 22.2 20.6 21.3 22.1	 19.4	
SD	 14.2	 14.2	 12.2	 10.3	 12.3 14.3 12.6 11.0 12.0 13.0	 12.6	
TN	 19.2	 19.2	 18.0	 16.8	 18.3 19.8 17.7 15.7 17.3 18.9	 15.9	
TX	 21.8	 21.8	 19.1	 16.5	 17.3 18.0 17.4 16.9 17.5 18.1	 15.7	
UT	 14.0	 14.0	 12.8	 11.6	 12.1 12.6 13.4 14.2 13.7 13.1	 13.5	
VT	 13.9	 13.9	 12.8	 11.7	 12.7 13.7 12.6 11.4 12.3 13.2	 12.1	
VI	 24.9	 24.9	 21.7	 18.5	 20.9 23.3 20.2 17.2 18.2 19.3	 17.0	
WA	 16.4	 16.4	 14.6	 12.8	 12.9 13.0 14.7 16.5 15.3 14.2	 14.8	
WV	 15.7	 15.7	 13.9	 12.1	 12.6 13.2 12.1 11.0 12.4 13.8	 11.6	
WI	 15.0	 15.0	 13.1	 11.3	 12.0 12.7 12.7 12.7 13.6 14.5	 13.8	
WY	 13.5	 13.5	 12.3	 11.1	 11.0 10.9 12.5 14.0 13.2 12.5	 12.9	
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Table	A‐6	
State‐level	Public	Support	for	Affirmative	Action	in	all	States	and	Washington	D.C.	from	2002‐2012	
	
State	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011	 2012	
AL	 15.7	 16.5	 17.2	 18.6	 19.9 21.9 23.9 22.7 21.5 23.2	 24.9	
AK	 17.1	 17.3	 17.5	 16.6	 15.7 16.0 16.3 17.2 18.2 17.7	 17.3	
AZ	 16.2	 16.7	 17.3	 17.2	 17.0 17.5 18.0 17.4 16.9 16.5	 16.2	
AR	 12.9	 19.2	 25.4	 19.7	 13.9 16.4 18.8 18.4 17.9 19.0	 20.1	
CA	 19.7	 20.1	 20.6	 18.3	 15.9 18.2 20.5 20.3 20.2 19.7	 19.2	
CO	 15.4	 16.1	 16.9	 16.2	 15.6 16.2 16.8 16.3 15.8 15.6	 15.4	
CT	 14.7	 16.2	 17.6	 17.5	 17.4 17.8 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.3	 18.4	
DE	 14.1	 17.3	 20.5	 18.6	 16.7 18.3 19.9 20.3 20.7 21.7	 22.8	
DC	 30.9	 33.8	 36.7	 35.2	 33.8 30.8 27.8 29.0 30.3 33.2	 36.1	
FL	 12.8	 14.4	 16.0	 14.5	 13.0 14.5 15.9 17.1 18.3 19.2	 20.2	
GA	 17.0	 20.7	 24.3	 22.1	 20.0 21.8 23.7 22.4 21.1 24.2	 27.3	
HA	 24.0	 24.2	 24.5	 22.3	 20.1 20.1 20.2 22.8 25.5 23.1	 20.8	
ID	 13.3	 13.6	 13.9	 13.9	 14.0 13.5 13.0 13.8 14.6 14.0	 13.3	
IL	 17.2	 17.4	 17.5	 17.2	 17.0 19.4 21.8 20.7 19.7 20.0	 20.3	
IN	 14.1	 16.1	 18.1	 17.3	 16.6 16.6 16.7 16.9 17.2 17.1	 17.1	
IA	 11.9	 11.3	 10.7	 12.4	 14.1 13.7 13.2 15.2 17.2 15.5	 13.7	
KS	 13.7	 15.2	 16.8	 15.5	 14.1 14.0 13.8 15.1 16.5 16.1	 15.7	
KY	 10.6	 13.1	 15.5	 14.1	 12.6 15.0 17.4 16.9 16.4 16.6	 16.8	
LA	 17.5	 22.1	 26.7	 22.9	 19.0 23.3 27.5 27.7 27.8 27.7	 27.6	
ME	 10.9	 12.2	 13.4	 13.2	 12.9 14.0 15.1 13.9 12.8 12.9	 12.9	
MD	 17.1	 19.5	 22.0	 23.4	 24.9 26.2 27.6 25.1 22.6 24.8	 27.0	
MA	 13.7	 15.5	 17.3	 16.7	 16.2 16.4 16.7 17.0 17.3 17.2	 17.1	
MI	 16.0	 16.0	 16.1	 16.6	 17.2 18.9 20.5 20.3 20.0 19.6	 19.1	
MN	 12.7	 13.0	 13.3	 14.8	 16.3 16.7 17.1 16.6 16.1 15.6	 15.1	
MS	 18.5	 22.4	 26.3	 23.7	 21.2 26.5 31.9 28.7 25.5 27.5	 29.5	
MO	 14.9	 15.3	 15.6	 16.5	 17.3 16.2 15.0 15.5 16.1 17.1	 18.0	
MT	 13.3	 13.3	 13.4	 13.2	 13.1 13.3 13.5 13.9 14.3 13.8	 13.3	
NE	 12.7	 13.4	 14.1	 14.1	 14.1 14.4 14.7 14.9 15.1 14.9	 14.7	
NV	 17.3	 17.6	 18.0	 17.1	 16.2 16.7 17.2 18.1 18.9 18.8	 18.6	
NH	 11.2	 13.1	 15.0	 14.0	 12.9 13.2 13.5 13.8 14.0 13.8	 13.5	
NJ	 16.9	 19.0	 21.0	 19.4	 17.9 17.0 16.1 18.3 20.5 20.6	 20.7	
NM	 17.3	 18.1	 19.0	 18.5	 18.0 19.0 20.0 19.3 18.5 17.5	 16.4	
NY	 18.0	 21.2	 24.4	 20.4	 16.4 19.8 23.2 20.9 18.7 20.3	 21.9	
NC	 14.9	 18.0	 21.1	 18.6	 16.1 18.3 20.6 22.9 25.3 24.2	 23.0	
ND	 11.7	 12.3	 12.9	 13.0	 13.0 12.0 11.1 12.7 14.3 14.0	 13.6	
OH	 14.9	 15.5	 16.1	 15.7	 15.3 15.5 15.6 16.5 17.4 17.8	 18.2	
OK	 11.8	 14.0	 16.2	 14.4	 12.5 15.8 19.2 18.0 16.9 17.3	 17.6	
OR	 14.4	 15.4	 16.4	 15.1	 13.8 13.4 13.0 13.9 14.9 14.6	 14.3	
PA	 14.3	 15.8	 17.4	 16.3	 15.2 15.8 16.4 18.8 21.2 19.6	 18.0	
RI	 13.4	 15.0	 16.5	 15.8	 15.0 18.7 22.3 19.8 17.3 17.0	 16.8	
SC	 16.7	 20.1	 23.5	 20.8	 18.1 19.7 21.3 21.3 21.3 23.4	 25.5	
SD	 12.2	 12.9	 13.7	 13.6	 13.4 13.8 14.2 14.6 15.1 14.6	 14.2	
TN	 13.0	 17.4	 21.7	 19.2	 16.6 16.2 15.8 16.5 17.1 18.8	 20.5	
TX	 13.4	 17.4	 21.4	 18.2	 15.0 17.5 20.1 21.3 22.6 21.2	 19.8	
UT	 13.8	 14.0	 14.1	 13.8	 13.4 13.8 14.1 14.6 15.0 14.4	 13.8	
VT	 11.0	 12.1	 13.1	 12.9	 12.7 13.0 13.3 13.5 13.7 13.5	 13.3	
VI	 14.6	 18.0	 21.3	 18.8	 16.3 18.4 20.5 20.8 21.0 21.8	 22.5	
WA	 15.4	 15.9	 16.4	 16.1	 15.9 14.8 13.8 15.0 16.3 16.0	 15.7	
WV	 9.3	 10.8	 12.4	 11.7	 11.1 13.3 15.5 15.2 14.8 14.7	 14.6	
WI	 13.1	 13.8	 14.5	 15.4	 16.3 16.8 17.4 16.7 15.9 15.7	 15.4	
WY	 13.3	 13.0	 12.7	 12.0	 11.3 11.9 12.6 13.3 14.0 13.6	 13.3	
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APPENDIX	B	
ALTERNATE	STRATEGIC	VARIABLE	INTERACTION	MODELS	
	
	 Below	(beginning	on	the	next	page)	are	tables	for	each	of	the	alternate	models	that	
replace	Circuit	Ideology	with	the	interaction	between	Judge’s	Ideology	and	Circuit	
Difference	as	the	measure	of	the	strategic	environment	faced	by	a	district	judge.	As	
mentioned	in	Chapter	5,	the	interaction	variable	was	not	significant	in	any	of	the	models;	
thus	the	original	models	(using	Circuit	Ideology)	were	used	as	the	final	models	for	this	
study.	However,	I	include	the	alternate,	interactive	models	here	for	information	purposes.		
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Table	B‐1	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Gay	Rights	Cases	on	all	Independent	Variables,	using	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	Interaction	Measure	instead	of	Circuit	Ideology,	including	all	
Cases	from	1991‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
1.434	(.473)**	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
2.348	(.905)**	
Judge’s	Gender	 ‐.984	(.417)*	 ‐1.043	(.413)*	
Judge’s	Race	 .168	(.468)	 .107	(.477)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 ‐.215	(.401)	 ‐.151	(.402)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 .253	(.416)	 .302	(.422)	
					Other	Christian	 ‐.050	(.489)	 .076	(.486)	
					Jewish	 ‐.404	(.622)	 ‐.325	(.604)	
Circuit	Difference	1	(Parties	match	or	not)	
Circuit	Difference	2	(CS	Score	distance)	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	
.169	(.491)	
‐‐‐	
‐.059	(.665)	
‐‐‐	
.455	(.610)	
‐.836	(1.768)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Cases)	
					Gay	Marriage	
					Prisoner	Discrimination	
					Other	Discrimination/Harassment	
					Privacy/Defamation	
					Domestic	Benefits	
					Gov’t	or	Private	Protections	
					Military/Don’t	Ask	Don’t	Tell	
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Gay	Rights	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States	
Constant	
	
‐1.016	(.651)	
‐.092	(.516)	
‐.872	(.371)*	
‐1984	(.954)	
‐.640	(.915)	
‐1.660	(.486)**	
.862	(.655)	
.020	(.013)	
	
.496	(.335)	
.924	(.426)*	
‐2.180	(1.047)	
	
‐1.123	(.674)	
‐.145	(.525)	
‐.878	(.372)*	
‐.956	(.943)	
‐.703	(.901)	
‐1.798	(.495)**	
.953	(.659)	
.016	(.013)	
	
.607	(.346)	
.705	(.430)	
‐1.287	(.928)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
280
67.24	
280	
68.56	
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Table	B‐2	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Gay	Rights	Cases	on	all	Independent	Variables,	using	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	Interaction	Measure	instead	of	Circuit	Ideology,	including	only	
Cases	from	1991‐2005,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
2.925	(.992)**	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
4.446	(1.768)*	
Judge’s	Gender	 ‐1.230	(.912)	 ‐1.042	(.874)		
Judge’s	Race	 .661	(.907)	 .507	(.918)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 .544	(.741)	 .541	(.712)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 1.411	(.719)*	 1.375	(.710)	
					Other	Christian	 .901	(.797)	 .969	(.799)	
					Jewish	 .325	(1.035)	 ‐.155	(1.007)	
Circuit	Difference	1	(Parties	match	or	not)	
Circuit	Difference	2	(CS	Score	distance)	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	
.586	(1.076)	
‐‐‐	
‐2.104	(1.281)	
‐‐‐	
.055	(1.278)	
‐3.852	(3.635)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Cases)	
					Prisoner	Discrimination	
					Other	Discrimination/Harassment	
					Domestic	Benefits	
					Gov’t	or	Private	Protections	
					Military/Don’t	Ask	Don’t	Tell	
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Gay	Rights	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States	
Constant	
	
1.223	(1.554)	
‐.401	(.736)	
1.717	(1.408)	
‐.651	(.760)	
.783	(.955)	
.045	(.029)	
	
.621	(.666)	
2.642	(1.011)**	
‐5.468	(2.285)	
	
1.338	(1.511)	
‐.214	(.704)	
1.353	(1.377)	
‐.543	(.749)	
1.277	(.908)	
.028	(.028)	
	
1.023	(.692)	
1.967	(.927)*	
‐3.243	(1.812)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
115
49.25	
115	
45.86	
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Table	B‐3	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Gay	Rights	Cases	on	all	Independent	Variables,	using	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	Interaction	Measure	instead	of	Circuit	Ideology,	including	only	
Cases	from	2006‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
1.019	(.654)	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
2.142	(1.264)	
Judge’s	Gender	 ‐.903	(.591)	 ‐976	(.575)		
Judge’s	Race	 ‐.022	(.632)	 ‐.175	(.646)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 ‐.653	(.572)	 ‐.722	(.562)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 ‐.337	(.671)	 ‐.275	(.657)	
					Other	Christian	 ‐.240	(.688)	 ‐.192	(.689)	
					Jewish	 ‐.328	(.992)	 ‐.269	(.955)	
Circuit	Difference	1	(Parties	match	or	not)	
Circuit	Difference	2	(CS	Score	distance)	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	
‐.130	(.659)	
‐‐‐	
.944	(.942)	
‐‐‐	
.488	(.841)	
‐.745	(2.413)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Cases)	
					Gay	Marriage	
					Prisoner	Discrimination	
					Other	Discrimination/Harassment	
					Privacy/Defamation	
					Gov’t	or	Private	Protections	
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Gay	Rights	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States	
Constant	
	
‐2.559	(.846)**	
‐.904	(.632)	
‐1.606	(.525)**	
‐1.540	(1.025)	
‐2.636	(.768)**	
.042	(.032)	
	
.511	(.467)	
.741	(.605)	
‐2.812	(2.273)	
	
‐2.481	(.845)**	
‐.882	(.625)	
‐1.486	(.508)**	
‐1.552	(1.004)	
‐2.697	(.769)**	
.052	(.030)	
	
.550	(.466)	
.482	(.617)	
‐2.934	(2.071)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
158
49.66	
158	
46.46	
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Table	B‐4	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Abortion	Cases	on	all	Independent	Variables,	using	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	Interaction	Measure	instead	of	Circuit	Ideology,	including	all	
Cases	from	1991‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
.878	(.620)	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
1.810	(1.134)	
Judge’s	Gender	 ‐.199	(.589)	 ‐.228	(.588)		
Judge’s	Race	 ‐1.427	(.834)	 ‐1.286	(.838)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 .488	(.504)	 .498	(.509)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 ‐.447	(.529)	 ‐.410	(.528)	
					Other	Christian	 .975	(.622)	 .806	(.630)	
					Jewish	 ‐.288	(.905)	 ‐.250	(.915)	
Circuit	Difference	1	(Parties	match	or	not)	
Circuit	Difference	2	(CS	Score	distance)	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	
‐.242	(.649)	
‐‐‐	
.334	(.873)	
‐‐‐	
.418	(.894)	
‐.670	(2.366)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Undue	Burden	Cases)	
					Gov’t	or	Private	Restrictions	
					Individual	Rights	
					Access	to	Clinics	
					Gov’t	or	Private	Protections		
State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Abortion	Rights	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States		
Constant	
	
‐.412	(.574)	
.274	(1.019)	
.187	(.507)	
.637	(.591)	
‐.003	(.027)	
	
.183	(.506)	
.931	(.582)	
‐1.835	(1.422)	
	
‐.463	(.574)	
.254	(1.032)	
.172	(.509)	
.511	(.606)	
.007	(.026)	
	
.347	(.514)	
.901	(.583)	
‐2.080	(1.355)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
182
24.36	
182	
25.42	
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Table	B‐5	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Affirmative	Action	Cases	on	all	Independent	Variables,	
using	Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	Interaction	Measure	instead	of	Circuit	Ideology,	including	
all	Cases	from	1991‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
.561	(1.294)	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
‐1.467	(1.868)	
Judge’s	Gender	 .389	(.936)	 ‐.354	(.998)		
Judge’s	Race	 ‐1.283	(.997)	 ‐.636	(1.065)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 1.421	(.885)	 1.466	(.893)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 .638	(.684)	 1.056	(.715)	
					Other	Christian	 ‐.743	(.970)	 ‐.656	(.935)	
					Jewish	 .271	(.969)	 .575	(.970)	
Circuit	Difference	1	(Parties	match	or	not)	
Circuit	Difference	2	(CS	Score	distance)	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	
‐.104	(1.310)	
‐‐‐	
3.146	(2.139)	
‐‐‐	
.657	(1.443)	
7.803	(4.130)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Policies)	
					Education	Policies	
					Contracting	Policies	
State‐Level	Support	for	Affirmative	Action	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States	
Constant	
	
1.962	(1.222)	
2.010	(.758)**	
.026	(.100)	
	
.588	(.793)	
1.423	(.908)	
‐2.672	(2.168)	
	
1.854	(1.149)	
2.042	(.771)**	
.041	(.100)	
	
.191	(.764)	
1.138	(.883)	
‐2.440	(1.824)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
87
31.11	
87	
33.17	
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Table	B‐6	
Logistic	Regression	Analysis	of	Decisions	in	Affirmative	Action	Cases	on	all	Independent	Variables,	
using	Berry	et	al.’s	Citizen	Ideology	Measure	instead	of	State‐Level	Public	Support	for	Affirmative	
Action,	and	using	Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	Interaction	Measure	instead	of	Circuit	
Ideology,	including	all	Cases	from	1991‐2012,	for	both	Judicial	Ideology	Models	
	
*	=	p≤0.05	 **	=	p≤0.01	
	
Independent	Variables	
Party	of	Appointing	
President	Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)	
Common	Space	Score	
Model	
Coefficients	(std.	errors)
Judge’s	Ideology	
					Party	of	Appointing	President	
					Common	Space	Score	
	
.319	(1.323)	
‐‐‐	
	
‐‐‐	
‐3.445	(2.332)	
Judge’s	Gender	 .768	(1.009)	 ‐.066	(1.033)		
Judge’s	Race	 ‐.911	(.996)	 ‐.215	(1.118)	
Judge’s	Religion	(Reference	–	no	affiliation)	 	 	
					Catholic	 1.657	(.918)	 1.843	(.960)	
					Mainline	Protestant	 .765	(.734)	 1.406	(.806)	
					Other	Christian	 ‐1.486	(1.142)	 ‐1.607	(1.099)	
					Jewish	 ‐.004	(1.038)	 .406	(1.019)	
Circuit	Difference	1	(Parties	match	or	not)	
Circuit	Difference	2	(CS	Score	distance)	
Judge’s	Ideology*Circuit	Difference	
‐.592	(1.371)	
‐‐‐	
4.562	(2.478)	
‐‐‐	
.676	(1.500)	
8.020	(5.494)	
Case	Type	(Reference	–	Employment	Policies)	
					Education	Policies	
					Contracting	Policies	
Citizen	Ideology	
State	Political	Culture	(Reference	–	Moralistic)	
					Individualistic	States	
					Traditionalistic	States	
Constant	
	
3.657	(1.579)*	
1.805	(.748)*	
‐.111	(.047)*	
	
1.243	(.837)	
.124	(1.023)	
3.789	(2.869)	
	
3.661	(1.515)*	
1.866	(.759)*	
‐.128	(.050)**	
	
.815	(.812)	
‐.290	(1.025)	
5.020	(2.758)	
n	
X2	of	Model	
87
37.51	
87	
40.93	
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Recent	decisions	regarding	LGBT	rights,	reproductive	rights,	and	racial	and	gender	
equality	by	U.S.	District	Courts	have	illuminated	how	these	lower	federal	courts	are	
increasingly	becoming	important	policymakers	in	our	political	system.	However,	research	
to	date	has	only	scratched	the	surface	on	district	court	decision	making	in	cases	involving	
significant	constitutional	issues	such	as	these.	The	substantial	variation	among	judges	(and	
among	states/regions)	in	the	decisions	made	and	resulting	policies	indicates	the	existence	
of	powerful,	competing	influences	on	district	judges.	I	conduct	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	
many	potential	influences	on	district	court	judges,	including	individual	ideology,	personal	
characteristics,	legal	factors,	and	strategy;	I	also	examine	the	influence	of	public	opinion	on	
judges,	a	variable	that	has	been	heretofore	ignored	at	the	district	court	level,	most	likely	
due	to	the	difficulty	of	obtaining	state‐level	public	opinion	data.	I	do	so	using	a	unique	
dataset	I’ve	created,	which	includes	every	district	court	case	over	a	22‐year	period	(1991‐
2012)	involving	LGBT	rights,	abortion,	and	affirmative	action.	My	results	run	counter	to	
several	recent	studies	discounting	the	role	of	ideology	on	district	court	judges	by	strongly	
confirming	the	importance	of	such	ideology,	at	least	when	salient	constitutional	rights	are	
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involved.	Additionally,	public	opinion	does	appear	to	play	a	role	in	certain	cases,	a	finding	
that	suggests	we	should	change	the	way	we	look	at	the	role	of	district	courts	in	our	current	
political	system,	as	well	as	opens	up	a	whole	new	avenue	of	study	for	judicial	scholars.	
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